On Election Day, February 18, 2008, FAFEN conducted the world’s largest Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) along with a robust, nationwide election observation methodology, following international principles and best practices.
Almost 16,000 FAFEN Polling Station Observers (PSOs) witnessed and recorded the counting of ballots in a statistically-valid sample of 7,778 randomly-selected polling stations in 260 National Assembly constituencies. An additional 3,000 Mobile Observers (MOs) helped transport the “Statement of the Count” and PSO checklists from polling stations to CCs. Each CC compiled the polling station data on standardized forms and faxed these PVT election results to the FAFEN Secretariat in Islamabad.
The purpose of a PVT is to compare the observed vote count in a sample of polling stations with the compiled election result for that constituency in order to provide evidence that confirms or disputes the official election result. A PVT does not take account of other aspects of the election process, such as pre-poll violations of the Code of Conduct. However, FAFEN has combined its PVT data with evidence provided by polling station observers of problems they witnessed first-hand on Election Day, such as party agents or polling officials stamping ballots. These observations often substantiate the anomalies that FAFEN has found in the quantitative PVT election results data.
This combination of quantitative PVT data and qualitative Election Day observations has enabled FAFEN to produce three unique “Election Result Analysis” reports between March 9 and May 7, 2008. These reports are compiled in this publication, along with samples of FAFEN’s PVT data and graphs for several constituencies. All of the reports and graphs are posted at www.fafen.org.
FAFEN Election Result Analysis-I provides a detailed description of FAFEN’s PVT methodology and the challenges FAFEN faced, and includes data for 33 constituencies. FAFEN Election Result Analysis-II presents data for 174 constituencies along with detailed recommendations for electoral reform. FAFEN Election Result Analysis – III compiles data and observations from the 20 National Assembly constituencies in Karachi and offers additional recommendations.
Pre-Election Observation Findings
FAFEN’s pre-election key findings can be grouped into four categories, as follows:
a) Election Administration
Copies of the Final Electoral Rolls (FER) and polling station lists (“polling schemes”) were not consistently distributed to district and constituency election officials and were not made available to election stakeholders until very late in the election calendar.
Many AECs, DROs, and ROs repeatedly received unclear instructions from the national ECP. They also received training from the ECP very late in the election process. Some of these officials were unwilling to meet with or respond to election observers and other stakeholders. Many DROs, in particular, were not aware of or were resistant to their election-related responsibilities, such as accrediting election observers.
ECP officials at the district and constituency levels were not consistently aware of election complaint procedures or mechanisms for tracking and enforcement of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates or election spending limits for candidates.
These officials often took no action to enforce the Code of Conduct. Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs), District Returning Officers (DROs), and ROs were transferred and replaced after the announcement of the election schedule in a number of constituencies.
b) Role of Local Governments
Despite the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance 2000 as well as the spirit of the ECP Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for General Elections 2008 (Article 1(17)) and Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act 1976), Nazims at all three tiers supported candidates or parties in many constituencies in advance of the elections.
Nazims and other district and local government officials supported parties and candidates by urging voters to vote for them, attending their rallies, and allowing use of official resources such as use of official cars and premises. FAFEN observers reported that political party candidates mobilized support through Union Nazims in more than 30% of the constituencies where candidate strategies were observed, except for PML-Q candidates, who did so in 72% of constituencies where their candidates were observed.
c) Political Parties and Candidates
Despite the ban on announcing new development schemes after the announcement of the election schedule, in more than 50% of constituencies, candidates were committing to undertake specific projects if they won the seat, and local government officials were
speeding the completion of development projects or initiating new projects. Some political parties and independent candidates were inducing voters through payments or promises of payments or other reward.
Other violations of the Code of Conduct included advertising on public and private buildings, intimidating local printing presses, using abusive language against rivals, inciting sectarian (or cultural/regional) sentiments, destruction of property, discouraging women from voting, and violating size limits for billboards and other signs and materials.
All major political parties’ candidates were found to be mobilizing voters through the influence of biradari leaders or through appeals to biradari affiliations in more than 68% of the constituencies where campaign strategies were observed. Some parties were mobilizing voters through appeals to ethnic affiliations or religious themes and affiliations.
The political parties that boycotted the polls were actively campaigning for the boycott and some were intimidating voters into boycotting. The boycotting parties also interfered with voter education programs.
d) Intimidation and Violence
Candidates were observed in many constituencies intimidating voters – primarily voters who are dependent for their livelihoods on landowners, employers, or others – in order to gain support.
Police were observed harassing candidates and/or workers of certain political parties by threatening to register cases against them. Police also asked supporters and candidates of certain political parties to stop campaigning. District police often refused to authorize rallies and public meetings of candidates of some parties on one pretext or another.
Police in many constituencies acted in favor of candidates affiliated to the former ruling party by providing protocol and extra-ordinary security to candidates and by attending rallies or putting up campaign materials of some candidates.
During the first ten days of February, FAFEN’s media monitoring project noted 46 separate incidents involving either violence or accusations about violence and fraud. The most deadly incidents reported in the media from February 1-10 occurred in Punjab, where 32 people were killed in election-related violence, followed by NWFP with 25 deaths.
Election Day Observation Findings
FAFEN’s Election Day key findings can be grouped into four categories, as follows:
a) Difference in Election Results – PVT Estimate vs. ECP Result
In 146 out of 174 National Assembly constituencies, the PVT estimate and ECP result are statistically equivalent. In 24 constituencies there is a statistically significant difference in the PVT estimate and ECP result for the margin of victory of the winner or for the runner-up, but with the same winning candidate. In four (4) constituencies there is both a statistically significant difference between the PVT estimate and the ECP result and a difference in the outcome (i.e., a different winning candidate). The statistical differences in these constituencies do not indicate with certainty that a different candidate won the election. However, the differences are significant enough to be outside the PVT’s margin of error. This summary does not include Karachi constituencies, where polling station problems were so significant that FAFEN is unable to confirm the election results in any constituency.
However, FAFEN PVT data in Karachi suggest that there is a statistically significant difference in the outcome in at least one constituency (and possibly two) and a statistically significant difference in the margin of victory in four constituencies.
b) Close Contests with Significant Problems at Polling Stations
In at least 60 constituencies out of 194 (31%), FAFEN’s election observation qualitative information and PVT data indicate that the contest was close and that polling station problems were widespread and/or serious enough that they could have had an effect on the outcome of the election.
An additional 69 constituencies (36% of 194) did not have close election outcomes, but reported major polling-station level problems. These problems included polling officials, polling agents, or others stamping ballot papers; voters being openly pressured inside polling stations to choose a particular party or candidate; polling stations ‘captured’ by armed men, polling agents, or others; physical violence against voters, polling officials, polling agents, or election observers; showing and use of firearms inside polling stations; and closure of women’s polling booths. In total, significant problems in polling stations were
documented in 129 out of 194 constituencies (66% or two-thirds).
c) Voter Turnout Greater than 100%
In 49 of 194 constituencies (25%), one or more polling stations in the sample had voter turnout rates equal to or exceeding 100% of the number of registered voters published by the ECP the week preceding the election. In other words, more ballots were counted in the ballot boxes in these polling stations than the number of voters registered to vote in the stations.
d) Low Voter Turnout in Female Polling Stations
The voter turnout in all sampled female polling stations was below average compared to the voter turnout for both male and combined polling stations sampled in the constituencies. Excluding all polling stations where turnout was 100% or more, the average national turnout was 49.8% in male polling stations, 50.3% in combined polling stations, and 39.7% in female polling stations. Turnout in women’s stations was even lower in FATA (12.4%) and NWFP (23.3%).
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