

Pakistan General Elections 2008

Election Day Process Analysis

A Report Based on Observation Data Collected by
More Than 18,000 FAFEN Observers on February 18, 2008



Free & Fair Election Network

Title: **Election Day Process Analysis**

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Free and Fair Election Network

Secretariat
23-B, Main Nazimuddin Road,
F-10/4, Islamabad, Pakistan
Email: secretariat@fafen.org
Website: www.fafen.org

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Acknowledgements

The Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) has had many successes since its inception in 2006. These successes include Pakistan's first statistically valid audit of the 2007 Draft Electoral Roll and the largest domestic election observation deployment for any Pakistan election (almost 20,000 observers on February 18, 2008 for General Elections).

These achievements would not have been possible without the invaluable services and partnership of FAFEN's member organizations and their dedicated personnel or without the support of The Asia Foundation, with generous financial contributions from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Royal Norwegian Embassy, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).

FAFEN Executive Council

FAFEN Member Organizations

Association for Creation of Employmnet (ACE)
AIMS Organization
All Women's Advancement and Resource Development (AWARD)
Baanhn Beli
Basic Education For Awareness Reforms and Empowerment (BEFARE)
Community Awareness Raising and Advocacy Ventures Around Needs (CARAVAN)
CAVISH Development Foundation
Citizens Commission for Human Development (CCHD)
Community Development Program (CDP)
Centre for Peace and Development (CPD)
Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI)
Intermedia
Indus Resource Center (IRC)
Integrated Regional Support Programme (IRSP)
Khwendo Kor
Mathini Women's Welfare Association (MWWA)
Paiman Alumni Trust
PATTAN Development Organization
Pakistan Press Foundation (PPF)
SANGAT Development Foundation
Sajjan Development Organization (SDO)
Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO)
SUNGI Development Foundation
Takhleeq
Taraqee Foundation
United Rural Development Organization (URDO)
Village Friends Organization (VFO)

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FAFEN Election Anniversary Publications

FAFEN offers two new publications on the one-year anniversary of the February 18, 2008, Pakistan General Elections. The first publication – Election Day Process Analysis – presents data and analysis not previously available, based on qualitative observation checklists from more than 18,000 FAFEN Election Day observers. FAFEN observers filled out a set of detailed checklists about the opening of the polls, the voting process, the closing of the polls, the ballot counting process, and the consolidation of election results. FAFEN's Election Day observation data is presented in full, along with additional summary findings and recommendations. The second publication – Election Results Analysis – consolidates all FAFEN Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) results for 242 National Assembly constituencies. These new publications are intended to contribute to the ongoing process of the Election Commission of Pakistan's Electoral Reforms Committee towards comprehensive reform of the Pakistan electoral system. FAFEN's recommendations are offered in a spirit of cooperation and shared goals.

About FAFEN

The Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) was established in 2006 as a coalition of 30 leading civil society organizations in Pakistan with the primary objective to mobilize voters and observe the general elections that took place in February 2008.

Since its inception, FAFEN has had many successes. The impact of its work on the process and conduct of elections has been acknowledged by political parties, the Election Commission of Pakistan, international observer groups, and domestic and international media. For example:

"In terms of reporting on and affecting changes in electoral administration and being coordinated, (FAFEN) domestic observation was more effective than international observation. ... It was probably the most effective and efficient activity supported by the donors ... (and) should be studied further as best practice." – Joint Donor Evaluation of Pakistan Electoral Assistance 2006-2008 (August 2008)

"FAFEN produced valuable election related information throughout the election period as well as a strong set of recommendations for election reform. Their parallel vote tabulation (PVT) effort was particularly impressive as they were able to have election monitors in 8,000 polling places throughout the day." -- Joint Donor Evaluation of Pakistan Electoral Assistance 2006-2008 (August 2008)

"The FAFEN observation reports show high quality of quantitative analysis based on both access to data from a statistically significant range of constituencies and a sound methodology." – European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) Final Report (April 2008)

What started out in 2006 as a loose network of civil society organizations was registered in 2008 as a legal entity under the name of Trust for Democratic Education and Accountability, which now manages FAFEN. For more information, please go to www.fafen.org

Summary of FAFEN Election Observation Methodology and Findings

PART I: VOTERS' LIST AUDIT & OBSERVATION OF DISPLAY PERIOD

A. Methodology

From June 13 to July 18, 2007, FAFEN conducted Pakistan's first statistically valid audit of the Draft Electoral Roll (2007). FAFEN conducted a List-to-People and People-to-List audit in electoral areas covered by 506 randomly selected Display Centers throughout the country - a methodology that has been tried and tested in many other countries. These Display Centers were selected in 500 randomly chosen Union Councils according to proportion of population of each province.

In addition, FAFEN observed the quality of processes implemented by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) Display Center Information Officers (DCIOs) in order to analyze their fairness, neutrality, and transparency, based on the ECP's Manual of Instruction. FAFEN's qualitative observation was conducted at about 21,000 (out of 45,000) Display Centers. Additionally, more than 3,000 DCIOs and 25,400 people visiting the Display Centers were interviewed to gauge their perceptions about the processes inside the centers.

FAFEN also studied the activities of political parties and civil society organizations during the Display Period to analyze their level of interest in the process at more than 5,500 locations of the four provinces. A total of 754 FAFEN static and mobile observers, duly trained for their multi-faceted tasks, were employed to carry out this research.

B. Key Findings

FAFEN's key findings with regard to the accuracy and completeness of the 2007 Draft Electoral Roll were as follows¹:

1. A Quarter of Households were Not Registered

Almost 27 percent of households in the electoral areas covered were found to be not registered in the draft electoral roll. The highest number of unregistered households was found in NWFP at 45.53 percent. This was followed by Balochistan, with 41.22 percent; Islamabad at 37.5 percent; Punjab with 23.36 percent, and Sindh at 16.73 percent. The data extrapolation leads to an alarmingly high number of unregistered households in the country – around 5.3 million, basing on the national figure of a total of 19,849,770 households given by the ECP.

2. More Women than Men were Unregistered

The number of women not registered on the draft electoral rolls was much higher than the number of unregistered men throughout the country. However, there remained a high number of people who have not been registered on the electoral rolls, irrespective of their sex. The highest number of unregistered women was found in NWFP, at almost 50%. This percentage was followed by Sindh, Punjab, and Islamabad. These women might not have been registered due to social obstacles to women's political participation and the fact that many women lack CNICs.

3. Registered Households had Unregistered Members

Unregistered people, both males and females, were scattered all over the country and were part of households that had some members registered on the electoral roll. The finding was established by both List-to-People and People-to-List audits. Out of a total of 7,094 households checked during the List-to-People audit, only 3,875 (54.62 percent) of households were found to have the exact number of males as were on the list, while 2,847 (40.13 percent) of households had the exact number of females as were on the list.

4. The 2007 Electoral Roll was Largely Free of Entry-Level Errors

The two audits took into account the issue of the accuracy of the 2007 draft electoral roll with regard to the entries of names, addresses, and CNIC numbers of voters. The audit established that this new roll was largely free of the entry-level errors. More than 97 percent of respondents whose details were cross-checked were found to be accurate. The List-to-People and the People-to-List audit generated similar data regarding the accuracy of the electoral roll.

1. Taken from "Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable," FAFEN, August 2007.

PART II: PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION

A. Methodology

FAFEN designed a long-term pre-election observation strategy involving one Observer District Coordinator (ODC) in each district, complemented by additional Constituency Coordinators (CCs) in districts with more than one National Assembly constituency. In total, FAFEN member CSOs hired 264 ODCs and CCs, covering all but eight constituencies in eight FATA Agencies. Each FAFEN ODC functioned as a CC for the National Assembly (NA) constituency in their district and had overall management responsibility for their district, including supervision of any additional CCs and all Election Day observers.

FAFEN provided four rounds of training for ODCs and CCs. Training sessions took place in nine locations across Pakistan. Observer District Coordinators were trained in September 2007 (in five clusters), November 2007 (in 11 clusters), in December 2007 (in 13 clusters) and in January 2008 (in 12 clusters), for a total of 41 training sessions in nine cities.

ODCs and CCs submitted comprehensive, standardized checklists each week to the FAFEN Secretariat/Data Center covering a wide range of election preparation and campaign issues. FAFEN's aim was to design these checklists so that they would capture quantifiable information – rather than only anecdotes – that could be tabulated weekly. Approximately 120 ODCs and 140 additional CCs sent weekly reports to FAFEN during a 15-week period to the FAFEN Secretariat based in Islamabad, which used this information to raise pertinent issues with various stakeholders with a view to improving the quality of electoral processes.

In early November, FAFEN began publishing 19 “FAFEN Election Updates” based on the reports by ODCs and CCs around the country. In addition to these data-driven Updates, FAFEN published “Missing and Duplicate Voters on Final Electoral Roll (FER),” February 13, 2008, providing conclusions of a FAFEN follow-up audit of the combined 2007 FER and the 2002 Supplemental Electoral Roll. This secondary audit was based on data from FAFEN's 2007 statistical “people-to-list” and “list-to-people” field audit of the Draft Electoral Roll as well as subsequent analysis for submission of an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on the same topic and continuous monitoring and advocacy about the development of the 2008 Final Electoral Roll.

B. Key Findings

FAFEN reached the following key conclusions based on its long-term observation of the electoral process from October 2007 to February 2008:


1. Election Administration

- 1.1 Copies of the Final Electoral Rolls (FER) and polling station lists (“polling schemes”) were not consistently distributed to district and constituency election officials and were not made available to election stakeholders until very late in the election calendar.
- 1.2 Many Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs), District Returning Officers (DROs), and ROs repeatedly received unclear instructions from the ECP. They also received training from the ECP very late in the election process. Some of these officials were unwilling to meet with or respond to election observers and other stakeholders. Many DROs, in particular, were not aware of or were resistant to their election-related responsibilities, such as accrediting election observers.
- 1.3 ECP officials at the district and constituency levels were not consistently aware of election complaint procedures or mechanisms for tracking and enforcement of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates or election spending limits for candidates. These officials often took no action to enforce the Code of Conduct.
- 1.4 AECs, DROs, and ROs were transferred and replaced after the announcement of the election schedule in number of constituencies.

2. Role of Local Government Officials

2.1 Despite the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance 2000 as well as the spirit of the ECP Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for General Elections 2008 (Article 1(17)) and Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act 1976), Nazims at all three tiers supported candidates or parties in many constituencies in advance of the elections.

2.2 Nazims and other district and local government officials supported parties and candidates by urging voters to vote for them, attending their rallies, and allowing use of official resources such as use of official cars and premises. FAFEN observers reported that political party candidates mobilized support through Union Nazims in more than 30% of the constituencies where candidate strategies were observed, except for PML-Q candidates, who did so in 72% of constituencies where their candidates were observed.




2.3 Police in many constituencies acted in favor of candidates affiliated to the former ruling party by providing protocol and extra-ordinary security to candidates and by attending rallies or putting up campaign materials of some candidates.

3. Political Parties and Candidates

3.1 Despite the ban on announcing new development schemes after the announcement of the election schedule, in more than 50% of constituencies, candidates were committing to undertake specific projects if they won the seat, and local government officials were speeding the completion of development projects or initiating new projects. Some political parties and independent candidates were inducing voters through payments or promises of payments or other reward.

3.2 Other violations of the Code of Conduct included advertising on public and private buildings, intimidating local printing presses, using abusive language against rivals, inciting sectarian (or cultural/regional) sentiments, destruction of property, discouraging women from voting, and violating size limits for billboards and other signs and materials.

3.3 All major political parties' candidates were found to be mobilizing voters through the influence of biradari leaders or through appeals to biradari affiliations in more than 68% of the constituencies where campaign strategies were observed. Some parties were mobilizing voters through appeals to ethnic affiliations or religious themes and affiliations.



3.4 The political parties that boycotted the polls were actively campaigning for the boycott and some were intimidating voters into boycotting. The boycotting parties also interfered in voter education programs.

4. Intimidation and Violence

- 4.1 Candidates were observed in many constituencies intimidating voters – primarily voters who are dependent for their livelihoods on landowners, employers, or others – in order to gain support.
- 4.2 Police were observed harassing candidates and/or workers of certain political parties by threatening to register cases against them. Police also asked supporters and candidates of certain political parties to stop campaigning. District police often refused to authorize rallies and public meetings of candidates of some parties on one pretext or another.
- 4.3 During the first ten days of February, FAFEN's media monitoring project noted 46 separate incidents involving either violence or accusations about violence and fraud. The most deadly incidents reported in the media from February 1-10 occurred in Punjab, where 32 people were killed in election-related violence, followed by NWFP with 25 deaths.

PART III: ELECTION DAY OBSERVATION

A. Methodology

FAFEN observed the February 18, 2008 Pakistan General Elections in a total of 258 (out of 272) National Assembly constituencies and conducted a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) in 256 constituencies. A total of 18,829 FAFEN Polling Station Observers (PSOs) and Mobile Observers (MOs) nationwide monitored the elections throughout Election Day. Pairs of PSOs observed events all day in approximately 7,100 polling stations. MOs made shorter visits to as many as 14,500 polling stations across the country. FAFEN's coverage represents a statistically-valid random selection of about 12% of polling stations in each constituency and nationwide.

PSO and MO recruitment began in November 2007, and training by FAFEN District and Constituency Coordinators was scheduled for the week before Election Day. Handbooks for PSOs and MOs included all information needed to accomplish their duties on Election Day, such as timetables for telephone reporting and instructions for coordinating with MOs for delivery of observation forms on election night. A special manual was produced with information and instructions for observation of women's polling booths. All observers were also provided with either a FAFEN chador or cap.

PSOs, MOs and CCs collected detailed data and qualitative information about adherence to procedures by polling station officials and other issues at the sampled polling stations using a set of four (4) color-coded FAFEN election observation forms (checklists):

FAFEN Observation Form 1: For use in male polling booths during the voting process. MOs used a separate abbreviated version of FAFEN Form 1 to record observations in each short visit to about 10 polling stations.

FAFEN Observation Form 2: For use in female polling booths during the voting process.

FAFEN Observation Form 3: for use during closing polling stations and counting ballots.

FAFEN Observation Form 4: For copying the "Statement of the Count" with details of the ballots counted for each candidate in a polling station. This FAFEN Form resembled the official form used by Presiding Officers for the same purpose.


FAFEN Observation Form 5: For use at the office of Returning Officer during the consolidation of polling station results.

In addition to this traditional election observation methodology, FAFEN undertook the most complex PVT ever attempted. FAFEN received data from nearly 3,000 polling stations on election night — greater than any single national PVT conducted elsewhere in the world, where PVTs have been used to assess primarily national-level races rather than 256 separate elections. In fact, FAFEN's PVT was equivalent to conducting a PVT in 256 countries with national races.

FAFEN PSOs observed the vote count at their assigned polling stations and recorded and obtained a copy of each "Statement of the Count." MOs helped collect and deliver these polling station results to FAFEN Constituency Coordinators, who compiled them onto special forms and faxed them throughout election night and the following day

In 191 out of 246 National Assembly constituencies, the PVT estimate and ECP result are statistically equivalent. In 45 constituencies there is a statistically significant difference in the PVT estimate and ECP result for the margin of victory of the winner or for the runner-up, but with the same winning candidate. In ten (10) constituencies there is both a statistically significant difference between the PVT estimate and the ECP result and a difference in the outcome (i.e., a different winning candidate). The statistical differences in these constituencies do not indicate with certainty that a different candidate won the election. However, the differences are significant enough to be outside the PVT's margin of error.

2. Close Contests with Significant Problems at Polling Stations




In at least 426 polling stations spread out in 162 constituencies out of 246 (65.9%), FAFEN's election observation qualitative information and PVT data indicate that the contest was close and that polling station problems were widespread and/or serious enough that they could have had an effect on the outcome of the election. These problems included polling officials, polling agents, or others stamping ballot papers; voters being openly pressured inside polling stations to choose a particular party or candidate; polling stations 'captured' by armed men, polling agents, or others; physical violence against voters, polling officials, polling agents, or election observers; showing and use of firearms inside polling stations; and closure of women's polling booths.

3. Voter Turnout Greater than 100%

In 61 of 246 constituencies (24.8%), one or more polling stations in the sample had voter turnout rates equal to or exceeding 100% of the number of registered voters published by the ECP the week preceding the election. In other words, more ballots were counted in the ballot boxes in these polling stations than the number of voters registered to vote in the stations.

4. Low Voter Turnout in Female Polling Stations

The voter turnout in all sampled female polling stations was below average compared to the voter turnout for both male and combined polling stations sampled in the constituencies. Excluding all polling stations where turnout was 100% or more, the average national turnout was 49.9% in male polling stations, 49.6% in combined polling stations, and 41.1% in female polling



stations. The same holds true for provincial figures, with the exception of Balochistan where turnout in Female polling stations was unusually high (61.1%) – higher than the averages of both Male and Combined polling stations in the province. Turnout in women's stations was lowest in FATA (10.4%) and NWFP (25.8%).

The following additional key findings are offered on the one-year anniversary of the election, based on the detailed qualitative observations of more than 18,000 FAFEN Election Day observers:

5. Voting without Proper Identification

Contrary to the law, voters in more than one in five polling booths were allowed to cast ballots without showing required identification. In more than one-fifth of polling booths, Polling Officers did not call out the name and number of each voter as the voter was confirmed on the electoral roll. In about one in twelve polling booths, Polling Officers did not mark off each voter's name on the electoral roll. In about one in every 15 polling booths, polling officials did not check the voters' thumb for indelible ink. The failure to implement these procedures opens the process to duplicate and fraudulent voting.

6. Compromised Voting Secrecy

In more than one-fourth of polling booths, people followed voters behind voting secrecy screens. The election law and policy are clear that there are only two very limited circumstances in which anyone can go behind a screen with another voter. In about one in every five polling booths, voters needing extra assistance got help from candidate or party agents, in clear contravention of law, procedure, and best practice for democratic elections. Allowing polling agents to speak to voters for any reason introduces an atmosphere of inappropriate influence or coercion in the polling booth.

7. Weakly Implemented Procedures for Challenged and Tendered Ballots

In about one-third and one-fourth of polling booths, respectively, challenged and tendered ballot papers were not kept separate from the National Assembly ballot box. Failing to follow these procedures means that these ballot papers were counted along with other votes. In a constituency with a significant number of challenged or tendered ballots, this failure of procedures could have an impact on a constituency's electoral result. The large number of duplicate and unverified entries in the supplemental Electoral Roll (taken from the 2002 voters' list) increased the chances of multiple voting and voter impersonation, and therefore also the chances for challenged ballots.

8. Ballot Box Stuffing

In about one-third of all polling stations, ballot papers were illegally stamped by polling officials, polling agents, or others. This serious and pervasive problem was reported almost twice as often from female polling stations compared to male or combined stations. "Ballot box stuffing" is a common accusation, leading to a loss of confidence in election results. Among the contributing factors to an environment open to extra ballots being illegally stamped and "stuffed" in ballot boxes are: (1) unclear procedures for the distribution of ballot books among polling booths; (2) failure or weaknesses in filling out (and double-checking) ballot book accounting forms; and (3) failure to fasten ballot box seals tightly (and poor instructions and photographs in the ECP training manuals on how to do so).

9. Security Problems and Law Enforcement Weakness

There were security problems in about one in every 25 polling stations. In about one out of every ten polling booths, according to observers, the polling station was "captured" and a significant number of voters were not permitted to vote. The election law does not specify the roles and responsibilities of police and other security officials during elections. In addition, the election law and regulations do not sufficiently empower Presiding Officers to implement their responsibilities as First Class Magistrates to enforce law and order in polling stations.

10. Unauthorized Individuals in Polling Stations

There were unauthorized individuals in about one in every seven polling stations. This serious breach of polling station security and integrity can lead to disruption of the polling process, intimidation and/or influence of voters and/or polling officials, ballot tampering, and other electoral malfeasance.

11. Weaknesses in Ballot Counting Procedures

In about one in every six polling stations Presiding Officers permitted non-ECP polling personnel, including candidates and polling agents, to handle ballot papers during the ballot counting process. In about one out of every 40 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not put ballots for each candidate in a separate pile, as required. In about one out of every 20 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not count the ballots for each candidate twice, as required.

12. Inconsistent Implementation of Invalid Ballot Rules

In more than one out of every six polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not reject invalid ballots according to the rules defined in the election law. Polling agents in almost half of polling stations argued that some ballots rejected as invalid should be accepted as valid. It is positive that polling agents participated actively in the ballot counting process. However, the election law and procedure are silent on whether this participation is permitted and how Presiding Officers should handle it.

13. No Statement of the Count to Observers

In about one out of every five polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not provide accredited election observers with a copy of the Statement of the Count. Giving neutral observers a copy of the polling station “result” is not required by law or mentioned in ECP procedural handbooks, but doing so would significantly add to the transparency of the electoral process and particularly the consolidation of electoral results.

14. Failure to Post Statement of the Count

In more than one out of every six polling stations, the Statement of the Count was not posted outside the polling station for public information. The problem was somewhat more common in Balochistan. This fundamental procedure should be standardized everywhere to ensure transparency to the voting public about the election results.

15. Delay in Sending Statement of the Count to Returning Officer

In almost one out of every ten polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not send a copy of the Statement of the Count immediately to the Returning Officer, as required by law. Failure to implement this procedure delays the vote consolidation and the announcement of the election result. These delays lead to a common suspicion that election results are altered during the ballot counting and/or consolidation processes, undermining public confidence in the electoral system and election results.

16. Inconsistent Methods of Delivering Statements of the Count

The ECP has not specified any mechanism for transporting polling station results from the Presiding Officers to the Returning Officers for consolidation of election results. Therefore, it is not clear who is permitted to transport election results. Statements of the Count are sensitive election materials that should be handled with care. The ECP should know who is responsible for these polling station results at all times.

17. Poorly Implemented Result Consolidation Procedures

In about one-third of constituencies for which data is available, Returning Officers did not follow the basic procedure of issuing a written notice to all candidates about the consolidation of election results. In the same percentage of constituencies, Returning Officers did not permit accredited election observers to witness the result consolidation process, and candidates or their agents did not witness the consolidation. In more than one in seven constituencies, candidates or their agents raised objections to the postal ballot counting process. In about one in nine constituencies, the postal ballot count changed the election result.



Section I

Polling Procedures

A. Preparing for Voting

B. Voting Process

C. Ballot Box Stuffing, Undue Influence,
Bias, Security Breaches

1. Polling Station Sign

Law, Procedure and Policy

“[The Presiding Officer (PrO) will] Attach the ‘Polling Station’ sign to the outside of the building. Tip: Make sure you have written the name and number of your polling station and constituency on it! Ensure ALL signs are prominently displayed.”


ECP Handbook for Presiding Officers (PrOs), Pg. 30 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	593	8.4
Yes	5419	76.5
No	1076	15.2
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, 76.5% had a sign clearly indicating the location of the polling station. There was no such sign in 15.2% of observed polling stations.¹

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, 76.2% had a sign posted and 16.7% did not. About 78% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP had a sign, while 15.7% did not. In Sindh, 77.3% of 1,615 polling stations had a sign, while 11.6% did not. In Baluchistan, 72.4% and 12.2% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, did and did not have the requisite sign. Similarly, 62.3% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory had a sign, while 13.2% did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, 53.3 % had a sign indicating the location of the station, while 13.2% did not¹. As many as 80.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations had a sign, while 17.9% did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, 81.3% had a sign, but 14.1% did not.

Recommendation

About one in six polling stations were unmarked by any sign, making it harder for voters to find where to vote. The ECP should emphasize in polling officials' training the importance of posting the appropriate exterior signs at polling stations.

1. Information missing for 8.4% of observed polling stations.

2. Campaigning Near Polling Stations

a. Campaign Materials within 100 Yards of Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

“A person is guilty of an offence punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees if he ... (4) exhibits, except with the permission of the Returning Officer and at a place reserved for the candidate or his election agent beyond the radius of one hundred yards of the polling station, any notice, sign, banner or flag designed to encourage the electors to vote or discourage the electors from voting, for any contesting candidate.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 85

“[The police will] Ensure that there are no campaign signs or literature within 100 yards of the polling station ...”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[The PrO will] Clean the polling station of any campaign material and distractions. Tip: Make sure you remove any campaign material within 100 yards of the polling station.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 30

“[The PrO will] periodically check ... outside the polling station to ... see that there are no campaign materials within 100 yards of the polling station.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 26% there were materials or paraphernalia for a party or a candidate within 100 yards of the polling station, whereas in 65.1% of the polling stations there were no such disallowed campaign materials.²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	634	8.9
Yes	1842	26
No	4612	65.1
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 26.5% campaign materials were there, whereas in 66% of stations there were none. In 32.9% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, there were materials for a party or candidate, while in 60.3% there were none. In Sindh, 21.8% of 1,615 polling stations had such paraphernalia, while 66.1% % did not. In Baluchistan, in 21% of the polling stations there were campaign materials, while in 62.2% of 286 observed polling stations there were no such materials. Similarly, in 9.4% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory there were campaign materials, while in 64.2% there were none.

Province-wise



2. Information missing for 8.9% of observed polling stations.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, disallowed campaign signs or literature were present in 20.4% of stations, while no materials were seen in 45.3% of stations.³ As many as 30.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations had such materials, while 67.2% did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations 25% had campaign paraphernalia, while 70% did not. In 25% of the combined polling stations, there were such materials, while in 70% there were none.

Recommendation

campaign materials were present near one in four polling stations. This problem was somewhat more common in NWFP and near male polling stations. [1] The ECP should emphasize in training for Presiding Officers that they are required to ensure that all campaign materials are removed from the area around the polling station. [2] In addition, the ECP should train police in the enforcement of election law and procedures, such as ensuring there are no campaign materials within 100 yards of polling stations.

3. Information missing for 34.3% of observed female polling stations.

b. Campaigning within 400 Yards of Polling Station

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Prohibition of canvassing in or near polling station.--A person is guilty of an offence punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees if he, within a radius of four hundred yards of the polling station, on the polling day- (1) canvasses for votes; (2) solicits the vote of any elector; [or] (3) persuades any elector not to vote at the election or for a particular candidate”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 85

“[The police will] Ensure that there are no ... campaign camps, or attempts to solicit or persuade voters, within 400 yards.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[The PrO will] Periodically check on the police outside the polling station to ensure that there are no disturbances or illegal activities”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 27.8% there were party/candidate camps or other attempts to influence voters within 400 yards of the polling station, whereas in 62.8% of the polling stations there was no such activity.⁴

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	669	9.4
Yes	1968	27.8
No	4451	62.8
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 29.3% there were party/candidate camps or attempts to influence voters, whereas in 62.7% there were none. In 33.7% of 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP, such camps or voter influence were seen, while in 59.4% they were not. In Sindh, in 21.4% of 1,615 observed polling stations, camps or influencing were seen, while in 65.9% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 22.7% of the of 286 observed polling stations there were such camps or attempts to influence, while in 59.8% of polling stations there were none. Similarly, in 15% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, such camps or activities were seen, while in 58.5% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 21.4% party/candidate camps or attempts to influence voters within 400 yards of the stations were noticed, while in 45.3% none were seen⁵. In as many as 32.5% of 2,357 observed male polling stations there were such camps or voter influencing, while in 64.4% there were none. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations in 26.6% there were such camps or activities, while in 68% there were none.

Gender-wise



4. Information missing for 9.4% of observed polling stations.

5. Information missing for 35.2% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

Illegal efforts to influence voters take place near one in four polling stations. [1] The ECP should emphasize the importance of having a 400-yard no-campaign zone around polling stations in polling officials' training. [2] In addition, the ECP should train police in the enforcement of election law and procedures, such as ensuring there are no party/candidate camps or other attempts to influence voters within 400 yards of polling stations.

3. Polling Officials Present Before Voting Begins

Law, Procedure and Policy

“There will be 3 polling staff working at each booth.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 8. See also Pg. 39 showing three officials and Pgs. 40, 43, and 45 stating tasks of each of three officials.

“[The PrO will] Arrive with polling staff minimum 2 hours before the official opening of the polling station.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 31


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 95.5% all three required polling officials were present before the opening of the poll, whereas in 1.6% they were not.⁶

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	393	2.9
Yes	13159	95.5
No	221	1.6
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 96% all three required polling officials were present, but in 1.5% they were not. In 94.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, all polling officials were present, while in 1.8% they were not. In Sindh, in 95% of 3,074 polling booths, the required officials were present, while in 1.6% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 94.7% and 1.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, three polling officials were and were not present before the poll. Similarly, in 97.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, the required officials were present, but in 1.2% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 93.7% all three required polling officials were present, but in 1.8% they were not. In as many as 97.1% of 7,473 observed male polling stations, the required officials were present, but in 1.4% they were not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 60 polling booths, the required number of election officials were not present.

6. Information missing for 2.9% of observed polling booths.

4. Voters' List in Polling Booths

a. Final Electoral Roll (FER) 2007 in Each Polling Booth

Law, Procedure and Policy

"The Returning Officer shall provide the Presiding Officer of each polling station with copies of electoral rolls containing the names of the electors entitled to vote at the polling station."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 10

"[The PrO will] Distribute the appropriate section of the Electoral Roll to each of [his/her] polling officers."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 31

"The Roll must be divided according to the number of booths."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 32, giving instructions about how to divide the Electoral Roll

"Display the list containing Serial Number of Voters outside the polling station as well as the polling booth [with voters] assigned on each booth. Tip: Make sure you attach the list in a place where it can be clearly seen by voters."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 30

"Post small signs at each polling booth showing the voters: The Electoral Roll and Serial numbers of the voters who will vote in this booth."


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 32

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	562	4.1
Yes	12993	94.3
No	218	1.6
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 94.3% the computerized Final Electoral Roll (FER) 2007 was available. The voters' list was missing in 1.6% of observed polling booths.⁷

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 95.6% the FER was there, but it was missing in 1.4% of booths. In 92.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the FER 2007 was present, while in 1.8% it was not. In Sindh, in 92.6% of 3,074 polling booths, the voters' list was there, while in 1.8% it was not. In Baluchistan, in 92.5% and 2.4% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, FER 2007 was and was not there. In 98.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, the FER 2007 was available.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 92.1% the FER 2007 was available, but in 1.7% it was not. In as many as 96.2% of 7,473 observed male polling stations the voters list was present, but in 1.4% it was not.

7. Information missing for 4.1% of observed polling booths

Recommendation

In about one in every 60 polling booths, the 2007 Final Electoral Roll was missing. This problem was most serious in Baluchistan, where the voters' list was missing from one in every 40 polling booths. [1] ECP distribution mechanisms should be improved to ensure that every polling station and booth has the appropriate voters' list before Election Day. In addition, most voters must obtain a "chit" from a political party "camp" outside the polling stations in order to find out where to vote. (Also see section A.2.b. above on "Campaigning within 400 Yards of Polling Station".) The ECP Handbook for Presiding Officers (2007) includes instructions about posting the voters' list outside polling booths (pages 30 and 32), but this procedure is rarely if ever implemented. [2] The election law should specify that the voters' list must be posted outside each polling station and each polling booth so that voters know where to cast their ballots. [3] The ECP should train polling officials to [a] post voters' list outside each polling station and [b] post outside each polling booth the portion of the voters' list indicating who should vote in that booth.

b. Supplemental List of Voters 2002 Attached to FER 2007

Law, Procedure and Policy

No ECP public document articulates this policy decision, instructions to election officials, or the methodology followed to create the 2008 Final Electoral Roll.

See FAFEN Press Releases, "Draft Electoral Roll 2007: Flawed but Fixable, August 23, 2007, <http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=45>, "FAFEN Urges ECP to Display Voter's List at Union Councils," October 26, 2007, <http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=55>, and "Missing and Duplicate Voters on Final Electoral Roll," February 13, 2008, <http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b3114b6e197.pdf>

Also see "FAFEN Election Update 19: Notes for Observers and Media on Election Day," February 17, 2008, Pg. 1-2, <http://www.fafen.org/admin/products/p47b8a00006c78.pdf>


Re women's voter registration and CNICs, see FAFEN report "Flawed but Fixable," Pg. 14-16 www.fafen.org/admin/products/p4729d6fb5a19e.pdf as well as these FAFEN press releases: <http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=43>, <http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=44>, <http://www.fafen.org/pressdet.php?id=55>

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1512	11
Yes	9900	71.9
No	2361	17.1
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 71.9% of booths the supplemental list of voters from the 2002 electoral list was stapled to the back of the 2007 FER. In 17.1% of polling booths, the 2002 supplemental list was not attached to the 2007 FER.⁸

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 73.2% the supplemental list was stapled to the FER 2007, but in 17.8% it was not. In 70.3% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the supplemental list was attached to FER 2007, while in 17.4% it was not. In Sindh, in 68.6% of 3,074 polling booths, the two lists were stapled together, while in 16.5% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 74.1% and 11.1% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, the two lists were and were not stapled together. In 86.9% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital the two lists were stapled together, but in 3.6% they were not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 65.5% the two lists were stapled together while in 19.2% they were not. In as many as 77.3% of 7,473 observed male polling stations the two lists were attached together, but in 15.4% they were not.

Recommendation

The 2002 Supplement to the Electoral Roll was not attached to the 2007 Final Electoral Roll, as required, in at least one in five polling booths. Preparations regarding the voters list were least consistent in female polling booths. Before the 2009 local government elections, the ECP should create a new voters list that is both complete (including all eligible voters) and accurate (without duplicate or false voters) through the following methodology:

- [a] return to the 2007 Final Electoral Roll (excluding the 2002 supplemental voters list);
- [b] reconcile the 2007 FER with the NADRA database in order to include all eligible citizens with Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) on the next voters list; and
- [c] register additional voters through systematic house-to-house enumeration (in collaboration with mobile NADRA units providing all eligible citizens with CNICs).

8. Information missing for 11% of observed polling booths.

5. Ballot Boxes, Ballot Papers, Secrecy Screens

a. Transparent Plastic Ballot Boxes

Law, Procedure and Policy

“New transparent ballot boxes will be used for balloting.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 8

“[The PrO will] Put transparent boxes at each polling booth.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 31

“Inventory of Election Materials” (showing in the that there are two transparent ballot boxes)

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 26

Also see ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33, 39, and 45 indicating that there are two kinds of ballots and that they must be placed in two separate ballot boxes.

“New Transparent Ballot Box!” and Instructions for “Opening and Closing of the Boxes”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 35-36

“Not more than one ballot box shall be used at a time for the purpose of the poll at any polling station, or at any polling booth, where there are more than one polling booths at a polling station....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30(3)

“Place the ballot box so as to be conveniently accessible to the electors, and at the same time within his view and within the view of such candidates or their election agents or polling agents as may be present.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30(4)(d)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 96.4% two transparent plastic boxes were present, while in 0.9% they were not.⁹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	373	2.7
Yes	13277	96.4
No	123	0.9
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 97.3% two transparent plastic boxes were available, but in 0.7% they were not. In 94.3% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, two transparent boxes were present, while in 1.7% they were not. In Sindh, in 95.8% of 3,074 polling booths, the appropriate ballot boxes were available, while in 0.8% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 96.6% and 0.4% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, two transparent boxes were and were not available. As many as 96% of all observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital had two transparent ballot boxes, while 1% did not.

Province-wise



9. Information missing for 2.7% of observed polling booths.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 94.6% two transparent ballot boxes were being used, while in 0.8% they were not. In as many as 97.9% of 7,473 observed male polling booths there were two transparent boxes, but in 1% there were not.

Recommendation

The introduction of transparent ballot boxes was a positive innovation for the 2008 General Elections. One or more ballot boxes were, nevertheless, missing from about one in every 110 polling booths. [1] The ECP should modify its training manuals for each election to include clear statements about how many ballot boxes of each color should be in each polling booth and where they should be placed within the booth so that observers and polling agents can see them clearly. [2] In addition, the Representation of the People Act 1976 Section 30 regarding ballot boxes must be amended.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Inventory of Election Materials” (showing that there are National Assembly Ballot Papers and Provincial Assembly Ballot Papers)

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 26

“[The PrO will] Determine the number of green ballot papers (Provincial Assembly)... Determine the number of white ballot papers (National Assembly)...”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33, (emphasis in original)

Also see ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 39 & 45 indicating that there are two kinds of ballots to be placed in two separate ballot boxes.


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 59.6% the appropriate ballot papers were available, whereas in 0.3 % they were not.¹⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	5533	40.2
Yes	8203	59.6
No	37	0.3
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, 59.1% had ballot papers, while 0.2% did not. In 67.5% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the ballot papers were available, while in 0.3% they were not. In Sindh in 55.2% of 3,074 polling booths the ballot papers were present, while in 0.4% they were not. In Baluchistan in 61.1% and 0.2% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, did and did not have ballot papers. Similarly, 61.9% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory had ballot papers.¹¹

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, 13.4% had ballot papers¹². As many as 98.5% of 7,473 observed male polling booths had ballot papers, while 0.5% did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

Only a few polling booths experienced problems with the delivery of ballot papers, according to available data from observers.

10. Information missing for 40.2% of observed polling booths.
 11. Information missing for 38.1% of observed polling booths.
 12. Information missing for 86.6% of observed female polling booths.

c. Voter Screens

Law, Procedure and Policy

“An election under this Act shall be decided by secret ballot...”
Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 28

“A Presiding Officer shall make such arrangements at the polling station that every elector may be able to secretly mark his ballot paper before folding and inserting it in the ballot box.”
Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30 (6)

“New screen off compartments will be used for balloting.”
ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 8

“[The PrO will] Make sure that the secrecy screen is situated in a way that prohibits anyone from seeing the way voters vote.”
ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 24

“[The PrO will] Check to make sure that the ... voting screens are in place.”
ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 31


“New Cardboard Voters Screens” (assembly instructions)
ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 37

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	465	3.4
Yes	12983	94.3
No	325	2.4
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, 94.3% had one or more voter screens set up correctly to protect the secrecy of the ballot, whereas 2.4 % did not.¹³

Province-wise




Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, 95.2% had had voter screen(s) set up correctly and 2.3% did not. In 93.4% of 2008 polling booths observed in NWFP had voter screens set up correctly, while 2.3% did not. In Sindh, 92.5% of 3074 polling booths had the voter screens setup correctly, while 2.3% did not. In Baluchistan 92.7% and 3.2% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, did and did not have the voter screens set up correctly. Similarly, 98.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory had voter screens set up correctly.

13. Information missing for 3.4% of observed polling booths.

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, 91.3% had the voter screens set up correctly and 3% did not. As many as 96.7% of 7,473 observed male polling booths had voter screens set up correctly and 1.8% did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

The introduction of cardboard voter secrecy screens was a positive innovation for the 2008 General Elections. Nevertheless, secrecy screens were missing from about one in every 40 polling booths. The ECP should modify its training manuals for the next elections to include clear statements about [a] how many secrecy screens should be in each polling booth and [b] how they should be positioned within each polling booth to ensure voter secrecy.

6. Showing that the Ballot Boxes are Empty

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before the time fixed for the commencement of the poll, the Presiding Officer shall - (a) ensure that every ballot box to be used is empty; (b) show the empty ballot box to the contesting candidates and their election agents or polling agents whoever may be present, and record their statements in this behalf in the prescribed form and obtain their signatures on them....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30(4)

“[The PrO will] One by one show each empty ballot box to all candidates, agents and observers who are at the polling station. (Tip: This step is important as it adds to the transparency of the election process.)”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 34

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	535	7.5
Yes	6477	91.4
No	76	1.1
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 91.4% the PrO showed empty ballot boxes to observers and agents, whereas in 1.1 % s/he did not.¹⁴

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 93.1% the PrO showed observers and polling agents empty ballot boxes and in 0.7% s/he did not. In 93.5% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP empty ballot boxes were shown to observers and polling agents, while in 1.1% they were not. In Sindh, in 87.8% of 1,615 polling stations, the PrO showed the observers and polling agents that the ballot boxes were empty, while in 1.9% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 82.9% and 2.1% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, the PrO did and did not show empty ballot boxes to observers and agents. Similarly in 75.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, the PrO showed the empty ballot boxes to observers and polling agents¹⁵.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 66.7% the PrO showed the empty ballot boxes to observers and polling agents and in 1% s/he did not.¹⁶ In as many as 97.7% of 2,357 male polling stations observed the PrO showed empty ballot boxes to observers and polling agents and in 0.8% he did not. In 95.1% of the 3,584 combined polling stations observed, the PrO showed empty ballot boxes to observers and polling agents, whereas in 1.2% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 90 polling booths, polling officials did not show the empty ballot boxes before the opening of the polls.

14. Information missing for 7.5% of observed polling stations

15. Information missing for 24.5% of observed polling stations.

16. Information missing for 32.2% of observed female polling stations.

7. Sealing Ballot Boxes

a. Showing Official ECP Seal Numbers



Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall - ... After the ballot box has been shown to be empty, close and seal it with his own seal and with the seal of such of the candidates, or their election agents or polling agents as may be present and may desire to put their own seals on it...”

*Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30(4)(c)*¹⁷

“The New Transparent Ballot Box!” (showing seal number)

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 35

“[The PrO will] Show the numbers and the ECP monogram on the seals to the agents and others present in the polling booth and ask them to note / record the seal numbers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 36


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 91.4% polling officials showed official ECP seal numbers to polling agents and observers after sealing the ballot boxes, whereas in 1.6 % they did not.¹⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	585	8.3
Yes	6390	90.2
No	113	1.6
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 92.1% polling officials showed official ECP seal numbers to polling agents and observers after sealing the ballot boxes and in 1.2% they did not. In 91.3% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP polling officials followed this procedure, while in 1.8% they did not. In Sindh, in 86.3% of 1,615 polling stations observed, polling officials showed official ECP seal numbers, while in 2.4% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 82.5% and 1.7% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, the polling officials did and did not follow the correct procedures regarding the seals on ballot boxes. Similarly, in 73.6% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory polling officials followed procedures, while in 1.9% they did not.¹⁹

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 65.2% polling officials showed official ECP seal numbers to polling agents and observers after sealing the ballot boxes and in 1.5% they did not.²⁰ In as many as 96.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, polling officials followed this procedure, and in 1.2% they did not. In 93.9% of 3,584 combined polling stations, polling officials showed official ECP seal numbers, whereas in 1.9% they did not.

Gender-wise



17. And also “If one ballot box is full or cannot further be used for receiving ballot papers, the Presiding Officer shall seal that ballot box with his own seal and with the seals of the candidates or their polling agents who may wish to seal it and keep it in a secure place in the polling station and use another ballot box in the manner laid down in sub-section (4).” (Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30(5))

18. Information missing for 8.3% of observed polling stations.

19. Information missing for 24.5% of observed polling stations.

20. Information missing for 33.3% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

The introduction of numbered, tamper-proof plastic seals on ballot boxes was a positive innovation for the 2008 General Elections. However, in about one in every 60 polling stations, polling officials did not show the seals to observers and agents after sealing the ballot boxes. Moreover, [1] The ECP should significantly modify its training manuals for the next elections to include a clearer description of the new ballot box seals, how they should be tightly closed, and how the numbers on the seals must be shown to election observers and polling agents at the beginning of the Election Day process. [2] In addition, the Representation of the People Act 1976 Section 30 regarding ballot box seals must be amended.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“After you have shown the first ballot box and seal (sic). Repeat this process with each ballot box. Tip: After this time NEVER unlock and open any ballot box until it is time for the count.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 34, (emphasis in original)

“[The PrO will] Fix the 4 seals on each side of the ballot boxes.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 36, showing seals fixed very loosely in large open loops on ballot box


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 91.2% each ballot box had four seals tightly sealed on each side, whereas in 0.9 % they did not.²¹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	556	7.8
Yes	6466	91.2
No	66	0.9
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 92.5% each ballot box had four side seals and in 0.9% they did not. In 93.7% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP each ballot box had four side seals, while in 0.7% they did not. In Sindh, in 88.1% of 1,615 polling stations the ballot boxes were sealed on all four sides, while in 1.3% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 84.3% and 1% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, boxes had four seals and did not. Similarly, in 73.6% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory each ballot box had four seals, one on each side of the box.²²

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 66.8% each ballot box had four seals on each side of the box and in 0.7% they did not.²³ In as many as 97.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, each ballot box had four side seals, while in 0.6% they did not. In 94.6% of 3,584 combined polling stations, ballot boxes had four side seals, whereas in 1.2% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 110 polling stations, some ballot boxes did not have four seals. Moreover, FAFEN election observer checklist forms did not anticipate a significant problem with the new tamper-proof ballot box seals, namely that many Presiding Officers attached the four seals loosely, leaving each seal with a large open loop, exactly as incorrectly shown in ECP training manuals. When the seals were attached in this way, it was possible to lift the top of the boxes to take ballots out or put extra ballots inside. This problem was not recorded systematically by FAFEN observers, but was reported anecdotally by many observers. The ECP must improve the training manuals and training process for the next elections to ensure that all election officials understand how to seal the ballot boxes tightly to avoid ballot box “stuffing” and other problems. Training sessions should include a demonstration of this essential step in preparation of the ballot boxes.

21. Information missing for 7.8% of observed polling stations.
 22. Information missing for 26.4% of observed polling stations.
 23. Information missing for 32.5% of observed female polling stations.

c. ECP Monogram on Ballot Box Seals

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The New Transparent Ballot Box!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 35, showing seal with ECP monogram

“[The PrO will] Show the ... ECP monogram on the seals to the agents and others present in the polling booth (sic)....”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 36

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	553	7.8
Yes	6503	91.7
No	32	0.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide, in 91.7% all ballot box seals had an ECP monogram, whereas in 0.5% they did not.²⁴

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 93.3% all ballot box seals had an ECP monogram and in 0.3% they did not. In 93.5% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, all ballot box seals had a monogram, while in 0.9% they did not. In Sindh, in 88.6% of 1,615 polling stations, all seals had monograms, while in 0.5% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 84.6% and 0.7% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, seals did and did not have monograms. Similarly, in 75.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory all box seals had ECP monograms.²⁵

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 66.6% all ballot box seals had an ECP monogram and in 0.5% they did not.²⁶ In as many as 98.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, all seals had ECP monograms, while in 0.3% they did not. In 95.5% of the 3,584 combined polling stations, all box seals had a monogram, whereas in 0.6% they did not.

Recommendation

Only a few polling booths experienced problems with the monogram on ballot box seals, according to available data from observers.

24. Information missing for 7.8% of observed polling stations.
 25. Information missing for 24.5% of observed polling stations.
 26. Information missing for 32.9% of observed female polling stations.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“When you [the PrO] have shown the empty ballot boxes and locked all of them, take out Form XI-A for certification of ballot boxes. Ask each polling agent who has witnessed the showing, locking and sealing of boxes to complete and sign one of those forms.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 34, Form XI – A, Pg. 38


Out of a total of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide, in 85.6% the PrO invited each polling agent and candidate to sign Form XI – A “Certification of Ballot Boxes,” whereas in 4.5% of polling stations this Form was not signed.²⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	706	10
Yes	6064	85.6
No	318	4.5
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 87.6% the PrO asked polling agents to sign the required Form, whereas in 4.4% he did not. In 87.1% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, polling agents certified the ballot boxes, while in 4.9% they did not. In Sindh, in 81.1% of 1,615 polling stations, the ballot boxes were certified, but in 4.9% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 77.6% and 3.5% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, the PrO did and did not have the polling agents and candidates sign Form XI – A. In 75.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, the certification form was signed.²⁸

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 59.5%, the ballot boxes were certified and in 4.7% they were not.²⁹ In as many as 91.8% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, polling agents and candidates signed the required form, while in 4.4% they did not. In 89.8% of 3,584 combined polling stations, the PrO asked each polling agent and candidate to sign the required form, but in 4.5% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In more than one in every 25 polling stations, polling agents did not certify that the ballot boxes were empty and correctly sealed by signing Form XI-A, as required. Without polling agent signatures, the results of a polling station are vulnerable to post-election petitions claiming that ballot boxes were “stuffed,” for example. The ECP should improve the training process for the next elections to ensure that all election officials understand the importance of getting the signatures of all polling agents on all appropriate forms, including Form XI-A. Training sessions should include a demonstration of how to fill out each required form completely and accurately.

27. Information missing for 10% of observed polling stations.
 28. Information missing for 24.5% of observed polling stations.
 29. Information missing for 35.8% of observed female polling stations.

1. Voter Identification

a. Allowed to Vote with NIC or CNIC

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Where an elector presents himself at the polling station to vote, Presiding Officer shall issue a ballot paper to the elector after satisfying himself about the identity of the elector 1[and shall, for that purpose, require the elector to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973)] 2[or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000)].”

1. Substituted vide Act No. IX of 1991, dated 18-6 1991.
2. Added vide Ordinance No. XXXVI of 2002, dated 31-7-2002.

The Representation of the People Act 1976, Section 33, adding provisions for voters to vote by showing their CNIC

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Integrity – Never stop a qualified voter from voting without a just cause.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“[The Polling Officer (PO) will] Check the voter’s National Identity Card (NIC). ”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, P. 40

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1402	10.2
Yes	12103	87.9
No	268	1.9
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 87.9% of booths Polling Officers (POs) permitted voters to cast ballots if the voters had NIC or CNIC, whereas in 1.9% of booths one or more voters were not permitted to vote despite having their NIC or CNIC.³⁰

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 89.7% voters could vote if they had NIC or CNIC, but in 1.5% they could not. In 83% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters could vote if they had NIC or CNIC, while in 2.3% they could not. In Sindh, in 85.9% of 3,074 polling booths voters could vote if they had NIC or CNIC, while in 2.8% they could not. In Baluchistan, in 87.6% and 2.1% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters could and could not vote if they had NIC or CNIC. Similarly, in 97.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters could vote if they had NIC or CNIC.³¹

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 81.5% POs allowed voters to vote if they had NIC or CNIC, but in 2.5% they did not always do so. In as many as 93.2% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, voters could vote if they had NIC or CNIC, but in 1.5% they could not.

30. Information missing for 10.2% of observed polling booths.

31. Information missing for 2.4 % of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one in every 50 polling booths, some voters were not permitted to vote despite having their NIC or CNIC with them. FAFEN election observer checklist forms anticipated inconsistencies related to the identification voters were required to show in polling booths because of problems with the electoral roll (documented in other FAFEN reports and press releases at www.fafen.org) and the ECP's addition of names without CNICs in a "supplemental" list of unverified voters taken from the 2002 Electoral Roll. FAFEN's recommendations regarding the electoral roll and voter verification have been published in earlier reports and press releases. (See also A. 4.b. above and B.1. b. below.) In addition, some voters in about 2.4% of polling stations may have been turned away despite having their NIC or CNIC because of partisan polling officials. (See section A.11.c. below, "Voters Disenfranchised Because of Polling Officials' Bias.")

b. Allowed to Vote with Identification Other Than NIC or CNIC

Law, Procedure and Policy

1[(A ballot paper shall not be issued to a person who: a) fails or refuses to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973) 2[or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000)]; ...”

1. Substituted vide ACT No. IX of 1991, dated 18-6-1991.
2. Added vide Ordinance No. XXXVI of 2002, dated 31-7-2002.

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(3)

“[The PO is responsible for] Ensuring that each and every voter has a valid National Identity Card.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Integrity – Never allow someone who is not qualified or on the Electoral Roll to vote.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“[The Polling Officer (PO) will] Check the voter’s National Identity Card (NIC). Tip: If the voter has no NIC s/he is not permitted to vote and you (Polling Officer) must send him away. Check that the NIC is real and acceptable.” and “Checking the National Identity Cards”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40-41, with detailed instructions

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1908	13.9
Yes	2902	21.1
No	8963	65.1
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 21.1% voters were permitted to cast ballots by showing identification other than NIC/CNIC (such as a birth certificate, matriculation certificate, nikkah nama, etc), whereas in 65.1% of polling booths voters were not permitted to vote by showing these disallowed forms of identification.³²

Province-wise




Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 19.6% voters could cast votes by showing identification other than NIC/CNIC, but in 68.2% they could not. In 19.4% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters could cast ballots using alternative identification, while in 62.5% they could not. In Sindh, in 27% of 3,074 polling booths voters could cast votes by showing identification other than NIC/CNIC, while in 57.1% they could not. In Baluchistan, in 17.5% and 69.9% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters could and could not cast votes by showing identification other than NIC/CNIC. Similarly, in 6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, voters were permitted to cast ballots without an NIC/CNIC, whereas in 90.5% they were not.

32. Information missing for 13.9% of observed polling booths.

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 27% the voters could cast votes by showing identification other than CNIC/NIC, while in 53.2% they could not. In as many as 16.1% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, voters were permitted to vote with showing NIC/CNIC, but in 75.1% they were not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

Contrary to the law, voters in more than one in five polling booths were allowed to cast ballots without showing required identification. The inconsistent application of voter identification law was most notable in Sindh province, where voters in more than one in four polling booths showed inadequate identification. With regard to voter identification requirements, the ECP must clarify its policy, re-emphasize correct procedures in election officials' training, and enforce the implementation of the law and procedures to ensure equity and fairness for all voters nationwide.

Law, Procedure and Policy

1[(A ballot paper shall not be issued to a person who: a) fails or refuses to produce his identity card provided for in the National Registration Act, 1973 (LVI of 1973) 2[or issued under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000)]; ...”

1. Substituted vide ACT No. IX of 1991, dated 18-6-1991.
2. Added vide Ordinance No. XXXVI of 2002, dated 31-7-2002.

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(3)

“[The PO is responsible for] Ensuring that each and every voter has a valid National Identity Card.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12, (emphasis in original)

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Integrity – Never allow someone who is not qualified or on the Electoral Roll to vote.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“[The Polling Officer (PO) will] Check the voter’s National Identity Card (NIC). Tip: If the voter has no NIC s/he is not permitted to vote and you (Polling Officer) must send him away. Check that the NIC is real and acceptable.” and “Checking the National Identity Cards”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40-41) (with detailed instructions


Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1833	13.3
Yes	570	4.1
No	11370	82.6
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 82.6% voters were not permitted to cast ballots without showing any identification, whereas in 4.1% one or more voters were permitted to vote without showing ID of any kind.³³

Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 84.8% voters could not vote without showing identification, but in 3.3% some voters were permitted to do so. In 79.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters could not vote without ID, while in 3.8% some voters were allowed to cast ballots anyway. In Sindh, in 77.8% of 3,074 polling booths, voters could not vote without showing identification while in 6.8% of polling booths voters were permitted to cast ballots without showing any form of ID. In Baluchistan, in 85.5% of 468 observed polling booths, voters had to show identification, while in 3.8% of polling booths some voters were not required to show any form of identification. Similarly, in 96.4% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, voters could not vote without showing identification.³⁴

Province-wise




33. Information missing for 13.3% of observed polling booths.

34. Information missing for 3.6% of observed polling booths.

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 75% the voters were required to show some form of identification, but in 5.5% some voters were allowed to vote without ID of any kind. In as many as 89% of observed male polling booths, voters could not vote without showing identification, but in 3% they could.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

See B.1.b. above, "Allowed to Vote with Identification Other Than NIC or CNIC."

2. Calling Out Voters' Names

Law, Procedure and Policy

"Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ... the number and name of the elector as entered in the electoral roll shall be called out...."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(b)

"[The Polling Officer (PO) is responsible for] Calling out name and serial number of the voter in the electoral roll."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12

"[The PO] ... strikes off name from Electoral Roll after calling out name and serial number of the Voter."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 39

"[The PO will] Find the voter's name on the Electoral Roll. The name should be called out loud. (Tip: Make sure that all the agents can hear the name called out distinctly.)"


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1670	12.1
Yes	9062	65.8
No	3041	22.1
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 65.8% the PO called out the name of each voter loudly so that polling agents and observers could hear, whereas in 22.1% s/he did not do so.³⁵

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 61.3% the PO called out the name of each voter loudly, but in 27.9% s/he did not. In 68.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, POs called out the name of each voter loudly, while in 14.4% they did not. In Sindh, in 74.3% of 3,074 polling booths the PO called out voters' names, while in 12.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 71.8% and 16.9% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, the PO did and did not call out the name of each voter loudly. Similarly, in 88.1% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, voters' names were called out, but in 8.3% they were not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 56.8% the PO called out the name of each voter loudly, but in 25.8% she did not. In as many as 73.4% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, voters' names were called out, but in 18.9% they were not.

³⁵. Information missing for 12.1% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In more than one-fifth of polling booths, Polling Officers did not call out the name and number of each voter as the voter was confirmed on the electoral roll. The failure to implement this very important procedure prevented polling agents from confirming the identity of voters and/or marking voters on their own copies of the electoral roll to prevent multiple or fraudulent voting. [1] The ECP must re-affirm in training sessions the importance of the well-known and long-standing procedure of calling out each voter's name in every polling booth. Polling agents should be trained to correct and/or report election officials who do not follow this procedure. [2] The ECP should introduce mechanisms to enforce the implementation of this procedure (and others) through suspension, professional sanction, fine or other appropriate measures.

3. Striking off Voters' Names from the Electoral Roll

a. Campaign Materials within 100 Yards of Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

"Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ...the entry relating to the elector on the electoral roll shall be struck off to indicate that a ballot paper has been issued to him...."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(c)

"[The PO is responsible for] Ensuring that voters are struck off the Electoral Roll before issuing of ballot paper."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12, (emphasis in original)

"Using a ball point and plastic scale, [the PO will] make a straight line through the name of the voter on [the] Electoral Roll."


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40; see also Pg. 39

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1625	11.8
Yes	11028	80.1
No	1120	8.1
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 80.1%, the Polling Officer (PO) found and struck off each voter's name on the Electoral Roll, whereas in 8.1% the PO did not follow this procedure correctly.³⁶

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 82% the PO struck off each voter's name on the Electoral Roll, but in 8% s/ he did not do so. In 72.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the PO found and struck off each voter's name, while in 9.7% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 78.8% of 3,074 polling booths the PO followed the correct procedure, while in 8.1% s/he did not strike names from the Electoral Roll as voters' names were found on the list. In Baluchistan, in 83.8% and 6% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, the POs did and did not follow this procedure. Similarly, in 96.4% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, voters' names were correctly struck from the Electoral Roll, but in 1.2% they were not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 74.4% the PO found and struck off each voter's name on the Electoral Roll, but in 9% she did not. In as many as 84.8% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, POs struck off voters' names correctly, but in 7.4% they did not.

36. Information missing for 11.8% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

As with calling out the name and number of each voter (above), the procedure requiring election officials to mark off each voter's name on the electoral roll was followed inconsistently. In about one in twelve polling booths, Polling Officers did not follow the procedure correctly. The failure to implement this procedure opens the process to duplicate and fraudulent voting and makes it impossible to cross-check voter turnout using the printed electoral rolls. The ECP must re-affirm the importance of the long-standing procedure of marking each voter's name off the voters' list in election officials' training through practical demonstration.

4. Indelible Ink to Prevent Voting More Than Once

a. Checking for Indelible Ink

Law, Procedure and Policy

“A ballot paper shall not be issued to a person who ... refuses to receive the personal mark with indelible ink or who already bears such a mark or traces of such a mark.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(3)(d)

“[The PO is responsible for] Inspecting each voter for signs of indelible ink.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12, ((emphasis in original)

“[The PO will] Inspect the right thumb of the voter for indelible ink. Tip: If there is indelible ink present then the voter has already voted. Send him/her away and inform the Presiding Officer (PrO) of what has happened.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1757	12.8
Yes	11115	80.7
No	901	6.5
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 80.7% the Polling Officer checked the cuticle of each voter’s right thumb and did not allow any voter to vote if his/her thumb had an indelible ink mark, indicating that the voter had already voted. In 6.5% of polling booths nationwide, the PO did not follow this procedure correctly, potentially enabling voters to cast ballots more than once.³⁷

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 83% the PO allowed voters to vote only if his/her thumb had no indelible ink mark, but in 6.1% the PO either did not check for an ink mark or allowed one or more voters with indelible ink marks to vote again. In 76% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the PO followed the required procedure, while in 6.3% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 77.1% of 3074 polling booths polling officer did so while in 8.2% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 82.5% and 4.9% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, POs did and did not check each voter’s right thumb for indelible ink and allowed them to vote only if their thumb had not already been marked. Similarly, in 95.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, the PO followed this procedure, but in 1.2% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 72.9% the PO checked each voter’s right thumb and prevented voters with ink marks from voting twice, but in 8.3% of polling booths the PO did not do so. In as many as 87.3% of observed male polling booths, POs checked for indelible ink and followed the correct procedure, but in 5.1% he did not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 15 polling booths, polling officials did not check the voters’ thumb for indelible ink. As with calling out the name and number of each voter and striking off the name of each voter (above), election officials opened the voting process to duplicate and fraudulent voting by failing to follow procedures regarding the application of indelible ink on voters’ thumbs consistently. All three of these procedures were carried out somewhat more inconsistently in female polling booths than in male polling booths. The ECP must re-affirm the importance of the long-standing procedure for checking voters’ thumbs for indelible ink in election officials’ training, using practical demonstration.

37. Information missing for 12.8% of observed polling booths.

Law, Procedure and Policy

"[The Polling Officer is responsible for] Applying indelible ink to the cuticle of the right hand thumb of each voter."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12, (emphasis in original)

"Inventory of Election Materials: ... Indelible Ink ..."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 26

"Polling Officer ... puts indelible ink on thumb ..."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 39, showing steps in voting process

"[The PO will] Apply indelible ink to the cuticle of the right thumb. Allow a few seconds for the ink to dry. ... Tip: It is important that the ink be applied correctly so that it is impossible to wipe out later. If the voter's skin in oily, provide a napkin/tissue so that the hand can be wiped before application of the ink."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 40


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 87% the Polling Officer applied indelible ink on the right thumb of each voter, while in 2.6% of the observed polling booth the Polling Officer did not follow this procedure, potentially enabling voters to cast ballots more than once.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1436	10.4
Yes	11976	87
No	361	2.6
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 88.6% the PO applied indelible ink on the right thumb of each voter, while in 2.6% of the observed polling booth the Polling Officer did not follow this procedure. In 82.3% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the PO followed the required procedure, while in 2.4% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 85.2% of 3074 polling booths polling officer did so while in 3.3% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 89.1% and 1.3% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, POs did and did not apply indelible ink on the right thumb of each voter. Similarly, in 95.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, the PO followed this procedure, but in 2.4% s/he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 80% the PO applied indelible ink on the right thumb of each voter, but in 3.9% of polling booths the PO did not do so. In as many as 92.8% of observed male polling booths, POs followed the correct procedure, but in 1.5% he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 40 polling booths election officials did not consistently apply indelible ink on the cuticle of each voter's thumb. This weakness in election procedure was more than twice as common in women's polling booths as in men's booths. An indelible ink mark, indicating that a person has already cast a ballot, helps prevent one voter from voting more than once. To prevent multiple voting, Presiding Officers' training for polling officials should emphasize the importance of applying indelible ink to each voter's thumb, especially in women's polling booths.

5. Preparing National Assembly (NA) Ballot

a. Filling Out Counterfoil of NA Ballot Paper

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ... the Presiding Officer shall record on the counterfoil of the ballot paper the number of the elector on the electoral roll the number of National Identity Card of the elector, stamp it with the official mark, sign it”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(e)

“First APO issues National Assembly ballot paper He (sic) will make entries on the counterfoil of the ballot paper.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 39

“[The APO1 will] Prepare the National Assembly ballot paper for voting. Tip: Make sure [you] have noted all required information on the ballot paper accurately.... Stamp the counterfoil with the official code marking stamp....”

ECP Handbook for PrO s, Pg. 43

“Filling out the Counterfoil: [APO1 will]

1. Write the voter’s NIC number...., **2.** Write the voter’s electoral roll number...., **3.** Write the Electoral Roll block code...., **4.** Write the name of the Electoral Area from the Electoral Roll....”

ECP Handbook for PrO s, Pg. 44


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 87.4% APO1 filled out the counterfoil of green NA ballot paper for each voter whereas in 1.3% s/he did not do so.³⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1557	11.3
Yes	12040	87.4
No	176	1.3
Total	13773	100


Province-wise

Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 89.6% APO1 filled out the counterfoil of NA ballot paper for each voter, but in 1% he did not. In 81.8% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APO1 did so, while in 1.8% he did not. In Sindh, in 85.1% of 3,074 polling booths, APO1 did so, while in 1.7% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 87.6% and 0.2% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APO1 did and did not fill out the counterfoil of NA ballot paper for each voter. Similarly, in 96.4% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory he did so, but in 1.2% he did not.



Gender-wise

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 81.3% APO1 filled out the counterfoil of NA ballot paper for each voter, but in 2% she did not. In as many as 92.5% of 7,473 observed male polling booths APO1 did so, but in 0.7% he did not.



Recommendation

In about one in every 100 polling booths, polling officials did not fill out the counterfoil of all NA ballots. Representation of the Peoples’ Act 1976, Section 33(2)(e) seems to require that the Presiding Officer sign each ballot counterfoil (in addition to signing the back of each ballot). The election law should be clarified to [a] eliminate the reference to the Presiding Officer’s signature on the counterfoil of every ballot, or [b] indicate that it is not the Presiding Officer who signs each counterfoil, but other polling officials in the polling booths.

38. Information missing for 11.3% of observed polling booths.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ... the Presiding Officer shall ... obtain on [the counterfoil] the thumb impression of the elector.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(e)

“A ballot paper shall not be issued to a person who ... refuses to put his thumb impression on the counterfoil”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(3)(c)

“[The APO1 will] Obtain the thumbprint of the voter on the space provided on the counterfoil. This is normally the right thumb for men and left thumb for women. Tip: If the voter has no thumb, obtain the print of the next finger! Ballot paper shall not be issued if voter refuses to put thumb impression.”

ECP Handbook for PrO s, Pg. 43

“Filling out the Counterfoil: [APO1 will] Obtain the voter’s thumbprint: Left thumb for men and right thumb for women.”

ECP Handbook for PrO s, Pg. 44


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 89.1% APO1 asked each voter to thumbprint the counterfoil of NA ballot paper, whereas in 1% he did not.³⁹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1364	9.9
Yes	12274	89.1
No	135	1
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 90.9% APO1 asked each voter to thumbprint the counterfoil of NA ballot paper, but in 0.7% he did not. In 83.4% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APO1 did so, while in 1.8% he did not. In Sindh, in 88% of 3,074 polling booths he did so, while in 1% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 90% and 1.3% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APO1 did and did not obtain each voter’s thumbprint on counterfoil of NA ballot paper. Similarly, in 95.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory APO1 did so, but in 1.2% he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 83.3% APO1 asked each voter to thumbprint the counterfoil of NA ballot paper, but in 1.2% she did not. In as many as 94% of 7,473 observed male polling booths APO1 did so, but in 0.8% he did not.

Gender-wise



39. Information missing for 9.9% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one in every 130 polling booths, polling officials did not require that all voters thumb-print their ballot counterfoils. FAFEN observation of ballot books during by-elections in 2008-2009 reveals possible fraud by polling officials or others thumb-printing multiple ballots in advance. See also C.1., "Extra Ballots Being Stamped / 'Ballot Box Stuffing.'"

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ... the ballot paper shall be stamped on its back with the official mark”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(e)

“First APO issues National Assembly ballot paper and puts official seal and his/her signature on the back of ballot paper.”

ECP Handbook for PROs, Pg. 39

“[APO1 will] On the back of the ballot paper stamp the ballot paper with the official code mark. Tip: This step is VERY important. If you do not stamp ... the back of the ballot paper, then the ballot will not be counted! Make sure that you stamp ... in the CENTER.”

ECP Handbook for PRO, Pg. 43, (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 89.3% APO1 stamped the back of each NA ballot paper with official ECP code mark, whereas in 0.9% he did not.⁴⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1347	9.8
Yes	12301	89.3
No	125	0.9
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 90.9% APO1 stamped the back of each NA ballot paper with the official ECP code mark, but in 0.7% he did not. In 83.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APO1 did so, while in 1.5% he did not. In Sindh, in 88.4% of 3,074 polling booths APO1 did so, while in 1% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 91.5% and 0.2% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APO1 did and did not do so. Similarly, in 96.4% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory he did so, but in 1.2% he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 83.8% APO1 stamped the back of each NA ballot paper with official ECP code mark, but in 1.1% she did not. In as many as 94% of 7,473 observed male polling booths APO1 did so, but in 0.7% he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 110 polling booths, election officials failed to stamp the back of ballot papers with the official code mark.

40. Information missing for 9.8% of observed polling booths.



d. Signing NA Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before a ballot paper is issued to an elector ...the ballot paper shall be ...signed by the Presiding Officer .”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(2)(d)

“First APO issues National Assembly ballot paper and puts official seal and his/her signature on the back of ballot paper.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 39

“[APO1 will] Sign [his/her] name across the official code mark. Tip: This step is VERY important. If you do not ... sign the back of the ballot paper, then the ballot will not be counted! Make sure that you ... sign in the CENTER of the ballot paper.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 43, (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1378	10
Yes	12267	89.1
No	128	0.9
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 89.1% APO1 signed the back of each NA ballot paper across the official code mark, whereas in 0.9% he did not.⁴¹


Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 90.9% APO1 signed the back of each NA ballot paper across the official code mark, but in 0.7% he did not. In 83.2% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the APO1 did so, while in 1.5% he did not. In Sindh, in 87.6% of 3,074 polling booths he did so, while in 1.3% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 91% and 0.4% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, the APO1 did and did not sign the back of each NA ballot paper across the official code mark. Similarly, in 95.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory he did, but in 1.2% he did not.

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Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 83.7% the APO1 signed the back of each NA ballot paper across the official code mark, but in 1% she did not. In as many as 93.6% of observed male polling booths APO did so, but in 0.8% he did not.

Recommendation

Only a few polling booths experienced problems with polling officials failing to sign the back of NA ballot papers, according to available data from observers. Representation of the Peoples' Act 1976, Section 33(2)(e) seems to require that the Presiding Officer sign the back of each ballot. The election law should be clarified to indicate that it is not the Presiding Officer who signs the back of each ballot, but other polling officials in the polling booths.

41. Information missing for 10% of observed polling booths.

6. Instructing Voters on Using Marking Stamp

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Attach the posters ‘Method to Mark Ballot Paper’ and ‘Names and Symbols of Candidates.’ Tip: Make sure you attach the posters in a place where they can be clearly seen by voters.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 30

“[APO2 will] Lightly ink the marking aid stamp and give it to the voter. Instruct the voter on how to mark the ballot paper. Tip: You may direct the voter towards the ‘Method to Mark the Ballot Paper’ poster.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 45

“Voting Methodology.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 46, showing how to mark and fold the ballot


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 83% APO2 inked the marking aid and instructed voters on how to use it, whereas in 5.7% he did not.⁴²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1557	11.3
Yes	11427	83
No	789	5.7
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 86.6% APO2 inked the marking aid and instructed voters on how to use it, but in 4.5% he did not. In 74.8% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APO2 did so, while in 7.7% he did not. In Sindh, in 78.7% of 3,074 observed polling booths he did so, while in 7.9% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 85.5% and 5.1% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APO2 did and did not ink the marking aid and instruct voters on how to use it. Similarly, in 72.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory, APO2 did so, but in 2.4% he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 78.9% APO2 followed this procedure, but in 4.9% she did not. In as many as 86.4% of 7,473 observed male polling booths APO2 did so, but in 6.5% he did not.

Gender-wise



42. Information missing for 11.3% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one out of every 18 polling booths, polling officials did not tell voters how to use the marking stamp on the ballot paper. Observers did not note whether the ECP explanatory poster was present in polling booths. Voter confusion about how to use the marking stamp on the ballot can cause ballots to be spoilt (see B.10.a. "Spoilt Ballot Papers") or rejected when ballots are counted. Common voter errors include marking a ballot twice, marking over the lines on a ballot so that the chosen candidate is not clear, and folding a ballot the wrong way so that there is a second ink impression on or near a second candidate symbol. [1] ECP training for polling officials should emphasize the importance of telling voters how to use the marking stamp. [2] In addition, ECP posters about how to mark a ballot should be visible to voters in every polling booth.

On the other hand, polling officials sometimes tell voters not only how to use the marking aid but also where (for what candidate) to mark the ballot. (See C.3.b., "Polling Officials Pointing to a Candidate/Party on Ballot Paper." [3] ECP training manual language should be changed from "Instruct the voter on how to mark the ballot paper" to "Instruct the voter on how to use the marking aid." [4] ECP training for polling officials should communicate that they must not instruct voters which candidate to vote for, either in words, or by pointing, or when showing voters how to use the marking aid on the ballot.

7. Secrecy of the Vote

a. Voters Going Behind Secrecy Screens to Mark Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“An election under this Act shall be decided by secret ballot...”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 28

“A Presiding Officer shall make such arrangements at the polling station that every elector may be able to secretly mark his ballot paper before folding and inserting it in the ballot box.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 30 (6)

“New screen off compartments will be used for balloting.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 8

“[APO2 will] Send the voter to the secrecy area to mark his/her ballot papers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 45. Also see Pg. 39, Step 5.


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 81.4% voters went behind secrecy screens to mark their ballot papers, whereas in 7.5% they did not.⁴³

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1536	11.2
Yes	11206	81.4
No	1031	7.5
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 84.2% voters went behind secrecy screens to mark their ballot papers, but in 6.3% they did not. In 73.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters did so, while in 10.8% they did not. In Sindh, in 79% of 3,074 observed polling booths they did so, while in 8.6% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 80.6% and 8.3% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters did and did not go behind the secrecy screens to mark their ballots. Similarly, in 95.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters did so, but in 2.4% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, 74.7% of voters went behind secrecy screens to mark their ballots, but in 8.6 % they did not. In as many as 86.9% of 7,473 observed male polling booths voters did so but in 6.5% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 13 polling booths, voters did not mark their ballots behind the new secrecy screen provided by the ECP, thereby compromising the secrecy of the vote. ECP training for election officials about the importance of voting secrecy and the new secrecy screens should include a practical demonstration of setting up a screen, positioning it in the polling booth properly, and instructing each voter to use it.

43. Information missing for 11.2% of observed polling booths.

b. People Going Behind Secrecy Screens to Help Voters

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Interference with the secrecy of voting.--A person is guilty of an offence ... if he ... interferes or attempts to interfere with an elector when he records his vote....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 88(a)

“Failure to maintain secrecy.--A Returning Officer, Assistant Returning Officer, Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer, or polling officer, or any candidate, election agent or polling agent attending a polling station ... is guilty of an offence ... if he ... fails to maintain or aid in maintaining the secrecy of voting....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 89(a)

“Where an elector is blind or is otherwise so incapacitated that he cannot vote without the assistance of a companion, the Presiding Officer shall allow him such assistance and thereupon such elector may do with such assistance anything which an elector is required or permitted to do under this Act.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(7)

“There are two circumstances under which a voter may ask for assistance: Voter is blind. Voter is disabled so that s/he cannot cast a ballot. The law allows a blind or disabled voter to receive assistance from a companion in casting his/her ballot. The assistant can be whoever the voter chooses, so long as the assister is not a candidate or candidate’s agent. In such cases the Presiding Officer must: Instruct the companion to mark the ballot papers as he is directed by the voter. ...; Keep a handwritten list of voters who needed assistance along with the names of their companions.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 54, (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1895	13.8
Yes	3700	26.9
No	8178	59.4
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 26.9% other individuals accompanied voters behind secrecy screens to help them, whereas in 59.4% they did not.⁴⁴

Province-wise




Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 26.7% people went behind secrecy screens to help voters, but in 61.5% they did not. In 29.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, individuals helped voters behind screens, while in 51.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 27.2% of 3,074 polling booths voters were helped behind screens, while in 57.9% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 17.9% and 66.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, people did and did not accompany voters behind secrecy screens to help them. Similarly, in 22.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters were accompanied behind secrecy screens, but in 64.3% they were not.

44. Information missing for 13.8% of observed polling booths.

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 27.5% voters were helped behind secrecy screens, but in 53.4 % they were not. In as many as 26.3% of 7,473 observed male polling booths other people helped voters behind screens, but in 64.4% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In more than one-fourth of polling booths, people followed voters behind voting secrecy screens. The election law and policy are clear that there are only two very limited circumstances in which anyone can go behind a screen with another voter. In addition, procedures for keeping records of helpers behind secrecy screens are not followed. ECP training for election officials should emphasize that only two kinds of voters may have a companion behind secrecy screens, that the companion cannot be a candidate or party agent, and that polling officials must record the name of each companion. See also B.8.a-d., "Voters Needing Assistance."

8. Voters Needing Assistance

a. Voters Receiving Assistance

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Where an elector is blind or is otherwise so incapacitated that he cannot vote without the assistance of a companion, the Presiding Officer shall allow him such assistance and thereupon such elector may do with such assistance anything which an elector is required or permitted to do under this Act.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(7)

“There are two circumstances under which a voter may ask for assistance: Voter is blind. Voter is disabled so that s/he cannot cast a ballot. The law allows a blind or disabled voter to receive assistance from a companion in casting his/her ballot. The assistant can be whoever the voter chooses, so long as the assister is not a candidate or candidate’s agent. In such cases the Presiding Officer must: Instruct the companion to mark the ballot papers as he is directed by the voter. ...; Keep a handwritten list of voters who needed assistance along with the names of their companions.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 54, (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	3389	24.6
Yes	9080	65.9
No	1304	9.5
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 65.9% of polling booths voters needing extra assistance took help from others, whereas in 9.5% they did not.⁴⁵

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, voters took assistance from others in 68.3% of polling booths, but in 9% they did not.⁴⁶ In 65.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters took assistance, while in 10.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 60.8% of 3,074 polling booths voters took assistance, while in 9.9% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 58.1% and 12.8% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters did and did not take assistance from others. Similarly, in 79.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters took help from others, but in 4.8% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 52% voters took assistance from others, but in 12% they did not. In as many as 77.7% of 7,473 observed male polling booths voters took help from others, but in 7.3% they did not.

Recommendation

In about two-thirds of polling booths, voters needing extra assistance got help from others (either behind the secrecy screen or otherwise). Observers noted that male voters needed and received assistance in about three-fourths of their polling booths, but women needed help only in about half of their booths. The difference may be explained by more missing data from women’s polling booths. ECP training for election officials should emphasize that only two kinds of voters may have a companion behind secrecy screens, that the companion cannot be a candidate or party agent, and that polling officials must record the name of each companion.

45. Information missing for 24.6% of observed polling booths.

46. Information missing for 36% of observed female polling booths

b. Voters Receiving Assistance from Polling Officials

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The law allows a blind or disabled voter to receive assistance from a companion in casting his/her ballot. The assistant can be whoever the voter chooses, so long as the assister is not a candidate or candidate’s agent.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 54, (emphasis in original)

“Provide assistance to confused voters. Make sure that you cater for the specific needs of voters who are elderly, ill, handicapped or disabled.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, voters who needed extra assistance took help from polling officials in 40.5% of observed polling booths, whereas in 34.8% they did not.⁴⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	3398	24.7
Yes	5577	40.5
No	4798	34.8
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, voters took assistance from polling officials in 36.7%, but in 40.1% they did not. In 45.6% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters took help from polling officials, while in 27.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 45.7% of 3,074 polling booths they did so, while in 27.3% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 43.8% and 28.4% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters did and did not take assistance from polling officials. Similarly, in 73.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters took help from polling officials, but in 11.9% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 35.8% voters took assistance from polling officials, but in 36.7% they did not. In as many as 44.4% of observed male polling booths voters took help from polling officials, but in 33.3% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about four out of every ten polling booths, voters needing extra assistance got help from polling staff (either behind the secrecy screen or otherwise). Election law and policy encourage election officials to assist voters. The rules do not bar polling officials from providing assistance behind secrecy screens. However, the law indicates that help behind secrecy screen should be given by “a companion,” rather than an official. Observers noted that male voters got help from polling officials in about two-fifths of their polling booths, but women got help from officials only in about one third of their booths. ECP training for polling personnel should emphasize that in giving assistance of any kind to voters, polling staff should be careful to avoid showing any bias or influencing voters’ electoral choices.

47. Information missing for 24.7% of observed polling booths.

c. Voters Receiving Assistance from Supporters of Candidates

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Interference with the secrecy of voting.--A person is guilty of an offence ... if he ... interferes or attempts to interfere with an elector when he records his vote....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 88(a)

“Failure to maintain secrecy.--A Returning Officer, Assistant Returning Officer, Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer, or polling officer, or any candidate, election agent or polling agent attending a polling station ... is guilty of an offence ... if he ... fails to maintain or aid in maintaining the secrecy of voting....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 89(a)

“The Polling Agent SHOULD NOT: directly question, or otherwise speak to, any voters while in the polling station, and not interfere with the voting process;”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13, (emphasis in original)

“The law allows a blind or disabled voter to receive assistance from a companion in casting his/her ballot. The assistant can be whoever the voter chooses, so long as the assister is not a candidate or candidate’s agent.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 54, emphasis added

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	3755	27.3
Yes	2970	21.6
No	7048	51.2
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, voters who needed extra assistance took help from polling agents or supporters of a certain party or candidate in 21.6% of the polling stations, whereas in 51.2% they did not.⁴⁸

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, voters took assistance from such inappropriate individuals in 21.8% of the polling booths, but in 52.7% they did not. In 19% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters took this assistance, while in 49.5% they did not. In Sindh, in 23.3% of 3,074 observed polling booths voters took assistance from such individuals, while in 47.7% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 16.7% and 52.1% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters did and did not take assistance from polling agents or supporters of a certain party or candidate. Similarly, in 25% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters did so, but in 60.7% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 21.3% voters took assistance from such individuals, but in 51% they did not. In as many as 21.8% of observed 7,473 male polling booths voters did so, but in 51.3% they did not.

48. Information missing for 27.3% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one in every five polling booths, voters needing extra assistance got help from candidate or party agents, in clear contravention of law, procedure, and best practice for democratic elections. This problem was observed slightly more frequently in Sindh and Islamabad than elsewhere in the country. Allowing polling agents to speak to voters for any reason introduces an atmosphere of inappropriate influence or coercion in the polling booth. ECP training for polling personnel must emphasize that representatives of candidates or parties may not communicate with voters in any way, including giving assistance to voters. Political parties' training for polling agents must emphasize the same message.

d. Voters Receiving Assistance from Family Members

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The law allows a blind or disabled voter to receive assistance from a companion in casting his/her ballot. The assistant can be whoever the voter chooses, so long as the assister is not a candidate or candidate’s agent.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 54, (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	2359	17.1
Yes	9040	65.6
No	2374	17.2
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, voters who needed extra assistance took help from family members in 65.6% of the polling stations, whereas in 17.2% they did not.⁴⁹

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, voters took assistance from family members in 72.3% of the polling booths, but in 13.8% they did not. In 54.8% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, voters took assistance from family members, while in 23.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 58.8% of 3,074 polling booths voters took assistance from family members, while in 19.6% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 42.9% and 32.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters did and did not take assistance from family members. Similarly, in 60.7% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters took assistance from family members, but in 31% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 61.2% voters took assistance from family members, but in 18.4% they did not. In as many as 69.4% of 7,473 observed male polling booths voters did so, while in 16.3% they did not.

Recommendation

In about two-thirds of polling booths, voters needing extra assistance got help from family members (either behind the secrecy screen or otherwise). Observers noted that male voters needed and received assistance from family members in slightly more polling booths than women did. The difference may be explained by missing data from some polling booths. ECP training for election officials should emphasize that only two kinds of voters may have a companion behind secrecy screens and that polling officials must record the name of each companion.

49. Information missing for 17.1% of observed polling booths.

9. Ensuring that Voters Fold The Ballot Paper Properly

Law, Procedure and Policy

“On receiving the ballot paper, the elector shall ... after he has so marked the ballot paper, fold and insert it in the ballot box.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 33(5)(c)

“[APO 2 will] make sure that the voter has folded his/her ballot papers. Then instruct him/her to insert the paper in the appropriate ballot box.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 45

“Voting Methodology.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 46, showing how to fold the ballot

“Valid and Invalid Ballot Papers: [Count ballots as valid if] due to over inking and wrong folding, the ink from the rubber stamp has made a second impression on another candidate’s space. Include this vote [in the count] only if it is clear in whose space the original distinct mark was put.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 63


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 76.6% APO2 ensured that voters folded ballot papers correctly and put them in correct ballot boxes, whereas in 11% he did not.⁵⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1705	12.4
Yes	10554	76.6
No	1514	11
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 78.3% APO2 made sure ballots were folded properly, while in 11.5% he did not. In 71.4% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APO2 did so, while in 10.6% he did not. In Sindh, in 75.6% of 3,074 polling booths APO2 did so, while in 10% he did not. In Baluchistan, in 75.9% and 10% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APO2 did and did not ensure that voters folded ballot papers correctly and put them in correct ballot boxes. Similarly, in 78.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory APO2 did so, but in 16.7% he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 71.2% APO2 ensured that voters folded ballot papers correctly and put them in correct ballot boxes, but in 11.2% she did not. In as many as 81.2% of observed male polling booths APO2 did so, but in 10.8% he did not.

Gender-wise



50. Information missing for 12.4% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In more than one in every ten polling booths, polling personnel did not ensure that voters folded ballots correctly and put in the correct ballot boxes. Voter confusion about how to fold the ballot can cause ballots to be spoiled (see B.10.a., “Spoilt Ballot Papers”) or rejected when ballots are counted (D.10., “Rejecting Ballot Papers in Accordance with the Rules”) Common voter errors include folding a ballot the wrong way so that there is a second ink impression on or near a second candidate symbol. ECP training for polling officials should emphasize the importance of ensuring voters have folded and deposited their ballots correctly. In addition, ECP posters about how to fold a ballot should be visible to voters in every polling booth.

10. Ballots Needing Special Handling

a. Spoilt Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Spoilt ballot paper.—(1) An elector who has inadvertently so spoilt his ballot paper that it cannot be used as a valid ballot paper may, upon proving the fact of inadvertence to the satisfaction of the Presiding Officer and returning the ballot paper to him, obtain another ballot paper and cast his vote by such other ballot paper. (2) The Presiding Officer shall forthwith cancel the ballot paper returned to him under subsection (1), make a note to that effect on the counterfoil over his own signatures and sign the cancelled ballot paper, and place it in a separate packet bearing the label “Spoilt Ballot Papers” .”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 36(1-2)

“A spoilt ballot paper is one that has been accidentally marked or torn or otherwise altered so that it cannot be used as a valid ballot paper. In case of a spoilt ballot paper, the Presiding Officer or the Assistant Presiding Officer must:

- Write the word “spoilt” at the back of the ballot paper
- Write the word “spoilt” over the signature on the counterfoil
- Place the spoilt ballot paper in the proper package ...
- Issue a new ballot paper to the voter, completing the counterfoil and stamping and signing the back of the ballot paper as you normally would.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 47


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 34% of polling booths, in case of a spoilt ballot paper, a new ballot paper was issued following the prescribed procedure, whereas in 36.8% it was not.⁵¹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	4020	29.2
Yes	4687	34
No	5066	36.8
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, the prescribed procedure was followed in 35.1% of polling booths, but in 39.6% it was not. In 32.8% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the prescribed procedure was followed, while in 29.6% it was not. In Sindh, in 32.8% of 3,074 polling booths the prescribed procedure was followed, while in 34% it was not. In Baluchistan, in 27.8% and 38.9% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, the prescribed procedure was and was not followed. Similarly, in 42.9% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory procedure was followed, but in 23.8% it was not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 31.2% the prescribed procedure was followed, but in 37.3% it was not. In as many as 36.4% of 7,473 observed male polling booths the prescribed procedure was followed, but in 36.3% it was not.

Gender-wise



51. Information missing for 29.2% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one-third of polling booths, procedures for issuing new ballot papers to replace spoilt ballots were not followed correctly. However, it is possible that this data may be inflated because some observers noted that the “procedure was not followed” in polling booths where there were no spoilt ballots. ECP training for polling officials should include a demonstration of examples of spoilt ballots and exact procedures to be followed.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Challenge of electors.--(1) If, at the time a person applies for ballot paper for the purpose of voting, a candidate or his polling agent declares to the Presiding Officer that he has reasonable cause to believe that person has already voted at the election, at the same or another polling station, or is not the person against whose name entered in the electoral roll he is seeking to vote ... the Presiding Officer may, after warning the person of the consequences and obtaining on the counterfoil his thumb impression, and if he is literate also his signature, issue a ballot paper (hereinafter referred to as “challenged ballot paper”) to that person.... (3) A ballot paper issued under sub-section (1) shall, after it has been marked and folded by the elector, be placed in the same condition in a separate packet bearing the label “Challenged Ballot Papers”, instead of being placed in the ballot box.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 35(1, 3)

“[The PrO will] Be prepared to direct or assist the Polling Officers and Assistant Presiding Officers when any problems or special cases arise, in particular handling both tendered and challenged votes.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

“Any polling agent/election agent or candidate has the right to challenge the vote of any person who s/he believes: Is impersonating another voter. Has already voted. In case of a challenged vote the Presiding Officer should Put the marked ballot papers in two Challenged Ballot Paper packets, one for National Assembly, one for Provincial Assembly. (DO NOT let the voter put the papers in the ballot box.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 52, (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 38.7% of polling booths, challenged ballots were kept separate from the NA ballot box, whereas in 31.3% they were not.⁵²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	4136	30
Yes	5326	38.7
No	4311	31.3
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 40.4% challenged votes were kept separate from the NA ballot box, but in 33.1% they were not. In 38.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, challenged votes were kept separate, while in 25.8% they were not. In Sindh, in 34.2% of 3,074 observed polling booths, challenged votes were kept separate, while in 30.9% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 37% and 29.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, challenged votes were and were not kept separate from the NA ballot box. Similarly, in 59.5% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory challenged votes were kept separate, but in 13.1% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 38.6% challenged votes were kept separate from the NA ballot box, but in 29.2% they were not. In as many as 38.7% of 7,473 observed male polling booths challenged ballots were kept separate, but in 33.1% they were not.

Gender-wise



52. Information missing for 30% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one-third of polling booths, challenged ballot papers were not kept separate from the National Assembly ballot box. Failing to follow this procedure means that challenged ballot papers were counted along with other votes. In a constituency with a significant number of challenged ballots, this failure of procedures could have an impact on a constituency's electoral result. The large number of duplicate and unverified entries in the supplemental Electoral Roll (taken from the 2002 voters' list) increased the chances of multiple voting and voter impersonation, and therefore also the chances for challenged ballots. ECP training for polling officials should include a demonstration of how a ballot could be challenged and exact procedures to be followed.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Tendered ballot papers.-- (1) If a person representing himself to be an elector applies for a ballot paper when another person has already represented himself to be that elector and has voted under the name of the person so applying, he shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of the section, to receive a ballot paper (hereinafter referred to as “tendered ballot paper”) in the same manner as any other elector. (2) A ballot paper issued under sub-section (1) shall, after it has been marked and folded by the elector, be placed in the same condition in separate packet bearing the label “Tendered Ballot Paper “ instead of being placed in the ballot box and shall not be included in the count by the Presiding Officer or the Returning Officer.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 35(1-2)

“[The PrO will] Be prepared to direct or assist the Polling Officers and Assistant Presiding Officers when any problems or special cases arise, in particular handling both tendered and challenged votes.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

“If a person comes to vote and has no ink on his finger but his name and number have already been marked in the Electoral Roll as having voted, s/he will have to give in a tendered vote. In case of a tendered vote, the Presiding Officer should ... Process the voter in a normal manner. After the voter has finished marking his/her ballot papers put them in the tendered ballot papers packet.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 50, (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, tendered ballots were kept separate from the NA ballot box in 39.8%, whereas in 28.8% they were not.⁵³

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	4320	31.4
Yes	5488	39.8
No	3965	28.8
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 40.4% tendered ballots were kept separate from the NA ballot box, but in 30.9% they were not. In 41.4% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, tendered ballots were kept separate, while in 22.6% they were not. In Sindh, in 36.1% of 3,074 polling booths tendered ballots were kept separate, while in 27.7% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 38.7% and 28% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, tendered ballots were and were not kept separate. Similarly, in 54.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory tendered ballots were kept separate, but in 14.3% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 37% tendered ballots were kept separate from the NA ballot box, but in 28.3% they were not. In as many as 42.3% of 7,473 observed male polling booths tendered ballots were kept separate, but in 29.2% they were not.

Gender-wise



53. Information missing for 31.4% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In more than one-fourth of polling booths, tendered ballot papers were not kept separate from the National Assembly ballot box. Failing to follow this procedure means that tendered ballot papers were counted along with other votes. In a constituency with a significant number of tendered ballots, this failure of procedures could have an impact on a constituency's electoral result. The large number of duplicate and unverified entries in the supplemental Electoral Roll (taken from the 2002 voters' list) increased the chances of multiple voting and voter impersonation, and therefore also the chances for tendered ballots. ECP training for polling officials should include a demonstration of the circumstances in which a ballot must be tendered and exact procedures to be followed.

11. Voters Disenfranchised

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Corrupt practice.--A person is guilty of corrupt practice if he ...causes or attempts to cause any person present and waiting to vote at the polling station to depart without voting.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 78(6)

“Undue influence.-A person is guilty of undue influence, if he- ... (a) impedes or prevents the free exercise of the franchise by an elector; or (b) compels, induces or prevails upon any elector to vote or refrain from voting.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 81(4)

“Officials not to influence voters.--A ... Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer, Polling Officer ... is guilty of an offence ... if he ... dissuades any person from giving his vote

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 90

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Never stop a qualified voter from voting without a just cause..... Never let your political opinions affect your electoral duties....Always treat everyone equally regardless of their ... political affiliation....”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“Treat all voters equally, irrespective of caste, class, gender, ethnicity and religion. Don't discriminate in favor of some voters at the expense of others.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49

“Capturing of polling station and polling booth, etc: -Whoever- (b) ... allows his supporters to exercise their right to vote and prevent others from free exercise of their right to vote; (c) ... prevents [any voter] from going to the polling station ...; or (d) being in the service of Government ... [engages in] any of the aforesaid activities or aids or connives at any such activity ... shall be guilty of an offence”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 82A


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 6.2% of polling stations a significant number of voters were prevented from casting their votes because of bias of polling officials or polling agents or because the polling station was captured. In 79.2% of polling stations, these problems were not reported.⁵⁴

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1032	14.6
Yes	442	6.2
No	5614	79.2
Total	7088	100

Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 6.7% of polling stations voters were prevented from casting their votes, while in 80.4% they were not. In 4.8% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP voters were obstructed, while in 81.9% they were not. In Sindh, in 7% of 1,615 observed polling stations voters were disenfranchised, while in 73.2% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 1.7% and 83.9% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, voters were and were not disenfranchised. Similarly, in 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory voters were not prevented from casting their votes.⁵⁵


Province-wise



54. Information missing for 14.6% of observed polling stations.

55. Information missing for 5.7% of observed polling stations.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations⁵⁶ nationwide, in 5.1% voters were prevented from casting their votes, while in 57.8% they were not. In as many as 5.6% of observed male polling stations voters were prevented from voting, but in 84.1% they were not. In 7% of 3,584 combined polling stations voters were disenfranchised, whereas in 82.8% they were not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 16 polling stations, a significant number of voters were prevented from casting ballots. See recommendations in sections below.

56. Information missing for 37.1% of observed female polling stations.

a. Voters Disenfranchised Because Polling Agent Challenged Their Right to Vote

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Any polling agent or candidate has the right to challenge the vote of any person who[m] s/he believes: Is impersonating another voter [or] Has already voted. In case of a challenged vote, the Presiding Officer should: Process the voter in a normal manner.... Put the marked ballot papers in two Challenged Ballot Paper packets, one for National Assembly, one for Provincial Assembly.....Complete the required information on both copies of Form XII: Challenged Voters List. (Do not permit the voter to leave the polling station until you complete the required information on BOTH copies of the form!)”

ECP Handbook for PROs, Pg. 52, all (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 15.1% voters were turned away without casting ballots because polling agents challenged their right to vote, whereas in 65.1% this problem was not observed.⁵⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	2729	19.8
Yes	2078	15.1
No	8966	65.1
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 15.1% voters were turned away because of polling agent challenges, but this problem was not noted in 66.3% of polling booths. In 12.7% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP voters were turned away because polling agents challenged their right to vote, while in 62.9% this problem was not reported. In Sindh, in 16.4% of 3,074 polling booths voters were turned away, while in 63.1% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 17.3% and 65.6% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters were and were not turned away. Similarly, in 10.7% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters were turned away without voting, but in 73.8% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 14.4% voters were not allowed to cast ballots because of polling agent challenges, but in 62% this problem was not observed. In as many as 15.7% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, voters were turned away, but in 67.7% they were not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every seven polling booths, voters were turned away rather than being given “challenged ballot papers” when polling agents challenged their right to vote. These voters were not permitted to cast their votes, as provided for in the election law. ECP training for election personnel should reinforce the importance of following the challenged ballot paper procedures so that no potentially qualified voter is turned away because of a polling agent’s challenge, which may or may not be justified.

57. Information missing for 19.8% of observed polling booths.

c. Voters Disenfranchised Because of Polling Officials' Bias

Law, Procedure and Policy

"Officials not to influence voters.--A Returning Officer, Assistant Returning Officer, Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer, Polling Officer or any other officer or clerk performing a duty in connection with an election, or any member of a police force, is guilty of an offence ... if he, in the conduct or management of an election or maintenance of order at a polling station, ... (b) dissuades any person from giving his vote; ... or (d) does any other act calculated to influence the result of the election.

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 90

"Breaches of official duty in connection with election.--A Returning Officer, Assistant Returning Officer, Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer or any other person employed by any such officer in connection with his official duties imposed by or under this Act, is guilty of an offence ... if he, wilfully and without reasonable cause, commits breach of any such official duty, by act or omission."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 91

"Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: As Gatekeepers of Democracy in Pakistan, Polling Personnel are mandated to ensure that all their actions are conducted according to the following [principles]: Never stop a qualified voter from voting without a just cause..... Never let your political opinions affect your electoral duties....Always treat everyone equally regardless of their gender, ethnic origin, religion, or political affiliation. This includes voters"

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16, (emphasis in original)

"Treat all voters equally, irrespective of caste, class, gender, ethnicity and religion. Don't discriminate in favor of some voters at the expense of others."


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	2762	20.1
Yes	1079	7.8
No	9932	72.1
Total	13773	100

Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 7.8% voters were turned away because of polling officials' bias, whereas in 72.1% this problem was not reported.⁵⁸

Province-wise




Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 7% voters were turned away because of polling officials' bias but this problem was not observed in 74.2% of polling booths. In 6.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP voters were turned away because of polling officials' bias, while in 70.1% they were not. In Sindh, in 11.1% of 3,074 polling booths voters were turned away for this reason, while in 67.5% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 9.6% and 73.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters were and were not turned away because of polling officials' bias. Similarly, in 4.8% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters were turned away, but in 77.4% they were not.

58. Information missing for 20.1% of observed polling booths.

Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 7.4% voters were turned away because of polling officials' bias, but in 66.9% this problem was not reported. In as many as 8.2% of observed male polling booths voters were turned away because of polling officials' bias, but in 76.5% they were not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 13 polling booths, according to observer perceptions, voters were not permitted to vote because of partisan or other bias of election personnel. The ECP must enforce the election law, including with regard to offenses committed by polling officials, such as political or other bias in the conduct of their election duties. ECP training for election personnel should emphasize neutrality and impartiality as critical to the integrity of the elections, using specific case examples to foster discussion.

d. Voters Disenfranchised Because Polling Station Captured

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Capturing of polling station and polling booth, etc:-Whoever- (a) seizes of polling station or a place fixed for the poll or makes polling authorities surrender the ballot papers or ballot box or both and doing of any other act which affects the orderly conduct of elections; (b) takes possession of a polling station or a place for the poll and allows his supporters to exercise their right to vote and prevent others from free exercise of their right to vote; (c) coerces, intimidates or threatens directly or indirectly any elector and prevents him from going to the polling station or a place fixed for the cast of his vote; or (d) being in the service of Government or corporations or institutions controlled by the Government of all or any of the aforesaid activities or aids or connives at, any such activity in the furtherance of the prospects of the election of a candidate, shall be guilty of any offence

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 82A

“The Presiding Officers having the powers of the Magistrate First Class can try summarily the following offences: Capturing the Polling Station and/or Polling Booth.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 57, See Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 86A

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	5036	36.6
Yes	1386	10.1
No	7351	53.4
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 10.1% voters were turned away because the polling station was captured, whereas in 53.4% of polling booths, this problem was not observed.⁵⁹

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 8.1% voters were turned away because a polling station was captured but in 58.3% they were not. In 15% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP voters were turned away because a polling station was captured, while in 42.6% they were not. In Sindh, in 12.6% of 3,074 polling booths voters were turned away for this reason, while in 47.1% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 7.1% and 54.7% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, voters were and were not turned away. Similarly, in 1.2% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory voters were turned away, but in 54.8% they were not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 6.2% voters were turned away because a polling station was captured, but in 67.6% they were not. In as many as 13.3% of observed male polling booths voters were turned away, but in 41.4% they were not.

59. Information missing for 36.6% of observed polling booths.

Recommendation

In about one out of every ten polling booths, according to observers, the polling station was “captured” and a significant number of voters were not permitted to vote. This problem was somewhat more common in NWFP and was twice as common at male polling booths as female polling booths. Election security is primarily the responsibility of the Presiding Officer, with support from the police or other security official assigned to the polling station. Despite the powers provided to them in the election law, Presiding Officers do not always feel empowered to take action when there is a security problem. The ECP and the state must make more effective plans for Election Day security, including coordination among polling officials and security personnel, in order to avoid the common “capture” of polling stations by armed or other locally-powerful individuals. ECP training for election personnel should emphasize their exercise of the Magisterial enforcement powers as critical to the integrity of the elections, using specific case examples to foster discussion.

12. Break in Polling

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Hours of the poll.- The Commission shall fix the hours, which shall not be less than eight, during which the poll shall be held and the Returning Officer shall give public notice of the hours so fixed and hold the poll accordingly.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 26

“Stopping of the poll.- (1)The Presiding Officer of a polling station shall stop the poll and inform the Returning Officer that he has done so if - (a) the poll at the polling station is, at any time, so interrupted or obstructed for reasons beyond the control of the Presiding Officer that it cannot be resumed during the polling hours fixed under section 26;and (b) any ballot box used at the polling station is unlawfully taken out of the custody of the Presiding Officer, or is accidentally or intentionally destroyed, or is lost or is damaged or tampered with to such an extent that the result of the poll at the polling station cannot be ascertained.”


Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 27

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1242	17.5
Yes	1861	26.3
No	3985	56.2
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 26.3% there was an unauthorized break in polling, whereas in 56.2% there was no break in polling.⁶⁰

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 25.2% there was an unauthorized break in polling, and in 58.5% there was no break. In 32.1% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP there was a break in polling, while in 51.1% there was no break. In Sindh, in 26.3% of 1,615 polling stations there was a break in polling, while in 52% there was no break. In Baluchistan, in 23.8% of 286 polling stations there was a break in polling, but in 59.8% there was none. Similarly, in 7.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory there was a break in polling, whereas in 88.7 % there was no break.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations⁶¹ nationwide, in 15% there was a break in polling, while in 46.9% there was no break. In as many as 25.8% of 2,357 observed male polling station there was a break in polling, while in 60.6% there was no break. In 30.1% of 3,584 combined polling stations there was a break in polling, whereas in 56.3% there was no break.

60. Information missing for 17.5% of observed polling stations.

61. Information missing for 38.1% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

One-fourth of all polling stations experienced an unauthorized break in the polling. This problem was somewhat more common in NWFP and at combined (male/female) polling stations. Polling stations must remain open and active for eight hours throughout Election Day, from the opening of the polls until the closing of the polls. Breaks in polling create an environment open to fraud, since ballot boxes, unused ballot papers, and other sensitive election materials may not be properly secured or supervised during the break. The ECP should emphasize in training for polling personnel that they are required to ensure that all polling stations and all booths remain open without a break throughout Election Day. Arrangements can be made to enable polling officials to take short breaks in organized shifts, if needed.

13. Closing the Polling Station

a. Closing the Polling Station at Prescribed Time

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Commission shall fix the hours, which shall not be less than eight, during which the polls shall be held, and the Returning Officer shall give public notice of the hours so fixed and hold the poll accordingly.”

The Representation of the People Act 1977, Section 26

“[PrOs will] At the precise time fixed for the closing [of polling stations], announce that the polling station is now closed.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	433	6.1
Yes	5883	83
No	772	10.9
Total	7088	100


Out of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 83% of the total the PrO closed the polling station at 5:00pm (17:00), whereas in 10.9% s/he did not close the station on time.⁶²

Province-wise



In 85.2% of the total 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, the PrO closed the polling station at 5:00pm, whereas in 9.6% s/he did not. Out of 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP, in 84.2% the PrO closed the station on time, but in 10.2% s/he did not. Out of 1,615 observed polling stations in Sindh, in 76.2% the PrO closed the station at the prescribed time, while in 15.6% s/he did not. In 84.6% of 288 observed polling stations in Baluchistan the PrO closed the station at 5:00pm, while in 4.9% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 86.8% of the observed 53 polling stations, the PrO closed the station on time, whereas in 11.3 % s/he did not.

Gender-wise



In 77.3% of 1,147 observed female polling stations the PrO closed the station at 5:00pm, while in 14.1% she did not. In 83.9% of 2,357 male polling stations the PrO closed the station at the prescribed time, while in 9.1% he did not. In 84.2% of 3,582 of observed combined polling stations, the PrOs closed the polling station on time, while in 11.1% s/he did not.

Recommendation

At about one in ten polling stations, Presiding Officers did not close the voters' queue at 5:00pm, as required. This problem was somewhat more common in Sindh and at female polling stations. Allowing voters at some polling stations to join the voting queue after 5:00pm, while voters at other polling stations are turned away after 5:00pm, creates inequality in access to the polls. This inequality has the potential to affect election results in constituencies with close contests. ECP training for polling personnel should emphasize the importance of closing all voting queues at 5:00pm (17:00), unless otherwise ordered because of special circumstances, in order to maintain equitable access to the polls by all voters.

62. Information missing for 6.1% of observed polling stations.

b. Closing Polling Station an Hour Later than Prescribed Time

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Commission shall fix the hours, which shall not be less than eight, during which the polls shall be held, and the Returning Officer shall give public notice of the hours so fixed and hold the poll accordingly.”

The Representation of the People Act 1977, Section 26

“[PrOs will] At the precise time fixed for the closing [of polling stations], announce that the polling station is now closed.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60


Out of a total of 7088 observed polling stations nationwide, 6.2% closed more than an hour late, whereas 65.5% closed at the prescribed time.⁶³

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	2008	28.3
Yes	437	6.2
No	4643	65.5
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, 5.2% polling station closed more than one hour late, and 68.3% closed on time. About 6.7% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP closed more than one hour late, while 68.4% closed at the prescribed time. In Sindh, 9% of 1,615 polling stations closed more than one hour late, while 56.3% did not. In Baluchistan, 2.8% of 286 polling stations closed late, but 65% closed on time. Similarly, in 73.6% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory closed at the prescribed time.⁶⁴

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, 2.4% polling stations closed more than one hour late, while 31.1% closed at the prescribed time.⁶⁵ As many as 5.8% of 2,357 observed male polling station closed late, while 74.2% did not. About 7.6% of 3,584 combined polling stations closed more than one hour late, whereas 70.8% closed on time.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

At about one in 15 polling stations, Presiding Officers closed the voters' queue more than one hour after the prescribed time of 5:00pm. ECP training for polling personnel should emphasize the importance of closing all voting queues at 5:00pm (17:00), unless otherwise ordered because of special circumstances, in order to maintain equitable access to the polls by all voters.

63. Information missing for 28.3% of observed polling stations

64. Information missing for 26.4% of observed polling stations.

65. Information missing for 66.5% of observed female polling stations.

c. Voters Arriving Late Allowed to Vote

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Voting after close of poll.--No person shall be given any ballot paper or be permitted to vote after the hour fixed for the close of the poll, except the persons who at that hour are present within the building, room, tent or enclosure in which the polling station is situated and have not voted but are waiting to vote.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 37

“Tip: Anyone who arrives to vote AFTER the closing must NOT be allowed to vote.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60 (emphasis in original)

“If you have a queue of voters, and it is closing time, you must allow those in the queue to vote. Tip: To make sure only those in the queue will be permitted to vote, either bring inside the polling station everyone in the queue and close the doors OR station a police officer at the end of the queue and direct him/her not to allow anyone else to join the queue.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	610	8.6
Yes	877	12.4
No	5601	79
Total	7088	100


In 12.4% of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, the PrO allowed voters to cast their votes who joined the polling station queue after the deadline of 5:00pm (17:00), whereas in 79% polling stations, s/he did not allow voters arriving late to cast a ballot.⁶⁶

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 11.4% the PrO inappropriately allowed late arriving voters to cast ballots, whereas in 81.6% of polling stations s/he did not. In 12.4% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO allowed late voters to cast ballots, while in 77.2% of polling stations, s/he did not. In Sindh, the PrO in 15.5% of 1,615 polling stations allowed late arriving voters to vote, while in 73.7% s/he did not. In Baluchistan 8.4% of 286 observed polling stations in Baluchistan the PrO allowed late arriving voters to cast ballots, while in 77.6% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 9.4% of 53 observed polling stations, the PrO allowed late voters to cast ballots, whereas in 86.8% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 14.5% the PrO inappropriately allowed late arriving voters to cast ballots, while in 75.4% she did not. In 12.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO allowed late voters to vote, while in 78.6% he did not. In 11.7% of 3,584 combined polling stations the PrO allowed late arriving voters to cast their votes, while in 80.5% s/he did not.

66. Information missing for 8.6% of observed polling stations

Recommendation

As with B.13.a. "Closing the Polling Station at the Prescribed Time," at about one in eight polling stations, Presiding Officers allowed voters to join the voting queue after 5:00pm, the prescribed closing time for all polling stations. This problem was somewhat more common in Sindh and at female polling stations. Allowing voters at some polling stations to join the voting queue after 5:00pm, while voters at other polling stations are turned away after 5:00pm, creates inequality in access to the polls. This inequality has the potential to affect election results in constituencies with close contests. ECP training for polling personnel should emphasize the importance of closing all voting queues at 5:00pm (17:00), unless otherwise ordered because of special circumstances, in order to maintain equitable access to the polls by all voters.

d. Allowing Voters in Queue to Vote

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Voting after close of poll.--No person shall be given any ballot paper or be permitted to vote after the hour fixed for the close of the poll, except the persons who at that hour are present within the building, room, tent or enclosure in which the polling station is situated and have not voted but are waiting to vote.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 37

“If you have a queue of voters, and it is closing time, you must allow those in the queue to vote.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	536	7.6
Yes	5729	80.8
No	823	11.6
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide, in 80.8% PrOs allowed those voters to cast their votes who were already in the polling station queue at 5:00pm (17:00), whereas in 11.6% of polling stations, they did not allow such voters to cast their ballots.⁶⁷

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 84.2% the PrO allowed voters to cast ballots if they were already in the voting queue at closing time, whereas in 9.5%, s/he did not. In 74.1% of 1,029 polling stations in NWFP, the PrO allowed those voters to cast their votes, while in 17.1%, s/he did not. Out of 1,615 polling stations observed in Sindh, PrOs in 76.8% of polling stations allowed such people to cast their votes, while in 13.9%, s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 78.7% of 286 polling stations the PrO allowed such voters to cast their votes, while in 9.8% s/he did not. Similarly, in 88.7% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory the PrO allowed such individuals to vote, while in 7.5% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 77.2% the PrO allowed voters in the queue at 5:00pm to cast their votes, while in 13.9% she did not. In as many as 80% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO allowed voters to cast their ballots if they arrived by 5:00pm, while in 11.2% he did not. In 82.5% of 3,582 combined polling stations, the PrO allowed such voters to cast their votes, while in 11.2% s/he did not.

Recommendation

At more than one in ten polling stations, Presiding Officers did not allow all voters who joined the voting queue before 5:00pm to cast their ballots, but instead closed the poll exactly at 5:00pm, contrary to election law and procedure. This problem was somewhat more common in Sindh. Turning away voters at some polling stations even though they joined the voting queue before 5:00pm, while allowing voters at other polling stations to cast ballots as long as they joined the queue before 5:00pm, creates inequality in access to the polls. This inequality has the potential to affect election results in constituencies with close contests. ECP training for polling personnel should emphasize the importance of allowing voters who join the voting queue before 5:00pm (17:00) to cast their ballots in order to maintain equitable access to the polls by all voters.

67. Information missing for 7.6% of observed polling stations

14. Polling Officials Remaining Inside Polling Booth Until End of Voting

Law, Procedure and Policy

“[The PrO is responsible for]: Conducting the count and preparing a statement for communication to the Returning Officer.... Assistant Presiding Officer (APO): Assisting the Presiding Officer in conducting his/her duties Polling OfficerAssisting the Assistant Presiding Officer in conducting his/her duties”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 78.3% all three required polling officials remained inside polling booth until end of voting, whereas in 2.5% they did not.⁶⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	2645	19.2
Yes	10779	78.3
No	349	2.5
Total	13773	100


Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 81.2% all three required polling officials remained in polling booths until the end of voting, but in 2.5% they did not. In 72.1% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, the required polling officials remained inside polling booths until the end of voting, while in 2.7% they did not. In Sindh, in 74.7% of 3,074 polling booths required polling officials did so, while in 2.5% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 75% and 3% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, polling official did and did not remain inside the polling booth, until the end of voting. Similarly, in 92.9% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory required polling officials remained inside the polling booths until the end of voting, but in 2.4% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 76.8% all three required polling officials remained inside polling booths until the end of voting, but in 2.7% they did not. In as many as 79.5% of 7,473 observed male polling booths they did so, but in 2.4% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 40 polling booths, one or more polling officials did not remain in the booth until the end of the voting process. There is no provision in the law or Election Commission procedures for any polling officials to leave their duty station until all ballots have been cast and counted. The departure of any polling official from the polling station creates an environment open to fraud, since multiple polling officials are needed to conduct the polling process and the ballot count and to keep all ballots and other sensitive election materials secure. [1] ECP training for polling officials should emphasize the importance of all polling personnel remaining at the polls until after the polling procedures are complete. [2] Any poll personnel who do not remain until the end of the polling should not be paid or should be officially reprimanded following uniform procedures.

68. Information missing for 19.2% of observed polling booths.

15. Closing Ballot Box Slots

Law, Procedure and Policy

“At each polling booth: After the last voter has voted the Assistant Presiding Officers should close the slots on their ballot boxes so that no additional ballot papers can be inserted.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

“After the poll is closed, pull the latches together for closing the slot and fit another seal through both of the latches. (Picture 5 & 6). Show the numbers and the ECP monogram on the 5th seal to the agents and others present in the polling booth and ask them to note / record the seal number.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 36

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	3224	23.4
Yes	9508	69
No	1041	7.6
Total	13773	100


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 69% APOs closed the slots on their ballot boxes after the last voter had voted so that no additional ballot papers could be inserted, whereas in 7.6% they did not do so.⁶⁹

Province-wise



Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 71.6% APOs followed this procedure, but in 8.6% they did not. In 63% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, APOs followed this procedure, while in 5.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 65.6% of 3,074 polling booths APOs followed this procedure, while in 7% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 68.4% and 4.3% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, APOs did and did not follow this procedure. Similarly, in 86.9% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory APOs followed this procedure, but in 6% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 69.2% APOs closed the slots on their ballot boxes after the last voter had voted so that no additional ballot papers could be inserted, but in 7.9% they did not. In as many as 68.9% of 7,473 observed male polling booths APOs followed this procedure, but in 7.3% they did not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 13 polling booths, polling officials failed to close the ballot box slots after the last vote was cast to prevent additional ballot papers from being inserted. Failure to follow this procedure opens the polling process to last-minute “ballot box stuffing” after the departure of the last voter from the polling booth. The ECP Handbook for Presiding Officers should provide clearer instructions about how to close the slots on the ballot boxes after the last voter has cast her/his ballot. The instructions on page 60 should refer back to the photographs and instructions on page 36.

69. Information missing for 23.4% of observed polling booths.

1. Extra Ballots Being Stamped/Ballot Box Stuffing

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Illegal practice.--A person is guilty of illegal practice if he ... votes ... more than once in the same polling station.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 83(1)(d)

“ Tampering with papers.-- ... a person is guilty of an offence ... if he ... (b) intentionally ... puts into any ballot box any ballot paper other than the ballot paper he is authorised by law to put in; or (c)(ii) ... takes, opens or otherwise interferes with any ballot box or packet of ballot papers in use for the purpose of election....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 87(1)(b-c)

“The Polling Agent SHOULD NOT: handle any materials, including ballot papers”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13 (emphasis in original)

“[The PrO will] Keep all forms, packets, and materials in a safe place so that nobody can tamper with them.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

“The Presiding Officer and the Polling Staff cannot in any way ... tamper with any ballot papers. To do [so] is a crime and [the polling officials] can be punished to the full extent of the law!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 55

“Law and Order Jurisdiction of the Presiding Officer: ... Attempting to vote more than once ... Stuffing the Ballot Box ... Forging a Ballot Paper”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 56

“The Presiding Officers having the powers of the Magistrate First Class can try summarily the following offenses: Tampering with ballot papers (Section 87 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976)”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 57


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 31.9% of stations ballot papers were being stamped by polling officials, polling agents or others on behalf of voters, whereas in 68.1 % this problem was not reported.

Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 32.4% ballot papers were being stamped by polling officials, polling agents or others on behalf of voters, whereas observers did not report this problem in 67.6% of polling stations. In 34% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP ballot papers were illegally stamped, while in 66% they were not. In Sindh, in 31.4% of 1,615 polling stations ballot papers were stamped illegally, while in 68.5% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 24.1% and 75.9% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, ballot papers were and were not being stamped by polling officials, polling agents or others on behalf of voters. Similarly, in 5.7% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory ballot papers were illegally stamped, while in 94.3% they were not.


Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1	0
Yes	2261	31.9
No	4826	68.1
Total	7088	100

Province-wise



Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 58.9 % ballot papers were being stamped by polling officials, polling agents or others on behalf of voters, and in 41.1% they were not. In as many as 25.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations ballot papers were tampered with, while in 74.4% they were not. In 27.4% of 3,584 combined polling stations ballot papers were being stamped by polling officials, polling agents or others on behalf of voters, whereas in 72.6% they were not.

Recommendation

In about one-third of all polling stations, ballot papers were illegally stamped by polling officials, polling agents, or others. This serious and pervasive problem was reported almost twice as often from female polling stations compared to male or combined stations. “Ballot box stuffing” is a common accusation after every election in Pakistan, leading to a loss of confidence in election results. Among the contributing factors to an environment open to extra ballots being illegally stamped and “stuffed” in ballot boxes are: [1] unclear procedures for the distribution of ballot books among polling booths; [2] failure or weaknesses in filling out (and double-checking) ballot book accounting forms; and [3] failure to fasten ballot box seals tightly (and poor instructions and photographs in the ECP training manuals on how to do so). Recommendations are as follows:

[1] The election law should more clearly define “ballot box stuffing,” with enforcement mechanisms against any polling official, polling agent, or other individual who marks more than one ballot or puts more than one ballot in a box for any reason.

[2] ECP procedures should require that all of the following information be recorded carefully and double-checked in each polling booth and station: the number of ballot books distributed to each polling booth at the beginning of Election Day (with no additional books distributed for any reason); the number of used counterfoils and unused ballot papers remaining in all ballot books at the end of the voting process; the number of voters whose names have been crossed off the voters’ list in each booth (and recorded with tick-marks throughout the voting process).

[3] ECP procedures should be changed to require counting of the number of ballots in each ballot box from each polling booth. (Counting the ballots from each box and then combining all ballots in order to count votes for each candidate can all be done at the polling station level.) An additional advantage of this recommendation is that it would enable the ECP to compile reliable sex disaggregated voter turnout data by adding the number of ballots counted from each men’s and each women’s polling booth.

[4] ECP training materials for polling officials should emphasize procedures related to preventing “ballot box stuffing,” including those described above as well as enforcement mechanisms and penalties for polling officials violating these rules or failing to prevent others from violating them.

[5] Neutral election observers and candidate/party polling agents should be trained to record the serial numbers of all ballot books issued to the polling station and to each booth in the station. They should monitor the accounting of all ballots and ballot books at the end of the voting process. Observers and agents also should compare the number of used counterfoils against the number of voters who have cast ballots in each booth (the number of voters’ names crossed off the voters’ list as well as the number of voters observers have counted in the booth) and against the number of ballots counted out of each ballot box.

2. Government Officials' Undue Influence in Polling Stations

a. Government Officials Influencing Voters in Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

"The [Election] Commission or the [Election] Commissioner may, at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend any officer performing any duty in connection with an election, or any other public functionary, or any member of the police force or any other law-enforcing agency who obstructs or prevents or attempts to obstruct or prevent the conduct of fair and impartial poll or interferes or attempts to interfere with an elector when he records his vote, or influences in any manner the polling staff or an elector or does any other act calculated to influence the result of election, and make such arrangements as it or he may consider necessary for the performance of the functions of the officer so suspended."

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 7(6)

"Undue influence.-A person is guilty of undue influence, if he- ... (a) impedes or prevents the free exercise of the franchise by an elector; or (b) compels, induces or prevails upon any elector to vote or refrain from voting; or (e) uses any official influence or governmental patronage...."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 81(4)

"There should be no factor influencing the [voters'] choice of vote on polling day."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 6


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in or nearby 3.8% of polling stations, government officials tried to influence voters, whereas in 82.3% no such inappropriate efforts to influence voters was observed.⁷⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	985	13.9
Yes	270	3.8
No	5833	82.3
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in or nearby 4.2% of polling stations, government officials tried to influence voters, but in 83.6% they were not witnessed doing so. In or nearby 3.8% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, government officials tried to influence voters, while in 83.8% observers did not witness such attempts to influence. In Sindh, in or nearby 3.4% of 1,615 observed polling stations, government officials tried to influence voters, while in 76.9% they did not. In Baluchistan, in or nearby 1% and 86.7% of 286 polling stations, respectively, government officials did and did not try to influence voters. Similarly, in or nearby 1.9% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, government officials tried to influence voters, while in 94.3% they were not witnessed doing so.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in or nearby 2.7% of polling stations, government officials tried to influence voters, while in 61.7% observers did not report these inappropriate efforts to influence voters.⁷¹ In or nearby as many as 3.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, government officials tried to influence voters, but in 86.1% they did not. In or nearby 4.3% of 3,584 combined polling stations government officials tried to influence voters, whereas in 86.4% they did not.

Gender-wise



70. Information missing for 13.9% of observed polling stations.

71. Information missing for 35.6% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

Government officials' undue influence on elections before polling day has been documented during 2007/2008 in "FAFEN Election Updates" available at www.fafen.org. The ECP should consistently enforce election laws related to government officials' undue influence both pre-election and on Election Day with serious penalties.

b. Government Officials Influencing Polling Staff in Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

"The [Election] Commission or the [Election] Commissioner may, at any time, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend any officer performing any duty in connection with an election, or any other public functionary, or any member of the police force or any other law-enforcing agency who obstructs or prevents or attempts to obstruct or prevent the conduct of fair and impartial poll or interferes or attempts to interfere with an elector when he records his vote, or influences in any manner the polling staff or an elector or does any other act calculated to influence the result of election, and make such arrangements as it or he may consider necessary for the performance of the functions of the officer so suspended."

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 7(6)

"Law and Order Jurisdiction of the Presiding Officer: ... Interfering with polling staff while they perform their duties ..."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.568

"Maintaining Law and Order: By the order of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, the Presiding Officer is authorized to act as a Magistrate 1st Class on Election Day!"

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 55-57 (following pages detailing offenses under Presiding Officers' authority)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 2.5% government officials tried to influence polling staff, whereas in 83.1% they were not observed trying to have this inappropriate influence.⁷²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1021	14.4
Yes	176	2.5
No	5891	83.1
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 2.3% government officials tried to influence polling staff, while in 85.1% observers did not witness their doing so. In 2.4% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP government officials tried to influence polling staff, while in 84.4% they did not. In Sindh, in 3.3% of 1,615 polling stations government officials tried to influence polling staff, while in 76.2% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 0.7% and 86.4% of 286 polling stations, respectively, government officials did and did not try to influence polling staff. Similarly, in 96.2% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, government officials were not observed trying to influence polling staff.⁷³

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 2.7% government officials tried to influence polling staff, while in 61.7% they were not observed doing so.⁷⁴ In as many as 3.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, government officials tried to influence polling staff, while in 86.1% they were not seen doing so. In 4.3% of 3,584 combined polling stations, government officials tried to influence polling staff, whereas in 86.4% they did not.

Gender-wise



72. Information missing for 14.4% of observed polling stations.

73. Information missing for 3.8% of observed polling stations.

74. Information missing for 36.3% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

Government officials tried to influence polling staff in about one of every 40 polling stations. ECP training for Presiding Officers should emphasize their status as Magistrate First Class on Election Day and their responsibility to enforce the election law and procedures, including against government officials influencing voters (C.2.a.) or polling personnel (C.2.b.) in polling stations. Mechanisms should be put in place to reinforce Presiding Officers' powers on Election Day, including [1] enforced penalties for Presiding Officers' failing to uphold their Magisterial law and order duties, and [2] ECP training for police on their duty to help Presiding Officers uphold these duties.

3. Impartiality/Neutrality of Polling Officials

a. Polling Officials Acting Impartially

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Neutrality: Never let your political opinions affect your electoral duties; Never wear any clothing or symbols related to any political parties or candidates; Never express your political opinions while the election is ongoing. ... Fairness: Always treat everyone equally regardless of their gender, ethnic origin, religion or political affiliation. This includes voters, polling agents, candidates and observers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“The [Election] Commission or the [Election] Commissioner may... suspend any officer performing any duty in connection with an election ... who ... attempts to obstruct or prevent the conduct of fair and impartial poll”

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 7(6)

“Undue influence.-A person is guilty of undue influence, if he- ... (a) impedes or prevents the free exercise of the franchise by an elector; or (b) compels, induces or prevails upon any elector to vote or refrain from voting; or (e) uses any official influence or governmental patronage....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 81(4)

“There should be no factor influencing the [voters’] choice of vote on polling day.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 6

“Do not bias the voter’s choice through unnecessary discussion or talk during the voting process.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49

“The Presiding Officer and the Polling Staff cannot in any way influence any voters To do [so] is a crime and [the polling officials] can be punished to the full extent of the law!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 55


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 73.4% polling officials acted impartially, whereas in 10.6% they did not.⁷⁵

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1130	15.9
Yes	5206	73.4
No	752	10.6
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 76.6% polling officials acted impartially, but in 9.5% they did not. In 75.1% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP polling officials acted impartially, while in 9.9% they did not. In Sindh, in 64.3% of 1,615 observed polling stations polling officials acted impartially, while in 13.8% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 71.7% and 11.9% of 286 polling stations, respectively, polling officials did and did not act impartially. Similarly, in 88.7% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory polling officials acted impartially, while in 1.9% they did not.

Province-wise



75. Information missing for 15.9% of observed polling stations.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 44.6% polling officials acted impartially, while in 5.4% they did not.⁷⁶ In as many as 79.7% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, polling officials acted impartially, but in 11.2% they did not. In 78.5% of 3,584 combined polling stations polling officials acted impartially, whereas in 11.9% they did not.

Recommendation

Polling officials in as many as one in ten polling stations carried out their duties in a partisan or biased manner. See below for recommendations.

76. Information missing for 50% of observed female polling stations.

b. Polling Officials Pointing to a Candidate/Party on Ballot Paper

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The [Election] Commission or the [Election] Commissioner may... suspend any officer performing any duty in connection with an election ... who ... attempts to obstruct or prevent the conduct of fair and impartial poll”

The Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 7(6)

“Undue influence.-A person is guilty of undue influence, if he- ... (a) impedes or prevents the free exercise of the franchise by an elector; or (b) compels, induces or prevails upon any elector to vote or refrain from voting; or (e) uses any official influence or governmental patronage....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 81(4)

“There should be no factor influencing the [voters’] choice of vote on polling day.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 6

“Professional Ethics for Polling Personnel: Neutrality: Never let your political opinions affect your electoral duties; ... Never express your political opinions while the election is ongoing. ... Fairness: Always treat everyone equally regardless of their gender, ethnic origin, religion or political affiliation. This includes voters, polling agents, candidates and observers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

“Instruct the voter on how to mark the ballot paper. Tip: You may direct the voter towards the ‘Method to Mark the Ballot Paper’ poster.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 45

“Do not bias the voter’s choice through unnecessary discussion or talk during the voting process.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49

“The Presiding Officer and the Polling Staff cannot in any way influence any voters To do [so] is a crime and [the polling officials] can be punished to the full extent of the law!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 55


Out of a total of 13,773 observed polling booths nationwide, in 11.3% polling officials tried to influence voters by pointing to one candidate or party symbol on ballot papers, whereas in 76.2% they did not.⁷⁷

Of 8,139 polling booths observed in Punjab, in 10.5% polling officials tried to influence voters, while in 78.9% they did not. In 12% of 2,008 polling booths observed in NWFP, polling officials inappropriately tried to influence voters, while in 70.2% they did not. In Sindh, in 12.7% of 3,074 polling booths, polling officials pointed to candidates or parties on ballots, while in 72.6% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 13.7% and 74.8% of 468 observed polling booths, respectively, polling officials did and did not try to influence voters by pointing to a certain candidate or party symbol. Similarly, in 3.6% of 84 observed polling booths in Islamabad Capital Territory they did so, but in 92.9% they did not.

Frequency Table


	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1731	12.6
Yes	1551	11.3
No	10491	76.2
Total	13773	100

Province-wise



77. Information missing for 12.6% of observed polling booths.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 6,300 observed female polling booths nationwide, in 12.5% the polling officials tried to influence the voters, but in 81.8% they did not. In as many as 10.2% of 7,473 observed male polling booths, polling officials did so, but in 81.8% they did not.

Recommendation

In more than one in ten polling booths, observers witnessed polling officials trying to influence voters by pointing to a candidate or symbol on the ballot.

- [1] The ECP training manual language should be changed from “Instruct the voter on how to mark the ballot paper” to “Instruct the voter on how to use the marking aid.”
- [2] Training for polling officials should communicate that they must not instruct voters which candidate to vote for, either in words, or by pointing, or when showing voters how to use the marking aid on the ballot.
- [3] Penalties (whether suspension or otherwise) should be enforced against any polling official violating the election law in the course of his or her election duties.

c. Polling Officials Treating All Voters Equally with Respect

Law, Procedure and Policy

"Always treat everyone equally regardless of their gender, ethnic origin, religion or political affiliation. This includes voters, polling agents, candidates and observers."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 16

"It is imperative that Polling Personnel maintain courteous behavior with voters at all times. ... Don't become rude or discourteous with voters no matter what the provocation... Treat all voters equally, irrespective of caste, class, gender, ethnicity and religion. Don't discriminate in favor of some voters at the expense of others"

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 49


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 83.3% polling officials treated all voters equally with respect, whereas in 3.9% they did not.⁷⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	908	12.8
Yes	5904	83.3
No	276	3.9
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 85.1% polling officials treated all voters equally with respect, but in 3.5% they did not. In 82.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, polling officials treated all voters with respect, while in 4.3% they did not. In Sindh, in 78.1% of 1,615 polling stations, polling officials treated all voters with respect, while in 5% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 86.4% and 2.8% of 286 polling stations, respectively, polling officials did and did not treat all voters with respect. Similarly, in 96.2% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory polling officials treated all voters with respect, while in 1.9% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 57.7% polling officials treated all voters with respect, while in 3% they did not.⁷⁹ In as many as 88.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, polling officials did so, but in 4.1% they did not. In 88% of 3,584 combined polling stations, polling officials treated all voters equally with respect, whereas in 4% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 25 polling stations, polling officials did not treat all voters equally with respect, according to observers. The problem was somewhat more serious in Sindh, where officials in about one in every 20 polling stations treated some voters disrespectfully.

78. Information missing for 12.8% of observed polling stations.

79. Information missing for 39.3% of observed female polling stations.

4. Security at Polling Stations

a. Maintaining Security at Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Maintenance of order at the polling station.-- (1)The Presiding Officer shall keep order at the polling station and may remove or cause to be removed any person who misconducts himself at a polling station or fails to obey any lawful orders of the Presiding Officer.(2) Any person removed under sub-section (1) from a polling station shall not, without the permission of the Presiding Officer, again enter the polling station during the poll and shall, if he is accused of an offence in polling station, be liable to be arrested without warrant by a Police Officer. (3) The powers under this section shall be so exercised not to deprive an elector of an opportunity to cast his vote at the polling station at which he is entitled to vote.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 32

“[The PrO has responsibility for] Making security arrangements at the polling station and limiting access only to those who have a legal right to be there.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12 (emphasis in original)

“[Police will] Maintain law and order outside the polling station at all times. ... [and] Assist the Presiding Officer in maintaining law and order inside the polling station when asked to do so.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[PrOs will] Ensure [they] have made appropriate security arrangements”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33

“[The PrO will] Periodically check on the police outside the polling station to ensure that there are no disturbances or illegal activities Tip: In case of any illegal activity, remember on this day you [PRO] have the powers of a first class magistrate!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

“Maintaining Law and Order: By the order of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, the Presiding Officer is authorized to act as a Magistrate 1st Class on Election Day!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 55-57)(following pages detailing offenses under Presiding Officers' authority


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Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1270	17.9
Yes	5542	78.2
No	276	3.9
Total	7088	100

Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 78.2% security was maintained, whereas in 3.9% it was not.⁸⁰

Province-wise




Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 80.3% security was maintained, but in 4.2% it was not. In 80.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP security was maintained, while in 3.2% it was not. In Sindh, in 72.6% of 1,615 polling stations security was maintained, while in 3.9% it was not. In Baluchistan, in 71.7% and 3.1% of 286 polling stations, respectively, security was and was not maintained. Similarly, in 75.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory security was maintained.⁸¹

80. Information missing for 17.9% of observed polling stations.

81. Information missing for 24.5% of observed polling stations.

Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 33.2% security was maintained, while in 1.3% security was disrupted.⁸² In as many as 88.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations security was maintained, but in 3.6% it was not. In 85.5% of 3,584 combined polling stations security was maintained, whereas in 4.9% it was not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

There were security problems in about one in every 25 polling stations. The problem was somewhat more serious in combined (male/female) polling stations, where about one in every 20 polling stations faced security problems. The election law does not specify the roles and responsibilities of police and other security officials during elections. In addition, the election law and regulations do not sufficiently empower Presiding Officers to implement their responsibilities as First Class Magistrates to enforce law and order in polling stations. The election law and regulations should include specific provisions to protect and empower Presiding Officers to fulfill their security responsibilities on Election Day. Presiding Officers must be given confidence that they can enforce all election laws within and around polling stations without risk of retaliation from any individual or group. [1] The role of police and other security officials – and their obligation to implement the orders of Presiding Officers – must be specified in the law. [2] The ECP should coordinate with other state institutions to provide election-related training for police and other security officers before each election. [3] Presiding Officers' lead role in ensuring security and enforcement of the law at the polling stations should be the topic of special ECP training sessions. [4] The election law should make District Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs) and Provincial Election Commissioners (PECs) responsible for supporting Presiding Officers in this effort at greater security and law & order at the polling stations.

82. Information missing for 65.5% of observed female polling stations.

b. Police/Security Officer Serving No Other Purpose than Providing Security

“[Police will] Maintain law and order outside the polling station at all times. ... Assist the Presiding Officer in maintaining law and order inside the polling station when asked to do so.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[PrOs will] Ensure [they] have made appropriate security arrangements and shared the list of permitted persons with the police officers on duty.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33

“[The PrO will] Periodically check on the police outside the polling station to ensure that there are no disturbances or illegal activities Tip: In case of any illegal activity, remember on this day you [PrO] have the powers of a first class magistrate!”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

“Police Officers should only be allowed inside the Polling Station if they are expressly invited by the Presiding Officer in order to handle a disturbance. Their role is to guard the doors to make sure that no unauthorized persons enter the building.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	532	7.5
Yes	6378	90
No	178	2.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, at 90% there was a police or security officer outside the station serving no other purpose than to maintain law and order, whereas at 2.5% of the polling stations there was no security officer or the officer was involved in some other activity than providing outside security.⁸³

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 91.3% there was an officer providing security, whereas at 2.4% there was none or the officer was conducting other activities. In 92.2% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP a security officer was performing the appropriate duties, while at 2.4% there was none. In Sindh, at 87.3% of 1,615 polling stations an officer was performing security duties only, while in 2.5% this was not the case. In Baluchistan, at 81.1% and 4.5% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, a security officer was and was not performing the appropriate duties. Similarly at 75.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory a security officer was performing the required duties.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, at 66.4% there was a security officer, while at 1.6% there was none or the officer was engaged in other activities.⁸⁴ In as many as 97.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations a security officer was performing the appropriate duties, while in 1.6% this was not the case. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, at 92.7% a security officer was engaged in appropriate duties, while in 3.4% this was not so.

83. Information missing for 7.5% of observed polling stations.

84. Information missing for 32% of observed female polling stations.

Recommendation

There were problems in about one in every 60 polling stations with police / security officers absent or involved in other activities than providing security. The problem was more serious in Baluchistan, where security officials in more than one in every 25 polling stations were involved in activities other than providing security.

c. Security Officer Present Outside Polling Station at the End of Day

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Closing the Polling Station: To make sure only those in the queue will be permitted to vote ... station a Police Officer at the end of the queue and direct him/her not to allow anyone else to join the queue. ... Their role [Police Officers] is to guard the doors to make sure that no unauthorized persons enter the building.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

“[Police will] Maintain law and order outside the polling station at all times. ... Assist the Presiding Officer in maintaining law and order inside the polling station when asked to do so.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[The PrO will] Periodically check on the police outside the polling station to ensure that there are no disturbances or illegal activities Tip: In case of any illegal activity, remember on this day you [PrO] have the powers of a first class magistrate!”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 48

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1314	18.5
Yes	5625	79.4
No	149	2.1
Total	7008	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 79.4% at the end of the day the police/security officer was present outside the polling station, whereas in 2.1% there was no security officer.⁸⁵

Province-wise



Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 81.4% at the end of the day the police/security officer was present outside the polling station, but in 2% s/he was not present. In 81.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP at the end of the day the police/security officer was present outside the polling station, while in 2.6% s/he was not. In Sindh, in 73.7% of 1,615 polling stations there was a police/security officer present outside the polling station, while in 2.4% there was not. In Baluchistan, in 74.8% and 0.7% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, a police/security official was and was not present. Similarly, in 71.7% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory a police/security official was present at the end of the day.⁸⁶

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 33.7% there was a police/security official present outside the polling station at the end of the day, while in 0.6% there was not.⁸⁷ In as many as 90.2% of 2,357 observed male polling stations there was a police/security official present outside the polling station at the end of the day, but in 2% there was not. In 86.8% of 3,584 combined polling stations there was a police/security official present outside the polling station at the end of the day, whereas in 2.6% there was not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 50 polling stations, the police/security official was not on duty at the end of the voting process.

85. Information missing for 18.5% of observed polling stations.

86. Information missing for 28.3% of observed polling stations.

87. Information missing for 65.6% of observed female polling stations.

5. Unauthorized Individuals in Polling Stations

a. Unauthorized Persons Allowed in Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Admission to the polling station.--The Presiding Officer shall, subject to such instructions as the Commission may give in this behalf, regulate the number of electors to be admitted to the polling station at a time and shall exclude from the polling station all other persons except- (a) any person on duty in connection with the election; (b) the contesting candidates, their election agents and polling agents; and (c) such other persons as may be specifically permitted by the Returning Officer.

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 31

“[The PrO has responsibility for] Making security arrangements at the polling station and limiting access only to those who have a legal right to be there.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12 (emphasis in original)

“Invite into the polling station those people who are permitted by law to be there, i.e. polling agents / election agents / candidates / authorized observers or any other individual who has a letter of authority from the DRO [District Returning Officer] or ECP [Election Commission of Pakistan]. Tip: Ensure you have made appropriate security arrangements and shared the list of permitted persons with the police officers on duty.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33

“Their role [Police Officers] is to guard the doors to make sure that no unauthorized persons enter the building.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 66.7% only authorized persons were allowed in the polling station, whereas in 14.4% unauthorized people were allowed in also.⁸⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1337	18.9
Yes	4727	66.7
No	1024	14.4
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 67.9% only authorized persons were allowed in the polling station, but in 15.2% others were allowed in also. In 70.8% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP only authorized persons were allowed in, while in 15% unauthorized other people were allowed also. In Sindh, in 60.6% of 1,615 voters this law was followed, while in 13.7% it was not. In Baluchistan, in 68.5% and 7.3% of 286 polling stations, respectively, this law was and was not followed. Similarly, in 69.8% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory only authorized persons were allowed in, whereas in 3.8% other people were also allowed in.

Province-wise



88. Information missing for 18.9% of observed polling stations.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 31.6% only authorized persons were allowed into polling stations, while in 7% unauthorized people were also permitted inside.⁸⁹ In as many as 76.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, only authorized people were allowed in, while in 14.1% others were allowed in as well. In 71.6% of 3,584 combined polling stations, authorized people were the only ones permitted inside, whereas in 17% unauthorized people were inside the polling station.

Recommendation

There were unauthorized individuals in about one in every seven polling stations. This serious breach of polling station security and integrity is a common problem in Pakistan elections. To increase security inside polling stations and decrease the potential for disruption of the polling process, intimidation and/or influence of voters and/or polling officials, ballot tampering, and other electoral malfeasance, only authorized individuals should be permitted inside polling stations and booths. [1] The election law must be clarified with regard to who is authorized to be inside polling stations, who can give authorization through what procedure, and what each category of persons is authorized to do inside polling stations. [2] Presiding Officers must be empowered to enforce limits on who enters polling stations. [3] Police and security officials must be trained to support Presiding Officers in restricting access to polling stations. [4] Any Presiding Officer or police/security officials failing to enforce the law with regard to unauthorized persons in polling stations should be sanctioned.

89. Information missing for 61.4% of observed female polling stations.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Disorderly conduct near polling station.--A person is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both, if he, on the polling day ... does any act which (a) disturbs or causes annoyance to any elector visiting a polling station for the purpose of voting; or (b) interferes with the performance of the duty of a Presiding Officer, Assistant Presiding Officer, Polling Officer or any person performing any duty at a polling station...

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 86(3)

“[The PrO has responsibility for] Making security arrangements at the polling station and limiting access only to those who have a legal right to be there.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 12 (emphasis in original)

“[Police will] Assist the Presiding Officer in maintaining law and order inside the polling station when asked to do so.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13

“[PrOs will] Ensure [they] have made appropriate security arrangements”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 33

“The Presiding Officers having powers of the Magistrate First Class can try summarily the following offenses: ... Capturing the polling station and/or polling booth Disorderly conduct [in or] near the polling station”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 57


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 20.9% armed people were present, whereas in 58.1% this problem was not reported.⁹⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1490	21
Yes	1481	20.9
No	4117	58.1
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 20.6% armed people were present, but in 61% they were not. In 21.4% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP armed people were present, while in 60.6% they were not. In Sindh, in 21.5% of 1,615 polling stations armed people were present, while in 50.9% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 19.6% and 49.7% of 286 polling stations, respectively, armed people were and were not present. Similarly, in 24.5% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, armed people were present, while in 49.1% they were not.

Province-wise



90. Information missing for 21% of observed polling stations.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations nationwide, in 11.3% armed people were present there, while in 21.6% there weren't any.⁹¹ In as many as 20.2% of 2,357 observed male polling stations armed people were present, but in 69.2% this problem was not reported. In 24.4% of 3,584 observed combined polling stations armed people were present, whereas in 62.4% they were not.

Recommendation

Individuals with weapons were present in at least one in five polling stations. Weapons in polling stations are not specifically prohibited by law, but they compromise the security and integrity of the election process. To maintain security and avoid creating an atmosphere of intimidation and coercion in polling stations, the election law should specify that no weapons may be brought into any polling station except by police and security officials. This rule should be enforced by Presiding Officers and security personnel.

91. Information missing for 67% of observed female polling stations.



Section II

Ballot Counting and Results Consolidation

A. Ballot Counting

B. Consolidation of Results

1. Ensuring Transparency of Counting Process

a. Allowing Authorized Individuals to Observe Vote Counting

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Proceedings at the close of poll.—(1)The Presiding Officer shall count the votes immediately after the close of the poll in the presence of such of the contesting candidates, election agents and polling agents as may be present. (2) The Presiding Officer shall give such of the contesting candidates, election agents and polling agents as may be present reasonable facility of observing the count and give them such information with respect thereto as can be given consistent with the orderly conduct of the count and the discharge of his duties in connection therewith.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38

“The Observers and Journalists may watch all aspects of the management and conduct of the election including actual polling on Election Day without any interference in proceedings. They may also watch vote counting and result consolidation.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007-08, Pg. 48

“After the last voter has voted, close the polling station and do not allow anyone inside except Polling Officials, Polling Agents, Candidates and Accredited Observers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

“Conducting the Count: Create a counting space in the center of the room. Invite observers and polling agents to view the process.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	468	6.6
Yes	6195	87.4
No	425	6
Total	7088	100

Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country in 87.4%, PO allowed candidates, polling agents/ accredited observers to observe counting process, whereas in 6% polling stations he did not.¹

Province-wise




Of 4,105 polling stations observed in Punjab, in 90% Presiding Officers allowed candidates/polling agents and accredited observers to observe the counting process, whereas in 5.1%, s/he did not. Of 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP, in 87.4% the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process and in 6.6% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 81.5% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process, but in 7.9% polling stations, s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 83.6% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/ accredited observers to observe the counting process, while in 6.6% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 90.6% of 53 observed polling stations the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process, whereas in 3.8% s/he did not.

1. Information missing from 6.6% polling stations

Out of 1,147 observed female polling stations, in 83.1% the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process, but in 6.4% she did not. In 87.6% of the 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process, but in 5.6% he did not. In 88.7% of 3,584 observed combined polling stations the PrO allowed candidates/polling agents/accredited observers to observe the counting process, but in 6.1% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in 17 polling stations, authorized individuals were not permitted to witness the counting of votes, compromising the transparency and integrity of the electoral process. Accredited observers and polling agents must have access to all aspects of the election process from the preparation for opening of the polling stations to the consolidation of results, as defined by international best practice for election administration and observation and the ECP “Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007-08”.

b. Allowing Unauthorized Individuals to Observe Vote Counting

Law, Procedure and Policy

“No person other than the Presiding Officer, the Polling Officer, any other person on duty in connection with the poll, the contesting candidates, their election agents and polling agents shall be present at the count.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(3)

“After the last voter has voted, close the polling station and do not allow anyone inside except Polling Officials, Polling Agents, Candidates and Accredited Observers.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

“[Police Officers’] role is to guard the doors to make sure that no unauthorized persons enter the building [during the ballot counting].”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	496	7
Yes	849	12
No	5743	81
Total	7088	100


Out of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide, in 12% the PrO allowed unauthorized persons to stay in polling stations during the counting process, whereas in 81% s/he did not.²

Province-wise



In 10.8% of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, the PrO allowed unauthorized persons to stay in polling stations during the counting process, whereas in 83.4% s/he did not. In 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP the PrO in 13.6% allowed unauthorized persons to stay in polling stations during the counting process, but in 79.6% s/he did not. In Sindh the PrO in 14.1% of 1,615 observed polling stations allowed unauthorized persons to remain during the counting process, but in 76.5% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 286 observed polling stations, in 12.2% the PrO allowed unauthorized persons to stay during the counting process, but in 75.9% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, the PrO in 3.8% of the observed 53 polling stations allowed unauthorized persons to stay during the counting process, whereas in 92.5% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of 1,147 observed female polling stations, in 10.5% the PrO allowed unauthorized persons to stay in polling stations during the counting process, but in 79.6% she did not. In 10.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO allowed unauthorized persons to stay for the counting process, but in 81.6% he did not. In 3,582 combined polling stations, the PrO in 13.2% allowed unauthorized persons to stay during the counting process, but in 81.1% s/he did not.

2. Information missing from 7% polling stations

Recommendation

There were unauthorized individuals in about one in every eight polling stations during the counting process. This serious breach of election security and integrity is a common problem in Pakistan elections. To increase security during the counting process and decrease the potential for disruption, intimidation and/or undue influence of polling officials, ballot tampering, and other electoral malfeasance, only authorized individuals should be permitted inside polling stations during the counting process. See also C.5.a.

c. Allowing FAFEN Observers to Closely Observe Vote Counting

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Proceedings at the close of poll.— The Presiding Officer shall give such of the contesting candidates, election agents and polling agents as may be present reasonable facility of observing the count and give them such information with respect thereto as can be given consistent with the orderly conduct of the count and the discharge of his duties in connection therewith.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(2)

“The Observers and Journalists may watch all aspects of the management and conduct of the election including actual polling on Election Day without any interference in proceedings. They may also watch vote counting and result consolidation.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 48

“Conducting the Count: Create a counting space in the center of the room. Invite observers and polling agents to view the process.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	418	5.9
Yes	6296	88.8
No	374	5.3
Total	7088	100


In 88.8% of the observed polling stations nationwide, the PrO allowed accredited FAFEN observers (and others) to sit or stand close enough to the counting table to see the mark on each ballot paper, whereas in 5.3% polling stations, he did not.³

Province-wise



In 90.7% of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, the PrO allowed FAFEN observers to observe the counting process closely, whereas in 4.8% s/he did not. In NWFP, the PrO in 90.7% of 1,029 observed polling stations allowed close observation of the counting, but in 3.6% s/he did not. In Sindh, the PrO in 83.2% of 1,615 polling stations allowed close observation, while in 8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 85.7% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO permitted close counting observation, but in 3.8% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, the PrO in 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations allowed close observation, but in 3.8% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of 1,147 observed female polling stations, in 85.5% the PrO allowed accredited FAFEN observers (and others) to sit or stand close enough to see the mark on each ballot paper, but in 5.1% she did not. In 89.1% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO allowed close observation of the counting process, but in 4.7% he did not. In 3,582 combined polling stations observed, in 89.7% the PrO allowed close observation, but in 5.7% s/he did not.

3. Information missing from 5.9% polling stations

Recommendation

FAFEN observers were not allowed to carefully observe the ballot counting process in about one out of every 20 polling stations. The ballot counting is as important as any other part of the election process. The election law should be amended (in line with ECP policy during the 2007-08 elections) to specify that accredited neutral observers must have access to closely observe the ballot counting process, along with polling agents and candidates.

d. Keeping Ballot Boxes in Clear View of Observers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Proceedings at the close of poll.— The Presiding Officer shall give such of the contesting candidates, election agents and polling agents as may be present reasonable facility of observing the count and give them such information with respect thereto as can be given consistent with the orderly conduct of the count and the discharge of his duties in connection therewith.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(2)

“The Observers and Journalists may watch all aspects of the management and conduct of the election including actual polling on Election Day without any interference in proceedings. They may also watch vote counting and result consolidation.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 48

“Conducting the Count: Create a counting space in the center of the room. Invite observers and polling agents to view the process.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	461	6.5
Yes	6431	90.7
No	196	2.8
Total	7088	100


In 90.7% of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide, all National Assembly ballot boxes remained in clear view of observers during entire counting process, whereas in 2.8% they were not always in clear view.⁴

Province-wise



In 92.6% of the 1,147 observed polling stations in Punjab, all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view during entire counting process, whereas in 2.3% they did not. In 91.2% of 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP, all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view during entire counting process, but in 2.7% they did not. In Sindh, all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view during entire counting process in 86% of 1,615 polling stations, but in 4.1% they did not. In Baluchistan in 87.8% of 286 observed polling stations, all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view, whereas in 2.4% they did not. All ballot boxes were in clear view in 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory.

Gender-wise



Of 1,147 female polling stations observed in 87.6%, all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view during the entire counting process, but in 2.4% they were not always in view. All NA ballot boxes remained in clear view during entire counting process in 91% of the observed male polling stations, but in 2.1% they did not. Out of 3,582 observed combined polling stations, in 91.5% all NA ballot boxes remained in clear view, while in 3.3% they did not.

4. Information missing from 6.5% polling stations

Recommendation

In about one in every 35 polling stations, ballot boxes were not in clear view throughout the counting process, hampering the transparency and security of this essential stage of the process. Observers and polling agents should be trained to “follow the ballot boxes,” focusing their attention on the security of the most sensitive election materials, and insist that ballot boxes always remain in clear view in polling booths and stations. ECP Presiding Officers should ensure that ballot boxes are always within view of poll watchers.

e. Allowing Only Polling Staff to Touch Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The polling agent SHOULD NOT...handle any materials including ballot papers...”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 13 (emphasis in original)

“The observer SHOULD NOT...handle any materials, including ballot papers....”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 14 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	617	8.7
Yes	5331	75.2
No	1140	16.1
Total	7088	100


In 75.2% of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide only ECP officials were allowed to touch ballot papers, whereas in 16.1% of polling stations, Presiding Officers also allowed others to touch ballot papers, including candidates and polling agents.⁵

Province-wise



In 75.9% of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, only ECP officials were allowed to touch ballot papers, whereas in 17.2% others handled ballots as well. In 80.2% of 1,029 observed polling stations in NWFP, only ECP officials were allowed to handle ballot papers, but in 11.1% others also did so. In Sindh, out of 1,615 polling stations observed, in 70.2% the PrO allowed only ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 17.5% others handled ballots as well. In Baluchistan in 73.1% of 286 observed polling stations, the PrO allowed only ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 11.9% the PrO allowed others to do so. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 88.7% of 53 observed polling stations the PrO allowed only ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 5.7% s/he allowed others to do so as well.

Gender-wise



Of 1,147 observed female polling stations, in 69.6% the PrO allowed only ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 17.9% she allowed others to handle ballots as well. In 77.2% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO allowed only ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 13.9% he allowed others as well. Of 3,582 combined polling stations, in 75.7% the PrO only allowed ECP officials to touch ballot papers, but in 16.9% others also did so.

Recommendation

In about one in every six polling stations Presiding Officers permitted non-ECP polling personnel, including candidates and polling agents, to handle ballot papers during the ballot counting process, potentially compromising the integrity of the process. The election law is silent on this issue. The election law and ECP procedure should specify that only ECP personnel may handle ballot papers during the counting process, except under very limited circumstances that should be defined carefully.

5. Information missing from 8.7% polling stations

2. Closing Doors Before Counting Begins

Law, Procedure and Policy

"[Police officers'] role is to guard the doors to make sure that no unauthorized persons enter the building [during the ballot counting]."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 60


In 86.3% of 7088 polling stations observed nationwide, PO locked the room during counting process and no one was allowed to leave till the end of process whereas in 7.1% polling stations, he did not.⁶

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	463	6.5
Yes	6119	86.3
No	506	7.1
Total	7088	100


In 89.2% of 4105 observed polling stations in Punjab, PO locked the room during counting of ballots and no one was allowed to leave till completion of the process whereas in 5.7% polling stations, he did not. In NWFP, in 87.5% of 1029 observed polling stations PO locked the room during counting of ballots and no one was allowed to leave till end of counting and in 6.4% polling stations, he did not. In Sindh of 1615 polling stations observed, in 78.9% PO followed this procedure and in 11.3% polling stations, he did not. In Baluchistan of 286 polling stations observed in 81.1% PO did so and in 8.7%, he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 98.1% of 53 observed polling stations PO did so while in 1.9% he did not.

Province-wise



In 81.7% of 1147 female polling stations observed PO locked the room during counting of ballots and no one was allowed to leave till the end of counting and in 9.2%, she did not. In 87.7% of 2357 observed male polling stations PO did so and in 5.6%, he did not. Out of 3582 combine polling stations, in 86.9% he did so and in 7.5% polling stations, he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in seven polling stations, the door of the counting room was not secured to prevent people from entering or leaving. It is common practice in Pakistan elections to prevent anyone from exiting the room during the process. However, this procedure is not reflected in the election law or ECP written materials. ECP policy about locking the counting room should be put in writing and revisited to ensure safety and security by including some carefully defined exceptions and caveats.

6. Information missing from 6.5% polling stations

3. Showing Ballot Box Seals

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Reopening the Ballot Box: ... Before breaking the seals show the seal numbers to the polling agents and other persons present in the polling station and ask them to match the seal numbers they recorded earlier (before and after the polling).”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 3 (but not referenced on pages 60-61 on “Closing the Polling Station” and “Counting the Votes”)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	524	7.4
Yes	5952	84
No	612	8.6
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 84% the PrO announced the ballot box seal numbers before opening the seals, whereas in 8.6% of polling stations, s/he did not.⁷

Province-wise



In 85.8% of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, the PrO called out the ballot box seal numbers before opening the seals, whereas in 8.6% s/he did not. In 85.1% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO announced ballot box seal numbers at the time of opening them, but in 7.9% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 78.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO announced ballot box seal numbers, but in 9.6% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 81.5% and 7% of 286 observed polling stations, respectively, the PrO did and did not do so. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 90.6% of 53 observed polling stations, the PrO announced ballot box seal numbers, but in 3.8% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 77.9% the PrO called out the numbers of ballot box seals before breaking the seals, but in 11.2% she did not. In 84.4% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO followed this procedure, but in 7.9% he did not. Out of 3,584 observed combined polling stations, in 85.6% the PrO announced ballot box seal numbers at the time of opening them, while in 8.3% s/he did not.

Recommendation

At about one in every 12 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not read out loud the numbers on the ballot box seals before breaking the seals. To enable polling agents and observers to monitor whether ballot boxes have been opened and resealed during Election Day, Presiding Officers should show or call out the numbers on the seals at the beginning of the voting process and again at the beginning of the counting process.

7. Information missing from 7.4% polling stations

4. Emptying Contents of NA Ballot Boxes on Table

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Create a counting space in the center of the room Empty the contents of all NA ballot boxes on the table. [Note (above): The following process will be repeated while counting the Provincial Assembly votes.]”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 68.9% the PrO unsealed and opened only the green National Assembly ballot boxes and put all NA ballots together for counting in the presence of observers/polling agents, whereas in 4% of polling stations, this procedure was not followed.⁸

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1918	27.1
Yes	4884	68.9
No	286	4
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations, in Punjab in 72.1% the PrO opened only NA ballot boxes and counted those ballots first, but in XXX% he did not follow this procedure. In 74.9% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO opened NA boxes first, but in 2.9% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 58.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO followed this procedure, but in XX% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 56.6% and 6.3% of 286 polling stations, respectively, the PrO did and did not open NA ballot boxes first. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 79.2% of 53 observed polling stations, the PrO did so.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 61.8% the PrO emptied NA ballot boxes first, but in 4.6% she did not.⁹ In 72.1% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO did so, but in 4.2% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 69.1% the PrO followed the procedure, but in 3.7% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every 25 polling stations the Presiding Officer opened NA and PA ballot boxes simultaneously. For an orderly and transparent ballot counting process, and to avoid tampering with Provincial Assembly ballots, Presiding Officers should open only National Assembly ballot boxes for counting and then afterwards open Provincial Assembly ballot boxes for separate counting.

8. Information missing from 27.1% polling stations

9. Information missing from 33.6% polling stations

5. Removing White PA Ballot Papers for Counting Later

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Remove any white PA ballot papers [from the NA ballot boxes] for counting later.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	720	10.2
Yes	6070	85.6
No	298	4.2
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 85.6% the PrO put aside white PA ballots accidentally deposited in green NA ballot boxes before counting the NA votes, whereas in 4.2% s/he did not.¹⁰

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 89.5% the PrO put aside white PA ballots for counting later, whereas in 2.9% s/he did not. In 78.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO followed this procedure, but in 7.8% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 82.8% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO did so, whereas in 4.7% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 80.1% of 286 polling stations the PrO did so, but in 5.9% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 34% of the observed polling stations the PrO did so, but in 15.1% he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 83% the PrO put aside white PA ballots accidentally deposited in NA ballot boxes, but in 4.2% s/he did not. In as many as 84.5% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO did so, but in 4.2% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 87.2% the PrO followed this procedure, but in 4.2% s/he did not.¹¹

Recommendation

In about one in every 25 polling stations the Presiding Officer removed white PA ballot papers accidentally deposited in NA ballot boxes before counting the NA ballots.

10. Information missing from 10.2% polling stations

11. Information missing from 50.9% polling stations

6. Accounting for All Ballot Papers Before Counting

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall (a) open the used ballot box or ballot boxes and count the entire lot of ballot papers taken out therefrom; (b) open the packet bearing the label ‘Challenged Ballot Papers’ and count them.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(4)

“Counting the Votes: [Step 1] Preparation for the Count. [Step 2] General counting of all National Assembly ballot papers. Counting of all challenged votes.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 61

“Count and recount ALL NA ballot papers. Enter total number of ballot papers on Line 2, Form XV.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 80.2% the PrO accounted for all ballot papers from all polling booths before starting the counting process, whereas in 10.9% s/he did not.¹²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	631	8.9
Yes	5683	80.2
No	774	10.9
Total	7088	100


In 81.8% of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, the PrO accounted for all ballot papers from all polling booths before starting the counting process, whereas in 10.8% s/he did not. In NWFP, in 82.6% of 1,029 polling stations, the PrO did so, but in 8.6% s/he did not. In Sindh of 1615 polling stations observed, in 75.6% the PrO did so, but in 11.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 78.7% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO did so, but in 9.8% s/he did not. In 52.8% of 53 polling stations observed in Islamabad Capital Territory the PrO accounted for all ballot papers before starting the counting process, whereas in 43.4% polling stations, he did not.

Province-wise



Out of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 75.1% the PrO accounted for all ballot papers from all polling booths before starting the counting process, but in 12.4% she did not. In 81.2% of 1,029 observed male polling stations the PrO did so, but in 9.8%, he did not. Of 3,582 combined polling stations observed, in 81.1% the PO followed this procedure, but in 11.2% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one in every nine polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not open all ballot boxes from all polling booths and account for all NA ballot papers before beginning the vote counting. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots. Uniform procedures should be followed, including opening all National Assembly ballot boxes from all polling booths and accounting for all ballot papers before beginning the vote counting process.

12. Information missing from 8.9% polling stations

7. Counting All NA Ballot Papers Twice


Law, Procedure and Policy
 “Count and recount ALL NA ballot papers.”
ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	669	9.4
Yes	6272	88.5
No	147	2.1
Total	7088	100


In 88.5% of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, the Presiding Officer counted all NA ballots twice, whereas in 2.1% s/he did not.¹³

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 90.6%, all NA ballots were counted twice, whereas in 1.5% they were not. In 88.5% 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, all NA ballots were counted twice, but in 2.6% they were not. In Sindh, in 83.5% of 1,615 observed polling stations, all NA ballots were counted twice, but in 3.2% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 83.9% of 286 observed polling stations all NA ballots were counted twice, whereas in 3.1% they were not. All NA ballots were counted twice in 96.2% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 85.4% all NA ballots were counted twice, while in 2.4% they were not. In as many as 88% of 2,357 observed male polling stations all NA ballots were counted twice, but in 2% they were not. Out of 3,584 observed combined polling stations, in 89.8% all NA ballots were counted twice, but in 2.1% they were not.

Recommendation
 In about one out of every 50 polling stations, Presiding Officers did not count the total number of National Assembly ballot papers twice, as required. Presiding Officers must be held responsible for carefully accounting for all ballot papers issued to each polling station on specific forms for this purpose, including serial numbers of ballot books issued to the polling station and to each polling booth, total used ballots, spoilt ballots, invalid ballots, challenged ballots, ballots for each candidate, and serial numbers of unused ballots. Training for Presiding Officers should emphasize these procedures through demonstration of each step and each form.

13. Information missing from 9.4% polling stations

8. Entering Number of NA Ballot Papers to the Ballot Paper Account Form

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Count and recount ALL National Assembly ballot papers. Enter total number of Ballot Papers on Line 2, Form XV.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations nationwide, in 88.1% the PrO wrote the total number of green National Assembly ballot papers on the Ballot Paper Account Form (form XV), whereas in 1.2% s/he did not.¹⁴

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	763	10.8
Yes	6241	88.1
No	84	1.2
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 90.1% the PrO entered the number of NA ballot papers on the Ballot Paper Account Form, whereas in 0.8% s/he did not. In 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, in 87.8% the PrO followed this procedure, but in 1.7% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 83.7% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO did so, but in 1.7% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 83.2% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO did so, but in 2.1% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 94.3% of the 53 observed polling stations the PrO did so.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 83.9% the PrO noted the number of NA ballot papers on the Ballot Paper Account Form, while in 1.5% s/he did not. In as many as 87.1% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO followed this procedure, but in 1.1% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 90% the PrO did so, but in 1.1% he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of 80 polling stations, Presiding Officers did not write the total number of National Assembly ballot papers on the Ballot Paper Account Form. Presiding Officers must be held responsible for carefully accounting for all ballot papers issued to each polling station on specific forms for this purpose, including serial numbers of ballot books issued to the polling station and to each polling booth, total used ballots, spoiled ballots, invalid ballots, challenged ballots, ballots for each candidate, and serial numbers of unused ballots. Training for Presiding Officers should emphasize these procedures through demonstration of each step and each form.

14. Information missing from 10.8% polling stations

9. Determining Valid and Invalid Ballot Papers

a. Examining Each Ballot Paper

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Examine ballot papers for validity.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1759	24.8
Yes	5167	72.9
No	162	2.3
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 polling stations observed nationwide in 72.9% the PrO examined each ballot paper to check its validity, whereas in 2.3 % s/he did not.¹⁵

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 76.6% the PrO examined each ballot paper for validity, and in 2.2% s/he did not. In 76.3% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO examined each ballot for validity, and in 2.3% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 63.3% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO did so, while in 2.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 61.9% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO followed this procedure, and in 1% s/he did not. In 71.7% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory the PrO did so.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 67.4% the PrO examined each ballot paper for validity, and in 2.6% she did not.¹⁶ In as many as 76% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO examined each ballot paper to check its validity, and in 2.2% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 72.6% the PrO examined each ballot paper for validity, but in 2.2% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In about one in every 50 polling stations the PrO did not examine each ballot paper carefully to check its validity according to the election law. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots such that Presiding Officers examine each ballot one by one and are better informed and more effective with regard to determining whether each ballot is valid or invalid.

15. Information missing from 24.8% polling stations
 16. Information missing from 30% polling stations



b. Determining Invalid Ballot Papers in Accordance with the Rules

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall count, in such manner as may be prescribed, the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate excluding from the count the ballot papers which bear (i) no official mark and signature of the Presiding Officer; (ii) any writing or any mark other than the official mark, the signature of the Presiding Officer and the prescribed mark or to which a piece of paper or any other object of any kind has been attached; (iii) no prescribed mark to indicate the contesting candidate for whom the elector has voted; or (iv) any mark from which it is not clear for whom the elector has voted: Provided that a ballot paper shall be deemed to have been marked in favour of a candidate if the whole or more than half of the area of the prescribed mark appears clearly within the space containing the name and symbol of that candidate and, where the prescribed mark is divided equally between two such spaces, the ballot paper shall be deemed invalid.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(4)

“Invalid ballot papers are those on which it is not possible to determine the voter’s choice of candidates; [or] which are not marked according to the law. While counting ballot papers: Exclude the following: 1. Those with no official codemark and signature of the Assistant Presiding Officer; 2. Those that are not official ballot papers; 3. Those marked with a rubber stamp other than the one supplied for marking the ballot paper; 4. Those where any piece of paper or other object has been attached; 5. Those where there is no rubber stamp mark indicating a choice or where more than one candidate has been marked; 6. Those whose rubber stamp mark is equally divided between two candidate spaces or is not within any candidate space. Include the following: 1. Those where – due to over-inking and wrong folding – the ink from the rubber stamp has made a second impression on another candidate’s space. Include this vote only if it is clear in whose space the original distinct mark was put; 2. Those where the rubber stamp mark goes over the line between two candidates’ spaces, but the majority of the stamp is [in] one candidate’s space. Count the vote for that candidate; 3. Those where there is more than one mark for the same candidate.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 63


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 61.8% the PrO rejected invalid and otherwise excludable ballot papers in accordance with the rules defined by the law, but in 17.7% s/he did not.¹⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1451	20.5
Yes	4382	61.8
No	1255	17.7
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 66% the PrO rejected ballot papers in accordance with the rules, and in 17% s/he did not. In 59.9% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO determined invalid ballot papers in accordance with the rules, while in 19.1% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 54.6% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO followed the correct procedure, whereas in 18.1% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 50.3% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO did so, and in 21% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 60.4% of 53 observed polling stations the PrO did so, and in 13.2% s/he did not.

Province-wise



17. Information missing from 20.5% polling stations

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 56.8% the PrO rejected ballot papers as invalid in accordance with the rules, but in 18% she did not.¹⁸ In as many as 61.6% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO rejected ballot papers in accordance with the rules, and in 17.3% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 63.5% the PrO followed invalid ballot paper procedures correctly, but in 17.9% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In more than one out of every six polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not reject invalid ballots according to the rules defined in the election law. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers are better informed and more effective with regard to determining whether each ballot is valid or invalid. Election law and ECP forms and handbooks also should be more consistent in the language used to describe invalid ballots, which are variously referred to as “excluded,” “rejected,” “doubtful,” and “invalid.”

18. Information missing from 25.2% polling stations

c. Determining as Invalid Ballot Papers without an Official Stamp and Signature

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall count, in such manner as may be prescribed, the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate excluding from the count the ballot papers which bear (i) no official mark and signature of the Presiding Officer....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(4)

“Invalid ballot papers are those on which it is not possible to determine the voter’s choice of candidates; [or] which are not marked according to the law. While counting ballot papers: exclude the following: 1. Those with no official codemark and signature of the Assistant Presiding Officer....”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 63


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 86.7% the PrO checked for the official stamp and signature on the back of each ballot paper and rejected those without either of the two, while in 4.4% s/he did not.¹⁹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	632	8.9
Yes	6144	86.7
No	312	4.4
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 89% the PrO checked each ballot paper for stamp and signature on its back, while in 4% s/he did not. In 87.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO followed this procedure, but in 4.9% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 80.5% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO did so, and in 5.6% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 84.3% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO did so, and in 2.4% s/he did not. In 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory the PrO checked each ballot paper for official stamp and signature, while in 1.9% s/he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 81.4% the PrO examined the back of each ballot paper for stamp and signature, but in 5.6% she did not. In as many as 2,357 observed male polling stations, in 87.4% the PrO followed the correct procedure, but in 3.8% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 87.9% the PrO checked each ballot paper for official stamp and signature, and in 4.4% he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 22 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not reject as invalid ballots without an official stamp and signature on the back, as prescribed by law. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers examine each ballot one by one and are better informed and more effective with regard to determining whether each ballot is valid or invalid.

19. Information missing from 8.9% polling stations

d. Determining as Invalid Ballot Papers without Clear Voter's Choice

Law, Procedure and Policy

"The Presiding Officer shall count, in such manner as may be prescribed, the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate excluding from the count the ballot papers which bear (iv) any mark from which it is not clear for whom the elector has voted: Provided that a ballot paper shall be deemed to have been marked in favour of a candidate if the whole or more than half of the area of the prescribed mark appears clearly within the space containing the name and symbol of that candidate and, where the prescribed mark is divided equally between two such spaces, the ballot paper shall be deemed invalid."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(4)

"Invalid ballot papers are those on which it is not possible to determine the voter's choice of candidates; [or] which are not marked according to the law. While counting ballot papers: Exclude the following: ... 5. Those where there is no rubber stamp mark indicating a choice or where more than one candidate has been marked; 6. Those whose rubber stamp mark is equally divided between two candidate spaces or is not within any candidate space. Include the following: 1. Those where – due to over-inking and wrong folding – the ink from the rubber stamp has made a second impression on another candidate's space. Include this vote only if it is clear in whose space the original distinct mark was put; 2. Those where the rubber stamp mark goes over the line between two candidates' spaces, but the majority of the stamp is [in] one candidate's space. Count the vote for that candidate; 3. Those where there is more than one mark for the same candidate."


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 63

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	765	10.8
Yes	5791	81.7
No	532	7.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 81.7% the PrO rejected as invalid ballot papers with an unclear voter's choice, but in 7.5% s/he did not.²⁰

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 85.9% the PrO rejected such ballot papers, and in 5.8% s/he did not. Of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, in 80.6% the PrO rejected such ballot papers, while in 9.1% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 72.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO rejected such ballot papers, and in 10.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan, in 73.4% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO rejected such ballot papers, while in 8% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, out of 53 observed polling stations, in 88.7% the PO rejected ballot papers on which the voter's choice was not clear, but in 5.7% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 76.1% the PrO followed procedures correctly for rejecting ballot papers without a clear voter choice, but in 9.2% she did not. In as many as 82.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO did so, and in 6.6% he did not.²¹ Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 82.7% the PrO rejected such ballot papers, while in 7.5% s/he did not.

20. Information missing from 10.8% polling stations

21. Information missing from 18.5% polling stations

Recommendation

In about one out of every 14 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not reject as invalid ballots on which the voter's electoral choice was unclear, as prescribed by law. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers

e. Separately Piling Invalid Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The ballot papers excluded from the count shall be put in a separate packet indicating thereon the total number both in letters and figures of the ballot papers, contained therein.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(7)

“Place all invalid ballot paper sin ECP II NA packet.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

“Completing the ‘Statement of the Count’: ... Line ii: Enter the total number of doubtful votes excluded from the count.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 64-65

“After the count is complete make sure you have the following items in front of you before you begin the packing process: ... 2. Doubtful ballot papers that have been excluded from the count...”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 69 and 70

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	789	11.1
Yes	5923	83.6
No	376	5.3
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 83.6 % the PrO piled invalid votes separately, but in 5.3% s/he did not.²²

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 86.6% the PrO piled invalid votes separately, and in 4.9% s/he did not. In of 84.8% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO piled invalid votes separately, but in 4.9% s/he did not. In Sindh, in 75.7% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO piled invalid votes separately, and in 6.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 80.1% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO piled invalid votes separately, and in 5.2% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 84.9% of 53 observed polling stations the PrO piled invalid votes separately, but in 1.9% he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 79.9% the PrO piled invalid votes separately, but in 6% she did not. In as many as 2,357 observed male polling stations, in 83.6% the PrO piled invalid votes separately, and in 5% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations in 84.7% the PrO piled invalid votes separately, but in 5.2% he did not.

22. Information missing from 11.1% polling stations

Recommendation

In about one out of every 20 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not put invalid ballots in a separate pile, as prescribed by law. Invalid ballots should be placed in a separate pile to protect the transparency and integrity of the ballot counting process and accounting for all ballots. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers place (or instruct to be placed) each ballot in a separate pile for either a candidate or invalid (rejected) ballots.

10. Disputes about Valid and Invalid Ballots

a. Polling Agents Demanding That Invalid Ballots be Considered Valid

Law, Procedure and Policy


"There is no provision in the election law or ECP Handbooks for polling agents to dispute whether a ballot is valid or invalid.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	921	13
Yes	3225	45.5
No	2942	41.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country in 45.5% polling agents demanded that some of the rejected (invalid) ballots should be counted as valid votes, but in 41.5% no polling agents made such demands.²³

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 45.2% polling agents demanded that some of the rejected ballots should be declared valid, while in 44.4% they did not. Of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, in 44.3% polling agents made such demands, and in 42.1% they did not. In Sindh out of 1,615 observed polling stations, in 49.3% polling agents made these demands, while in 32.4% they did not. In Baluchistan in 37.8% of 286 observed polling stations, polling agents made such demands, while in 44.1% they did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in 17% of 53 observed polling stations polling agents made such demands, and in 69.8% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 38.3% polling agents demanded that some rejected ballots should be counted as valid votes, but in 45.1% they did not. In as many as 2,357 observed male polling stations, in 45.1% polling agents made such demands, and in 41% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 48% polling agents made these demands, and in 40.7% they did not.

Recommendation

Polling agents in almost half of polling stations argued that some ballots rejected as invalid should be accepted as valid. It is positive that polling agents participated actively in the ballot counting process. However, the election law and procedure are silent on whether this participation is permitted and how Presiding Officers should handle it. The election law and/or ECP procedure should define whether and how polling agents may challenge the rejection of ballots as invalid and how Presiding Officers should maintain order in the counting process while addressing those challenges, which should be handled uniformly in all polling stations to ensure fairness and equity in the election process. Polling agents also should have comprehensive training to ensure that they understand under what circumstances a ballot must be rejected as invalid.

23. Information missing from 13% polling stations

b. Polling Agents Demanding That Some Ballot Papers be Considered Invalid

Law, Procedure and Policy

There is no provision in the election law or ECP Handbooks for polling agents to dispute whether a ballot is valid or invalid.


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 53.8% polling agents demanded that some of the ballots should be rejected and declared as invalid, whereas in 33.4% no polling agents made such demands.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	903	12.7
Yes	3815	53.8
No	2370	33.4
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 54% polling agents made such demands, and in 35.8% they did not. Of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, in 57.1% polling agents demanded this, and in 28.8% they did not. In Sindh, in 52.7% of 1,615 observed polling stations, polling agents made such demands, and in 29.8% they did not. In Baluchistan in 51% of 286 observed polling stations, polling agents made such demands, and in 31.5% they did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 28.3% of observed polling stations polling agents demanded this, and in 62.3%, they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 47.7% polling agents demanded that some ballots should be rejected as invalid, but in 36% they did not. In as many as 52.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, polling agents made such demands, and in 33.2% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 56.3% polling agents demanded this, and in 32.8% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

Polling agents in more than half of polling stations argued that some ballots counted as valid should be rejected as invalid. It is positive that polling agents participated actively in the ballot counting process. However, the election law and procedure are silent on whether this participation is permitted and how Presiding Officers should handle it. The election law and/or ECP procedure should define whether and how polling agents may challenge the counting of valid ballots and how Presiding Officers should maintain order in the counting process while addressing those challenges, which should be handled uniformly in all polling stations to ensure fairness and equity in the election process. Polling agents also should have comprehensive training to ensure that they understand under what circumstances a ballot must be counted as valid.

24. Information missing from 12.7% polling stations

11. Separately Accounting for Each Candidate's Votes

a. Separating Ballots for Each Candidate

Law, Procedure and Policy

"The Presiding Officer shall count, in such manner as may be prescribed, the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate"

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(4)

"The valid ballot papers cast in favour of each contesting candidate shall be put in separate packets and each such packet shall be sealed and shall contain a certificate as to the number, both in letters and figures, of the ballot papers put in it and shall also indicate the nature of the contents thereof, specifying the name and symbol of the contesting candidate to whom the packet relates."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(6)

"Counting the Votes: [Step 2] ... Candidate-specific counting of valid National Assembly ballot papers.... Candidate-specific counting of challenged National Assembly ballot papers...."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 61

"Conducting the count: Distribute valid ballot papers according to candidates.... Place candidate-specific ballot papers in ECP I NA packet."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

"After the count is complete make sure you have the following items in front of you before you begin the packing process: ... 1. Counted valid ballot papers for each candidate"


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 69 and 70

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	418	5.9
Yes	6296	88.8
No	374	5.3
Total	7088	100

Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 88% the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate, but in 2.7%, s/he did not.


Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 90.9% the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate, but in 1.8% s/he did not. In 86.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate, but in 5%, s/he did not. In Sindh, in 81.8% of 1,615 observed polling stations, ballots for each candidate were piled separately, but in 3.6% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 84.6% of 286 observed polling stations the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate, but in 3.5% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations, the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate.

Out of a total of 1,147 observed female polling stations, in 85.4% the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate and in 2.4% she did not. In as many as 88% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate and in 2.4% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 88.8% the Presiding Officer separately piled ballots for each candidate and in 3% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 40 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not put ballots for each candidate in a separate pile, as required. Ballots for each candidate should be placed in separate piles to protect the transparency and integrity of the ballot counting process and accounting for all ballots. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers place (or instruct to be placed) each ballot in a separate pile for either a candidate or invalid (rejected) ballots.

b. Counting Each Candidate's Votes Twice

Law, Procedure and Policy

"Count and recount valid candidate-specific NA ballot papers."


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	771	10.9
Yes	5963	84.1
No	354	5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 84.1% each candidate's votes were counted twice, but in 5%, they were not.²⁶

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 86.6% each candidate's votes were counted twice while in 4.4% they were not. In 83.2% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, each candidate's votes were counted twice and in 6.1% they were not. In Sindh, in 79.4% of 1,615 observed polling stations, each candidate's votes were counted twice, but in 5.6% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 76.6% of 286 observed polling stations each candidate's votes were counted twice and in 7.7% they were not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 96.2% of 53 polling stations observed each candidate's votes were counted twice.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 80.9% each candidate's votes were counted twice and in 4.8% they were not. In as many as 84.1% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, each candidate's votes were counted twice and in 4.8% they were not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 85.1% each candidate's votes were counted twice and in 5.2% they were not.

Recommendation

In about one out of every 20 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not count the ballots for each candidate twice, as required. Ballots for each candidate should be counted twice to protect the transparency and integrity of the ballot counting process and accounting for all ballots. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers count each candidate's ballots twice.

26. Information missing from 10.9% polling stations

12. Challenged Votes

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Conducting the Count: Count valid challenged votes per candidate. Enter number of challenged votes in Column 4 of Statement of the Count.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62

“Completing the ‘Statement of the Count’” Column 4: Enter the total number of valid challenged votes polled by each candidate.” .”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 64-65 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 60.8% challenged votes were counted separately, but in 18% they were not.²⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1497	21.1
Yes	4312	60.8
No	1279	18
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 62% challenged votes were counted separately, while in 19.2% they were not. In 63.9% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, challenged votes were counted separately and in 16.1% they were not. In Sindh, in 56.3% of 1,615 observed polling stations, challenged votes were counted separately, but in 17.2% they were not. In Baluchistan, in 55.2% of 286 observed polling stations challenged votes were counted separately and in 16.4% they were not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 73.6% of 53 observed polling stations challenged votes were counted separately, and in 3.8% they were not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 55.7% challenged votes were counted separately, but in 18.1% they were not. In as many as 60.3% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, challenged votes were counted separately and in 17.6% they were not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations in 62.8% challenged votes were counted separately and in 18.3% they were not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In more than one out of every six polling stations, challenged ballot papers were not counted separately, as required. Challenged ballots should be counted separately to protect the transparency and integrity of the ballot counting process and accounting for all ballots. Election law, regulations, and training materials should describe much more carefully the procedures to be followed for counting of ballots in order to ensure that Presiding Officers count challenged ballots separately.

27. Information missing from 21.1% polling stations

13. Statement of the Count Form

a. Filling Out Statement of the Count Form XIV For NA

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall, immediately after the count, prepare a statement of the count in such form as may be prescribed showing therein the number of valid votes polled by each contesting candidate and the ballot papers excluded from the count.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(9)

“Complete TWO Statement of the Count Forms, one for National Assembly and one for the Provincial Assembly.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 64-65 (emphasis in original)

“The Statement of the Count is the ‘result’ of each polling station. The Form is to be CAREFULLY filled at the end of the count for both National and Provincial Assembly”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 66 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	998	14.1
Yes	5866	82.8
No	224	3.2
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 82.8% the PrO filled out Statement of the Count Form XIV for the National Assembly soon after counting NA ballot papers, while in 3.2% s/he did not.

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 85.6% the PrO filled out Statement of the Count Form XIV for the NA soon after counting NA ballots, but in 2.6% s/he did not. In 83.6% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP the PrO followed this procedure, but in 3.5% s/he did not. In Sindh in 75.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, the PrO did so, but in 4.4% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 78% of 286 observed polling stations, the PrO did so and in 3.1% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 83% of 53 observed polling stations, the PrO filled out Statement of the Count Form XIV for the NA soon after counting NA ballots.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 79% the PrO filled out Statement of the Count Form XIV for the NA soon after counting NA ballots, but in 2.5% she did not. In as many as 81.8% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO did so, but in 3.2% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations in 84.6% the PrO did so, but in 3.4% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In about one out of every 30 polling stations, the Presiding Officer filled out the National Assembly Statement of the Count soon after counting the NA ballot papers.

28. Information missing from 14.1% polling stations

b. Polling Agents/Candidates Signing Statement of the Count Form XIV

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall obtain on each statement and packet prepared under this section the signature of such of the contesting candidates or their election agents or polling agents as may be present and, if any such person refuses to sign, the Presiding Officer shall record that fact.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(13)

“All polling/election agents and/or candidates present are required to sign on the original copy of the completed [Statement of the Count] form.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country in 83.9% all polling agents/candidates signed the Statement of the Count form, while in 4.6% they did not.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	821	11.6
Yes	5944	83.9
No	323	4.6
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 86.1% all polling agents/candidates signed Statement of the Count form, but in 4.4% they did not. In 82.8% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, all polling agents/candidates signed the Statement of the Count form, and in 5.4% they did not. In Sindh, in 79.4% of 1,615 observed polling station all polling agents/candidates signed Statement of the Count form and in 4.5% polling stations, they did not. In Baluchistan, in 79.7% of 286 observed polling stations polling agents/candidates signed Statement of the Count form and in 4.5%, they did not. In 90.6% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory all polling agents/candidates signed Statement of the Count form, and in 1.9% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 79.6% polling agents/candidates signed Statement of the Count form and in 4.5% they did not. In as many as 83.4% of 2,357 observed male polling stations all polling agents/candidates signed statement of count form, and in 4.8% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 85.5% polling agents/candidates signed the Statement of the Count form, but in 4.4%, they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In more than one out of every 25 polling stations, some polling agents/candidates did not sign the Statement of the Count form.

29. Information missing from 11.6% polling stations

14. Ballot Paper Account Form

a. Filling Out Ballot Paper Account Form

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall also prepare in the prescribed form a ballot paper account showing separately (a) the number of ballot papers entrusted to him; (b) the number of un-issued ballot papers; (c) the number of ballot papers taken out of the ballot box or boxes and counted; (d) the number of tendered ballot papers; (e) the number of challenged ballot papers; and (f) the number of spoilt ballot papers.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(10)

“Complete TWO Ballot Paper Account Forms, one for National Assembly and one for Provincial Assembly.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.67-68

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	780	11
Yes	6143	86.7
No	165	2.3
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 86.7% the PrO filled out a National Assembly Ballot Paper Account form, whereas in 2.3% s/he did not.³⁰

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 88.9% the PrO filled out a Ballot Paper Account form, whereas in 1.9% s/he did not. In 86.2% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO filled out a Ballot Paper Account form and in 3.5% s/he did not. In Sindh in 81.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO followed this procedure, but in 2.5% s/he did not. In 81.8% of 288 observed polling stations in Baluchistan the PrO filled out a Ballot Paper Account form and in 3.1% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 92.5% of 53 observed polling stations the PrO filled out the required form.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 82.7% the PrO filled out a National Assembly Ballot Paper Account form and in 2.3% she did not. In as many as 86% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO filled out a Ballot Paper Account form, but in 2% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 88.4% the PrO filled out a Ballot Paper Account form and in 2.6% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In about one in 40 polling stations the Presiding Officers did not fill out a Ballot Paper Accounting form. Presiding Officers must be held responsible for carefully and accurately accounting for all ballot papers issued to each polling station on specific forms for this purpose, including serial numbers of ballot books issued to the polling station and to each polling booth, the total number of used ballots, spoilt ballots, invalid ballots, challenged ballots, ballots for each candidate, and serial numbers of unused ballots. Training for Presiding Officers should emphasize these procedures through demonstration of each step and each form.

30. Information missing from 11% polling stations

b. Polling Agents/Candidates Signing NA Ballot Paper Account Form

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall obtain on each statement and packet prepared under this section [including the ballot paper account] the signature of such of the contesting candidates or their election agents or polling agents as may be present and, if any such person refuses to sign, the Presiding Officer shall record that fact.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(13)

“All polling agents/candidates who have witnessed the count should be asked to sign this form [Ballot Paper Account Form XV].”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.68


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 82.4% all polling agents/candidates signed the NA Ballot Paper Account Form, but in 5.1% they did not.³¹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	879	12.4
Yes	5844	82.4
No	365	5.1
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 85.2% all polling agents/candidates signed the NA Ballot Paper Account Form, but in 4.7% they did not. In 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, all polling agents/candidates signed the ballot account form in 81.3% polling stations, but in 6.4% they did not. In Sindh in 76.5% of 1,615 observed polling stations all polling agents/candidates did s, but in 5.9% they did not. In Baluchistan in 79.4% of 286 observed polling stations polling agents/candidates signed the NA Ballot Paper Account Form and in 4.2% they did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 88.7% of the observed polling stations all polling agents/candidates did so, but in 1.9% they did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 77.1% all polling agents/candidates signed the NA Ballot Paper Account Form and in 6.2% they did not. In as many as 81.9% of 2,357 observed male polling stations all polling agents/candidates signed the NA Ballot Paper Account Form, but in 4.9% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 84.5% all polling agents/candidates did so, but in 5% they did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 20 polling stations, some polling agents/candidates did not sign the Ballot Paper Account Form.

31. Information missing from 12.4% polling stations

15. Packing Ballot Papers and Accounting Forms

a. Packing Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall seal in separate packets—(a) the un-issued ballot papers; (b) the spoilt ballot papers; (c) the tendered ballot papers; (d) the challenged ballot papers; (e) the marked copies of the electoral rolls; (f) the counterfoils of used ballot papers; (g) the tendered votes list; (h) the challenged votes list; and (i) such other papers as the Returning Officer may direct.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(12)

“All forms and materials should be packed according to the following instructions and transported to the Returning Officer. Polling agents, candidates, and observers are permitted to view this process. Note: Each form and packet must be sealed and signed by the Presiding Officer and all the candidates and agents present.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.70 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	710	10
Yes	6269	88.4
No	109	1.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country in 88.4% polling staff placed all counted ballot papers in appropriate packets, whereas in 1.5% they did not.³²

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 90.7% counted ballot papers were placed in appropriate packets and in 1% they were not. In 87.3% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, counted ballot papers were placed in appropriate packets and in 3.6% they were not. In Sindh in 83.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, all counted ballot papers were placed in appropriate packets, but in 1.6% they were not. In Baluchistan in 85% of 286 observed polling stations all counted ballot papers were put in appropriate packets, but in 1.7% they were not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 94.3% of 53 observed polling stations, polling officials put all counted ballot papers in appropriate packets.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 85% all counted ballot papers were placed in appropriate packets, but in 1.3% they were not. In as many as 88% of 2,357 observed male polling stations polling officials placed all counted ballot papers in appropriate packets and in 1.4% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 89.9% all counted ballot papers were placed in appropriate packets and in 1.7% they were not.

Recommendation

In about one out of every 70 polling stations, polling personnel did not pack all counted ballots and other election materials as required.

32. Information missing from 10% polling stations

b. Packing Original NA Statement of the Count with Election Material

Law, Procedure and Policy

"After the close of the [ballot counting] proceedings under the foregoing subsection, the The Presiding Officer shall, in compliance with such instructions as may be given by the Commission in this behalf cause the packets, the statement of the count and the ballot paper account prepared by him to be sent to the Returning Officer together with such other records as the commission may direct."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(5)

"A copy of the statement of count shall be sealed in an envelope which shall be put in the polling bag required to be sent to the Returning Officer."

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Election 2007, Pg. 38

"Place the original (top) copy of the [Statement of the Count] from in the bag of election materials to be sent to the Returning Officer."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg. 62 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 83.9% the PrO packed the original National Assembly Statement of the Count form with the other election materials to send to the Returning Officer, while in 3% s/he did not.³³

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	929	13.1
Yes	5947	83.9
No	212	3
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 86.7% the PrO packed the original NA Statement of the Count with other election material for the RO, but in 2.3% s/he did not. In 83.2% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, the PrO followed this procedure, but in 4.8% s/he did not. In Sindh in 77.8% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO did so, but in 3.8% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 80.4% of 286 observed polling stations the PrO did so, and in 2.4% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 88.7% of 53 observed polling stations, the PrO followed this procedure.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 78.8% the PrO packed the original NA Statement of the Count with other election materials to send to the RO, but in 4.2% she did not. In as many as 83.5% of 2,357 observed male polling stations the PrO did so, while in 2.6% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 85.8% the PrO did so and in 2.8% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In about one out of every 30 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not pack the original Statement of the Count with the other election materials to send to the Returning Officer.

33. Information missing from 13.1% polling stations

16. Distributing Copies of NA Statement of the Count

a. To Polling Agent/Candidate

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall give a certified copy of the statement of the count and the ballot paper account to such of the candidates, their election agents or polling agents as may be present and obtain a receipt for such copy.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(11)

“The Presiding Officer, after observing due formalities, shall prepare the Statement of the Count in the prescribed form and shall provide a carbon copy of the statement to the polling agents present at the polling station. He shall obtain signatures of polling agents, as may be present, on the statement of count before issuing it.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38 and see also page 31

“Distribute the remaining copy (sic) to the Polling/Election Agents and/or Candidates present during the count. If more copies are needed, fill out another set of forms. Each agent is entitled to a copy of the form.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	904	12.8
Yes	5699	80.4
No	485	6.8
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 80.4% all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the National Assembly Statement of the Count, while in 6.8% not all received a copy³⁴

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 84% all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 5.5% they did not. In 76.1% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 10.8% they did not. In Sindh in 73.9% of 1,615 observed polling stations, all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 8.3% they did not. In Baluchistan, in 79.7% of 286 polling stations, all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, while in 4.9% they did not. In 84.9% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 3.8% they did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 74.1% all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 9.1% they did not. In as many as 80.7% of 2,357 observed male polling stations all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 6.2% they did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations in 82.2% all polling agents/candidates present received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 6.5% they did not.

34. Information missing from 12.8% polling stations

Recommendation

In about one out of every 15 polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not provide each polling agent or candidate with a copy of the Statement of the Count, as required by law. The problem was somewhat more common in women's polling stations, in which agents/candidates were not provided the Statement of the Count in one out of every 11 polling stations. Presiding Officers should be held responsible for ensuring that each polling agent and/or candidate present in the polling station is provided with a copy of the Statement of the Count at the end of the ballot counting process. The election law and procedure should be amended to require that each accredited observer present in the polling station also receive a copy of the Statement of the Count.

b. To Accredited Observers

Law, Procedure and Policy


“There is no provision in the election law or policy for accredited observers to receive a copy of the Statement of the Count.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1151	16.2
Yes	4410	62.2
No	1527	21.5
Total	7088	100


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 62.2% each accredited observer received a copy of the National Assembly Statement of the Count, but in 21.5% observers were not provided a copy of the polling station election “result.”

Province-wise



Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 65.6% each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 20.4% observers did not receive a copy. In 58.5% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 23.7% s/he was not provided with a copy. In Sindh in 54.7% of 1,615 observed polling stations each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 24.6% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 66.4% of 286 observed polling stations each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 14.7% s/he did not. In 77.4% of 53 observed polling stations in Islamabad Capital Territory, each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, and in 9.4% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed, in 58.3% each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, but in 21.6% she did not receive a copy. In as many as 62.4% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, whereas in 20.6% polling stations he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 63.3% each accredited observer received a copy of the NA Statement of the Count, while in 22.1% s/he did not.

Recommendation

In about one out of every five polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not provide accredited election observers with a copy of the Statement of the Count. Giving neutral observers a copy of the polling station “result” is not required by law or mentioned in ECP procedural handbooks, but doing so would significantly add to the transparency of the electoral process and particularly the consolidation of electoral results. The election law and ECP procedure should be amended to require Presiding Officers to give a copy of the Statement of the Count to each accredited observer present in the polling station at the end of the ballot counting process.

35. Information missing from 16.2% polling stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

“After the close of the proceedings under the foregoing subsections, the Presiding Officer shall, in compliance with such instructions as may be given by the Commission in this behalf, cause the packets, the statement of the count and the ballot paper account prepared by him to be sent to the Returning Officer together with such other records as the Commission may direct.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(15)

“The Presiding Officer shall arrange to deliver the copy of the statement of count to the concerned Returning Officer by the quickest possible means.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

“1. Place the original (top) copy of the [Statement of the Count] form in the bag of election materials to be sent to the Returning Officer. 2. Send one copy [of the Statement of the Count] immediately to the Returning Officer.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 72.1% the Presiding Officer sent a copy of the NA Statement of the Count to the Returning Officer soon after the counting of ballot papers, but in 9.7% of polling stations the PrO did not immediately send a copy of the Statement of the Count to the RO.³⁶

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1291	18.2
Yes	5110	72.1
No	687	9.7
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab in 76.1% the PrO sent a copy of the NA Statement of the Count to the RO soon after counting of ballot papers, but in 9.1% s/he did not. In 68.5% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP the PrO sent a copy of the NA Statement of the Count to the RO soon after counting of ballot papers, and in 11.1% s/he did not. In Sindh in 65.3% of 1,615 observed polling stations the PrO followed this procedure, but in 10.3% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 66.4% of 286 observed polling stations, the PrO sent a copy immediately to the RO, whereas in 10.5% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory the PrO in 67.9% of 53 observed polling stations did so, but in 9.4% s/he did not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 67.8% the PrO sent a copy of the NA Statement of the Count to the RO immediately after counting of ballot papers, but in 9.2% she did not. In as many as 71.7% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, the PrO sent a copy of the NA Statement of the Count to RO soon after counting of ballot papers, and in 8.9% he did not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 73.7% the PrO followed this procedure, whereas in 10.4% s/he did not.

Gender-wise



36. Information missing from 18.2% polling stations

Recommendation

In almost one out of every ten polling stations, the Presiding Officer did not send a copy of the Statement of the Count immediately to the Returning Officer, as required by law. Failure to implement this procedure delays the vote consolidation and the announcement of the election result. These delays lead to a common suspicion that election results are altered during the ballot counting and/or consolidation processes, undermining public confidence in the electoral system and election results. The ECP should take all measures to ensure that Presiding Officers make arrangements in advance of Election Day to have a copy of the Statement of the Count delivered to the Returning Officer without any delay at the end of the ballot counting process.

d. Displaying Statements of the Count Outside Polling Stations

Law, Procedure and Policy

“A duly signed copy of the statement of count shall be affixed at a prominent place outside the polling station immediately after its preparation for information of general public.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38 and see also page 31

“Place one copy outside the polling station announcing the result.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)


Out of a total of 7,088 observed polling stations across the country, in 63.5% a copy of the National Assembly Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, whereas in 17.1% it was not.³⁷

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	1380	19.5
Yes	4498	63.5
No	1210	17.1
Total	7088	100


Of 4,105 observed polling stations in Punjab, in 68.7% a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, while in 15.6% it was not. In 58.3% of 1,029 polling stations observed in NWFP, a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, but in 18.9% it was not. In Sindh in 55.7% of 1,615 observed polling stations, a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, and in 18.5% it was not. In Baluchistan in 50.7% of 286 observed polling stations this procedure was followed, but in 24.5% it was not. In Islamabad Capital Territory in 62.3% of 53 observed polling stations a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed, whereas in 11.3% it was not.

Province-wise



Out of a total of 1,147 female polling stations observed nationwide, in 60.1% a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, but in 16.6% it was not. In as many as 62.1% of 2,357 observed male polling stations, a copy of the NA Statement of the Count was displayed outside the polling station, but in 16.8% it was not. Out of 3,584 combined polling stations, in 65.4% this procedure was followed, but in 17.4% it was not.

Gender-wise



Recommendation

In more than one out of every six polling stations, the Statement of the Count was not posted outside the polling station for the public's information. The problem was somewhat more common in Baluchistan. This fundamental procedure should be standardized everywhere to ensure transparency to the voting public about the election results. The ECP should take all measures to ensure that Presiding Officers are held responsible for displaying a copy of the Statement of the Count outside the polling station at the end of the ballot counting process.

37. Information missing from 19.5% polling stations

1. Returning Officer Receiving Results from Polling Stations

a. Presiding Officer Bringing Result for Consolidation

Law, Procedure and Policy

“After the close of the proceedings under the foregoing subsections, the Presiding Officer shall, in compliance with such instructions as may be given by the Commission in this behalf, cause the packets, the statement of the count and the ballot paper account prepared by him to be sent to the Returning Officer together with such other records as the Commission may direct.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(15)

The Presiding Officer shall arrange to deliver the copy of the statement of count to the concerned Returning Officer by the quickest possible means.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

“Send one copy [of the Statement of the Count] immediately to the Returning Officer.”


ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	111	42
Yes	129	48.9
No	24	9.1
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 48.9% the PrO brought the polling station Statement of the Count (polling station election result) to the RO for consolidation, whereas in 9.1% the PrO did not do so.³⁸

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 74.7% the PrO brought the result for consolidation, whereas in 16.5% s/he did not. In NWFP in 79.2% of 24 observed constituencies, the PrO brought the result for consolidation, whereas in 20.8% s/he did not. In Sindh in 83.7% of 43 observed constituencies the PrO brought the result for consolidation, whereas in 7% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 75% of 8 observed constituencies the PrO brought the result for consolidation, whereas in 12.5% s/he did not.³⁹

Recommendation

The ECP has not specified any mechanism for transporting polling station results from the Presiding Officers to the Returning Officers for consolidation of election results. Therefore, it is not clear who is permitted to transport election results and who is not permitted to do so. Statements of the Count are sensitive election materials that should be handled with care. The ECP should know who is responsible for these polling station results at all times. In about one-fourth of constituencies, police were entrusted with bringing election results from polling stations to the Returning Officer for consolidation. The ECP should clarify who is authorized to transport Statements of the Count from polling stations to the Returning Officers. Police can serve this purpose, with appropriate special arrangements for transportation. Presiding Officers, under the leadership of Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs) and Provincial Election Commissioners (PECs) should be responsible for making arrangements in advance of Election Day for the timely transportation of election results to Returning Officers by a standardized mechanism prescribed by the ECP.

38. Information from 43.2% constituencies is missing.

39. No data available for Islamabad.

Law, Procedure and Policy

"After the close of the proceedings under the foregoing subsections, the Presiding Officer shall, in compliance with such instructions as may be given by the Commission in this behalf, cause the packets, the statement of the count and the ballot paper account prepared by him to be sent to the Returning Officer together with such other records as the Commission may direct."

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 38(15)

The Presiding Officer shall arrange to deliver the copy of the statement of count to the concerned Returning Officer by the quickest possible means."

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

"Send one copy [of the Statement of the Count] immediately to the Returning Officer."

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 25% police brought results from polling stations, whereas in 31.1% they did not.⁴⁰

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	116	116
Yes	66	25
No	82	31.1
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 34.1% police brought results, whereas in 53.8% they did not. In NWFP in 45.8% of 24 observed constituencies, police brought results, whereas in 50% they did not. In Sindh in 44.2% of 43 observed constituencies, police brought results, whereas in 44.2% they did not. In Baluchistan in 62.5% of 8 observed constituencies, police brought results, whereas in 25% they did not.⁴¹

Province-wise



Recommendation

The ECP has not specified any mechanism for transporting polling station results from the Presiding Officers to the Returning Officers for consolidation of election results. Therefore, it is not clear who is permitted to transport election results and who is not permitted to do so. Statements of the Count are sensitive election materials that should be handled with care. The ECP should know who is responsible for these polling station results at all times. In about one-fourth of constituencies, police were entrusted with bringing election results from polling stations to the Returning Officer for consolidation. The ECP should clarify who is authorized to transport Statements of the Count from polling stations to the Returning Officers. Police can serve this purpose, with appropriate special arrangements for transportation. Presiding Officers, under the leadership of Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs) and Provincial Election Commissioners (PECs) should be responsible for making arrangements in advance of Election Day for the timely transportation of election results to Returning Officers by a standardized mechanism prescribed by the ECP.

40. Information missing from 40.9% constituencies

41. No data available for Islamabad.

c. Results Arriving Late

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Presiding Officer shall arrange to deliver the copy of the statement of count to the concerned Returning Officer by the quickest possible means.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

“Send one copy [of the Statement of the Count] immediately to the Returning Officer.”

ECP Handbook for PrOs, Pg.66 (emphasis in original)

“Consolidation proceedings should be held as soon as possible after polling day.”


ECP Handbook for Returning Officers (ROs), Pg.77

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	118	44.7
Yes	83	31.4
No	63	23.9
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 31.4% results arrived very late on Election Day night or the following days from one or more polling stations, whereas in 23.9% result arrived promptly on Election Day night.

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 49.5% some polling station results arrived late, but in 40.7% no results were delayed. In 58.3% of 24 observed constituencies in NWFP some results arrived very late, while in 29.2% no results were delayed. In Sindh in 48.8% of 43 observed constituencies, results from one or more polling stations arrived very late, whereas in 32.6% results were not delayed. In Baluchistan in 37.5% of 8 observed constituencies, results came very late from one or more polling stations, whereas in 62.5% they did not.⁴²

Recommendation

In addition, delay in result consolidation decreases public confidence in the election process and results. In approximately one-third of constituencies, some results arrived very late to the RO, delaying the consolidation and announcement of results. Presiding Officers, under the leadership of Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs) and Provincial Election Commissioners (PECs) should be responsible for making arrangements in advance of Election Day for the timely transportation of election results to Returning Officers by a standardized mechanism prescribed by the ECP.

42. No data available for Islamabad.

2. Transparency Of The Consolidation Process

a. Informing Candidates about the Venue, Day and Time for Consolidation of Result

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer shall give the contesting candidates and their election agents a notice in writing of the day, time and place fixed for the consolidation of the results....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(1)

“Returning Officer should give a written notice to all contesting candidates and their election agents of the day, time and place fixed for consolidation of results.”


ECP Handbook for Returning Officers (ROs), Pg.77

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 37.1% the RO issued a written notice to all candidates informing them about the date, place and time for consolidation of results, whereas in 19.7% the RO did not do so.⁴³

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	114	43.2
Yes	98	37.1
No	52	19.7
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 58.2% the RO issued a written notice, whereas in 30.80% s/he did not. In NWFP in 75% of 24 observed constituencies, the RO issued such a notice, whereas in 16.7% s/he did not. In Sindh in 51.20% of 43 observed constituencies, the RO notified candidates in writing, whereas in 39.5% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 50% of 8 observed constituencies, the RO issued a written notice, but in 50% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in the only observed constituency, the RO issued a written notice to all candidates informing them about the date, place and time for consolidation of results.



Recommendation

In about one-third of constituencies for which data is available, Returning Officers did not follow the basic procedure of issuing a written notice to all candidates about the consolidation of election results. ECP officials, rather than judicial officers, should be responsible for vote consolidation at the constituency level in order to ensure that all procedures are carried out accurately, completely, transparently, and in a timely manner. Judges should be responsible only for hearing challenges to the ballot consolidation process, along with other election petitions regarding election results. Returning Officers should be held responsible for issuing a written notice to all candidates/polling agents and observers about the date, place and time for consolidation.

43. Information from 43.2% constituencies is missing

b. Allowing FAFEN Observers to Witness Result Consolidation

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer of the constituency on receipt of the statements of the count from all polling stations shall sum up the total votes cast in favour of each candidate in the presence of candidates and/ or their election agents as may be present in his office.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

“The Observers and Journalists may watch all aspects of the management and conduct of the election including actual polling on Election Day without any interference in proceedings. They may also watch vote counting and result consolidation.”


ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007-08, Pg. 48

The Handbook for Returning Officers does not mention accredited election observers.

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	105	39.8
Yes	64	24.2
No	95	36
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 24.2% the RO refused permission to FAFEN observers to witness result consolidation, whereas in 36% s/he permitted accredited observers to observe the process.⁴⁴

Province-wise

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 33% the RO refused permission to observers, whereas in 60.4% s/he did not. In NWFP in 41.7% of 24 observed constituencies, the RO refused permission, whereas in 58.3% s/he did not. In Sindh in 44.20% of 43 observed constituencies the RO did not permit observers to witness the result consolidation, whereas in 51.2% s/he did allow observers. In Baluchistan in 50% of 8 observed constituencies, the RO refused permission, whereas in 50% s/he did not. In Islamabad Capital Territory, in the only observed constituency, the RO refused permission to observers to witness the consolidation of result

Recommendation

In about one-third of constituencies, Returning Officers did not permit accredited election observers to witness the result consolidation process, and candidates or their agents did not witness the consolidation. The ECP should amend election procedures to enable accredited election observers to witness the result consolidation process. All materials produced by the ECP for observers and for Returning Officers should reflect this policy clearly.

44. Information from 43.2% constituencies is missing.



Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer shall ..., in the presence of such of the contesting candidates and election agents as may be present, consolidate in the prescribed manner the results of the count furnished by the Presiding Officers....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(1)

“The Returning Officer of the constituency on receipt of the statements of the count from all polling stations shall sum up the total votes cast in favour of each candidate in the presence of candidates and/or their election agents as may be present in his office.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

“It is essential that opportunity is provided to contesting candidates and their election agents to witness this process to add to the transparency of process.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 21.2% candidates witnessed the consolidation of results, whereas in 26.9% they did not.⁴⁵

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	137	51.9
Yes	56	21.2
No	71	26.9
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 29.7% candidates witnessed the consolidation of the election result, whereas in 46.2% they did not. In NWFP in 58.3% of 24 observed constituencies, candidates witnessed the consolidation of the result, whereas in 29.2% they did not. In Sindh in 30.2% of 43 observed constituencies candidates witnessed the consolidation, whereas in 41.9% they did not. In Baluchistan in 25% of 8 observed constituencies candidates witnessed the result consolidation, whereas in 50% they did not.⁴⁶

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one-fourth of constituencies, candidates or their agents did not witness the consolidation of election results, undermining the transparency of this essential stage of the election process. Political parties and candidates should ensure that their representatives are present at the consolidation of election results by the Returning Officers

45. Information from 43.2% constituencies is missing.

46. No data available for Islamabad.

3. Examining Excluded (Invalid) and Challenged Ballot Papers

a. Examining Ballot Papers Excluded from Counting (Invalid Ballots)

Law, Procedure and Policy

“Before consolidating the results of the count, the Returning Officer shall examine the ballot papers excluded from the count by the Presiding Officer and, if he finds that any such ballot paper should not have been so excluded, count it as a ballot paper cast in favour of the contesting candidate for whom the vote has been cast thereby.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(3)

“Returning Officer will open the polling bags received from Presiding Officers and one by one examine all the ballot papers excluded from count by the Presiding Officers.”


ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	128	48.5
Yes	85	32.2
No	51	19.3
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 32.2% the RO examined ballot papers excluded from the count, whereas in 19.3% s/he did not.⁴⁷

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 59.3% the RO examined ballot papers excluded from the count, whereas in 26.4% s/he did not. In NWFP in 29.2% of 24 observed constituencies, the RO examined ballot papers excluded from the count, whereas in 54.2% s/he did not. In Sindh in 44.2% of 43 observed constituencies, the RO examined ballot papers excluded from the count, whereas in 30.2% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 62.5% of 8 observed constituencies, the RO examined ballot papers excluded from the count, whereas in 12.5% s/he did not.⁴⁸

47. Information missing from 48.5% constituencies

48. No data available for Islamabad.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The same procedure [as above] will be repeated (separately) for all challenged votes.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 34.5% the RO examined challenged ballot papers, whereas in 15.9% s/he did not.⁴⁹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	131	49.6
Yes	91	34.5
No	51	15.9
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, the RO in 59.3% examined challenged ballot papers, whereas in 26.4% s/he did not. In NWFP in 54.2% of 24 observed constituencies, the RO examined challenged ballot papers, whereas in 29.2% s/he did not. In Sindh in 44.2% of 43 observed constituencies, the RO examined challenged ballot papers, whereas in 23.3% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 62.5% of 8 observed constituencies, the RO examined challenged ballot papers, whereas in 12.5% he did not.⁵⁰

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one in five constituencies, the Returning Officer did not examine (invalid) ballot papers that had been excluded from the ballot count in the polling stations. In about one in six constituencies, the RO did not examine challenged ballot papers, as required. ECP officials, rather than judicial officers, should be responsible for ballot consolidation in order to ensure that all procedures are carried out accurately, completely, transparently, and in a timely manner. Returning Officers should be held responsible for examining all excluded and challenged ballots, as required.

49. Information missing from 49.6% constituencies
 50. No data available for Islamabad.

4. Changing Status of Excluded (Invalid) and Challenged Ballot Papers

a. Allowing Candidates/Polling Agents to Examine Excluded/Challenged Ballot Papers

Law, Procedure and Policy

“If any contesting candidate or election agent wants to see such [excluded or challenged] ballot papers it may be shown to him/her.”


ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	133	50.4
Yes	73	27.7
No	58	22
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, the RO in 27.7% allowed candidates or election agents to see excluded/challenged ballot papers, whereas in 22% s/he did not.

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 47.3% the RO allowed candidates or election agents to see excluded/challenged ballot papers, whereas in 34.1% s/he did not. In NWFP in 41.7% of 24 observed constituencies, the RO allowed candidates or election agents to see excluded/challenged ballot papers, whereas in 41.7% s/he did not. In Sindh in 37.2% of 43 observed constituencies, the RO allowed candidates or agents to see excluded/challenged ballot papers, whereas in 34.9% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 50% of 8 observed constituencies, the RO allowed candidates or election agents to see excluded/challenged ballot papers, whereas in 25% s/he did not.⁵¹

51. No data available for Islamabad.

b. Adding Excluded Ballot Papers to the Count of Candidates

Law, Procedure and Policy

“If Returning Officer finds that a ballot paper should not have been excluded, s/he will count it in favor of the contesting candidate for whom it has been cast.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77 (emphasis in original)


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, RO in 12.9% added excluded ballot papers to the count of candidates whereas in 36% he did not.⁵²

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	135	51.1
Yes	34	12.9
No	95	36
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 23.10% RO added excluded ballot papers to the count of candidates whereas in 59.3% he did not. In NWFP in 29.2% of 24 observed constituencies, RO added excluded ballot papers to the count of candidates whereas in 54.2% he did not. In Sindh in 11.6% of 43 observed constituencies RO added excluded ballot papers to the count of candidates whereas in 53.5% he did not. In Baluchistan in 12.5% of 8 observed constituencies, RO added excluded ballot papers to the count of candidates whereas in 62.5% he did not.⁵³

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one in five constituencies, the Returning Officer did not allow candidates/agents to examine excluded and challenged ballot papers. However, in more than one in eight constituencies, the RO did add ballots into the count that had been excluded or challenged in the polling stations. ROs and candidates/agents re-examining excluded and challenged ballot papers is an essential part of the results consolidation process. ECP officials, rather than judicial officers, should be responsible for ballot consolidation in order to ensure that all procedures are carried out accurately, completely, transparently, and in a timely manner. Returning Officers should be held responsible for allowing candidates and agents to examine excluded and challenged ballots to avoid disenfranchising voters and failing to count their votes in favor of candidates.

52. Information missing from 51.1 constituencies

53. No data available for Islamabad

5. Counting Postal Ballots

a. Excluding Postal Ballots Received After Due Date

Law, Procedure and Policy

“An elector on receiving his ballot paper for voting by postal ballot shall record his vote in the prescribed manner and, after so recording, post the ballot paper to the Returning Officer in the envelope sent to him under sub-section (3), so as to reach the Returning Officer before the consolidation of results by him.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 29(4)

“The Returning Officer shall also count the ballot papers received by him by post in such manner as may be prescribed and include the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate in the consolidated statement except those which he may reject on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 38.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(4)


“Postal ballots will not be counted if: Received after due date; Declaration is not found in Cover Form X; Declaration is substantially defective; Serial No of ballot differs from one on the cover.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	145	54.9
Yes	66	25
No	53	20.1
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 25% postal ballots received after the due date were excluded from the count, whereas in 20.1% they were included in the count.⁵⁴



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 47.3% postal ballots received after the due date were excluded, whereas in 31.9% they were included. In NWFP in 37.5% of 24 observed constituencies, postal ballots received after the due date were excluded, whereas in 29.2% they were included. In Sindh in 23.3% of 43 observed constituencies postal ballots received after the due date were excluded, whereas in 34.9% they were included. In Baluchistan in 50% of 8 observed constituencies, postal ballots received after the due date were excluded, whereas in 25% they were included.⁵⁵

Recommendation

In about one in five constituencies, postal ballots received late were nevertheless included in the vote count, and in one in four constituencies postal ballots were not excluded despite technical grounds for doing so. Returning Officers should be held responsible for processing postal ballots using clear, standardized procedures.

54. Information missing from 54.9% constituencies

55. No data available for Islamabad.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“An elector on receiving his ballot paper for voting by postal ballot shall record his vote in the prescribed manner and, after so recording, post the ballot paper to the Returning Officer in the envelope sent to him under sub-section (3),so as to reach the Returning Officer before the consolidation of results by him.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 29(4)

“The Returning Officer shall also count the ballot papers received by him by post in such manner as may be prescribed and include the votes cast in favour of each contesting candidate in the consolidated statement except those which he may reject on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (4) of section 38.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(4)

“Postal ballots will not be counted if: Received after due date; Declaration is not found in Cover Form X; Declaration is substantially defective; Serial No of ballot differs from one on the cover.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 17.8% postal ballots were excluded on technical grounds, whereas in 28.8% they were not.⁵⁶

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	141	53.4
Yes	47	17.8
No	76	28.8
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 33% postal ballots were excluded on technical grounds, whereas in 44% were not. In NWFP in 29.2% of 24 observed constituencies, postal ballots were excluded on technical grounds, whereas in 45.8% they were not. In Sindh in 18.6% of 43 observed constituencies postal ballots were excluded on technical grounds, whereas in 48.8% they were not. In Baluchistan in 25% of 8 observed constituencies postal ballots were excluded on technical grounds whereas, in 50% they were not.⁵⁸

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one in five constituencies, postal ballots received late were nevertheless included in the vote count, and in one in four constituencies postal ballots were not excluded despite technical grounds for doing so. Returning Officers should be held responsible for processing postal ballots using clear, standardized procedures.

57. Information missing from 53.4% constituencies

58. No data available for Islamabad.


c. Candidates/Election Agents Raising Objections to Postal Ballot Count

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	138	52.3
Yes	35	13.3
No	91	34.5
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 13.3% candidates/election agents raised objections to postal ballot count whereas in 34.5% they did not.⁵⁹

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 27.5% candidates/election agents raised objections to postal ballot count whereas in 52.7% they did not. In NWFP in 16.7% of 24 observed constituencies candidates/election agents raised objections to postal ballot count whereas in 58.3% they did not. In Sindh in 11.6% of 43 observed constituencies candidates/election agents raised objections to postal ballot count whereas in 55.8% they did not. In Baluchistan in 12.5% of 8 observed constituencies candidates/election agents raised objections to postal ballot count whereas in 62.5% they did not.⁶⁰

59. Information missing from 52.3% constituencies
 60. No data available for Islamabad.

d. Postal Ballot Count Changing the Election Result


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 11.7% the postal ballot count changed the final election result, whereas in 34.5% it did not.⁶¹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	142	53.8
Yes	31	11.7
No	91	34.5
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 24.2% the postal ballots count changed the election result, whereas in 54.9% it did not. In NWFP in 12.5% of 24 observed constituencies the postal ballot count changed the result, whereas in 58.3% it did not. In Sindh in 11.6% of 43 observed constituencies the postal ballot count changed the result, whereas in 51.2% it did not. In Baluchistan in 12.5% of 8 observed constituencies the postal ballot count changed the result, whereas in 62.5% it did not.⁶²

Province-wise



Recommendation

In more than one in seven constituencies, candidates or their agents raised objections to the postal ballot counting process. In about one in nine constituencies, the postal ballot count changed the election result. Postal ballot regulations should be re-examined and clarified. Automatic recounting of votes should be instituted in constituencies where the winning margin is less than 200 votes or the total invalid and/or postal ballots exceed the winning margin.

61. Information missing from 53.8% constituencies

62. No data available for Islamabad.

6. Ballot Recount

a. Candidates/Election Agents Requesting Recount

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer may recount the ballot papers- (a) upon the request of, or challenge in writing made by, a contesting candidate or his election agent, if the Returning Officer is satisfied that the request or the challenge is reasonable; or (b) if so directed by the Commission, in which case the recount shall be held in such manner and at such place as may be directed by the Commission.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(6)

“Returning Officer will ... NOT ordinarily recount all valid votes. Recounting of all ballot papers may only be done under TWO circumstances: If requested in writing by any contesting candidate or his/her election agent under the condition that the Returning Officer is satisfied that the request is reasonable; [or] If directed by the Election Commission.”


ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.81 (emphasis in original)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	140	53
Yes	29	11
No	95	36
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 11% candidates/election agents requested a recount of votes, whereas in 36% they did not.⁶³

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 18.7% candidates/election agents requested a recount, whereas in 36% they did not. In NWFP in 16.7% of 24 observed constituencies candidates/election agents requested a recount, whereas in 62.5% they did not. In Sindh in 18.6% of 43 observed constituencies candidates/election agents requested a recount, whereas in 37.2% they did not. In Baluchistan candidates/agents made no request for recount in 75% of 8 observed constituencies.⁶⁴

Recommendation

In about one in nine constituencies, candidates or their agents requested a recount of all ballots. In about one in eleven such constituencies, the Returning Officer refused to conduct the recount. Automatic recounting of votes should be instituted in constituencies where the winning margin is less than 200 votes or the total invalid and/or postal ballots exceed the winning margin.

63. Information missing from 53% constituencies

64. No data available for Islamabad.

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer may recount the ballot papers- (a) upon the request of, or challenge in writing made by, a contesting candidate or his election agent, if the Returning Officer is satisfied that the request or the challenge is reasonable; or (b) if so directed by the Commission, in which case the recount shall be held in such manner and at such place as may be directed by the Commission.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(6)

“Returning Officer will ... NOT ordinarily recount all valid votes. Recounting of all ballot papers may only be done under TWO circumstances: If requested in writing by any contesting candidate or his/her election agent under the condition that the Returning Officer is satisfied that the request is reasonable; [or] If directed by the Election Commission.”

ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.81 (emphasis in original)


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 9.1% of constituencies where a recount was requested the RO refused to recount, whereas in 31.8% s/he agreed.⁶⁵

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	156	59.1
Yes	24	9.1
No	84	31.8
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 14.3% of constituencies where a recount was requested the RO refused to recount, whereas in 54.9% s/he agreed. In NWFP in 16.7% of 24 observed constituencies where a recount was requested the RO refused to recount, whereas in 54.2% s/he agreed. In Sindh in 14% of 43 observed constituencies where a recount was requested the RO refused to recount, whereas in 37.2% he agreed. In Baluchistan in 12.5% of 8 observed constituencies where a recount was requested the RO refused to recount, whereas in 62.5% he agreed.⁶⁶

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one in nine constituencies, candidates or their agents requested a recount of all ballots. In about one in eleven such constituencies, the Returning Officer refused to conduct the recount. Automatic recounting of votes should be instituted in constituencies where the winning margin is less than 200 votes or the total invalid and/or postal ballots exceed the winning margin.

65. Information missing from 59.1% constituencies

66. No data available for Islamabad.

7. Result of the Count Form XVII

a. Completing Form XVII

Law, Procedure and Policy

“The Returning Officer shall- immediately after preparing the consolidated statement and the return of election, reseal in the prescribed manner the packets and statements opened by him for the purpose of consolidation, permitting such of the candidates and their election agents as may be present to sign the packets and affix their seals to such packets.....”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 40(a)

“The ballot papers rejected by the Returning Officer under sub-section (4) shall be shown separately in the consolidated statement.”

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 39(5)

“The Returning Officer of the constituency ... shall prepare a statement containing preliminary result in the prescribed format and get signatures thereupon of candidates and/or their election agents as may be present.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

Returning Officer will prepare Consolidation Statement by Polling Station in Form XVI. Result of the Count will be prepared in Form XVII. Both forms should be sealed and sent to ECP as per instructions conveyed to the RO. Tip: Both these forms should be carefully prepared and re-checked.”


ECP Handbook for ROs, Pg.77 (forms on pages 79-80)

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	143	54.2
Yes	104	39.4
No	17	6.4
Total	264	100

Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 39.4% the Returning Officer completed Result of the Count Form XVII with witnesses, whereas in 6.4% s/he did not.⁶⁷

Province-wise



Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 71.4% the RO completed Result of the Count Form XVII with witnesses, whereas in 8.8% s/he did not. In NWFP in 66.7% of 24 observed constituencies the RO completed Form XVII with witnesses, whereas in 12.5% s/he did not. In Sindh in 41.9% of 43 observed constituencies the RO completed Form XVII with witnesses, whereas in 11.6% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 62.5% of 8 observed constituencies the RO completed Form XVII with witnesses, whereas in 12.5% s/he did not.⁶⁸

Recommendation

In about one in 15 constituencies for which data is available, the Returning Officer completed the Result of the Count Form XVII with no witnesses so that the completion of the form cannot be verified. ECP officials, rather than judicial officers, should be responsible for ballot consolidation in order to ensure that all procedures are carried out accurately, completely, transparently, and in a timely manner. Returning Officers should complete the Result of the Count Form XVII with candidates and/or their agents present, along with accredited observers, to ensure transparency of this essential stage of the election process.

67. Information missing from 54.2% constituencies

68. No data available for Islamabad.

b. Providing a Copy of Form XVII to All Candidates/ Election Agents

Law, Procedure and Policy

The Returning Officer shall-.... supply duly attested copies of the consolidated statement and the return of election to such of the candidates and their election agents as may be present.

Representation of the Peoples Act 1976, Section 40(b)

“The Returning Officer of the constituency shall then announce the preliminary result of election of his constituency locally and a copy thereof shall be affixed outside his office for information of the general public.”

ECP Brief for National/International Observers, General Elections 2007, Pg. 38

The Handbook for Returning Officers does not mention giving a copy of the Result of the Count to candidates or polling agents


Out of 264 constituencies observed nationwide, in 37.1% the RO provided a copy of Form XVII to all candidates/election agents, whereas in 9.8% s/he did not.⁶⁹

Frequency Table

	Frequency	Percent
Missing	140	53
Yes	98	37.1
No	26	9.8
Total	264	100

Out of 91 constituencies observed in Punjab, in 69.2% the RO provided a copy of the Result of the Count to all candidates/election agents, whereas in 13.2% s/he did not. In NWFP in 58.3% of 43 observed constituencies the RO provided a copy of Form XVII to all candidates/election agents, whereas in 20.8% s/he did not. In Sindh in 39.5% of 43 observed constituencies the RO provided a copy of Form XVII to all candidates/election agents, whereas in 16.3% s/he did not. In Baluchistan in 50% of 8 observed constituencies the RO provided a copy of Form XVII to all candidates/election agents, whereas in 25% s/he did not.⁷⁰

Province-wise



Recommendation

In about one in ten constituencies for which data is available, the Returning Officer did not provide a copy of Result of the Count Form XVII to all candidates/polling agents. ECP handbooks and other materials do not mention this important requirement of the election law. Returning Officers should ensure that all candidates or their agents receive a copy of the Result of the Count Form XVII.

69. Information missing from 53% constituencies

70. No data available for Islamabad.



Annexure

FAFEN Election Observation Forms

A. FAFEN Observation Form 1

B. FAFEN Observation Form 2

C. FAFEN Observation Form 3

D. FAFEN Observation Form 4

E. FAFEN Observation Form 5

A. FAFEN Observation Form 1

آپ نے اس پولنگ بوتھ میں کتنے مردوں کو ووٹ ڈالتے ہوئے گنا

FAFEN کا مشاہدہ فارم نمبر 1

عام پولنگ سٹیشن اور مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ
پولنگ سٹیشن کا کھولنا اور ووٹنگ کا عمل

ہدایات :- فارم کی ہر قطار میں جواب لکھیں۔ اور اس فارم کو الیکشن کے دن کے اختتام پر فائین کے دیگر فارموں کے ہمراہ اپنے حلقہ مشاہدہ کار (CC) کے حوالے کر دیں۔

ضلع: _____ NA حلقہ نمبر: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا نام: _____ فائین NGO کا نام: _____

پولنگ سٹیشن کا نام: _____ پولنگ سٹیشن کا نمبر: _____

پولنگ بوتھ کی تعداد: مردانہ: _____ زنانہ: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا متعلقہ اسٹیشن پر پہنچنے کا وقت: _____ پولنگ سٹیشن کھلنے کا وقت: _____

پورے پولنگ سٹیشن کے لئے۔ دن کے آغاز پر

ہاں	نہیں
	پولنگ سٹیشن کی طرف رہنمائی کرنے والا نشان موجود ہے۔
	پولنگ سٹیشن یا 100 گز کے اندر کسی پارٹی یا امیدوار کی حمایت ظاہر کرنے والا کوئی مواد موجود ہے۔
	پولنگ سٹیشن کے 400 گز کے اندر پارٹی/امیدوار کے انتخابی کیمپ (یا ووٹروں پر اثر انداز ہونے والے دیگر اقدامات) موجود ہیں۔
	پولنگ سٹیشن کے باہر ایک پولیس/سیکورٹی آفیسر موجود ہے جو صرف اور صرف پولنگ سٹیشن کے باہر امن وامان کی صورت حال برقرار رکھنے پر متعین ہے۔
	پولنگ کا عمل شروع ہونے سے پہلے ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں انتخابی عملہ کے درکار تینوں ارکان (APO-1، APO-2 اور پولنگ آفیسر) موجود ہیں۔
	ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں کمپیوٹرائزڈ جنتی فہرست رائے دہندگان 2007 (FER) موجود ہے۔
	ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں (FER) کے آخر میں 2002 کے انتخابی فہرستوں سے ضمنی فہرست رائے دہندگان لف ہے۔
	ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں دو شفاف بیٹ بکس موجود ہیں۔
	ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں بیٹ بکس پیپر موجود ہیں۔
	ووٹنگ سکینیں ووٹ کی رازداری کو برقرار رکھنے کیلئے درست طور پر قائم کی گئی ہیں تاکہ کوئی بھی شخص ووٹروں کو اپنے بیٹ پیپر پر مہر لگاتے نہ دیکھ سکے۔
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے پولنگ ایجنٹوں اور مشاہدہ کاران کو خالی بیٹ بکس دکھائے۔
	پھر انتخابی عملہ نے بیٹ بکس سیل کے اور الیکشن کمیشن آف پاکستان (ECP) کی سرکاری سیلوں کے نمبر تمام پولنگ ایجنٹوں اور مشاہدہ کاران کو دکھائے۔
	ہر بیٹ بکس کو چاروں طرف سے ایک ایک سیل لگا کر تختی سے بند کیا گیا۔
	بیٹ بکس پر لگائی گئی ہر سیل پر الیکشن کمیشن آف پاکستان (ECP) کا مونیٹورنگ موجود ہے۔
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے بیٹ بکسوں کی تصدیق کے فارم XI A پر ہر پولنگ ایجنٹ اور امیدوار کے دستخط کروائے۔

ایک مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ

مشاہدہ کاری کے لئے صرف ایک مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ کا انتخاب کریں۔ بوتھ نمبر: _____

وقت جب آپ کا مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ دوٹنگ کیلئے کھلا: _____

پولنگ کے آغاز پر اس بوتھ میں قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ پیپرز کی کل تعداد: _____

وقت جب اس مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں آخری ووٹر نے ووٹ ڈالا: _____

پولنگ کے اختتام پر اس بوتھ میں قومی اسمبلی کے ڈالے گئے سبز بیٹ پیپرز کی کل تعداد: _____

پولنگ کے آغاز پر قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ بکس پر لگائی گئی چاروں سیلوں کے نمبر: _____

_____ / _____ / _____

پولنگ کے اختتام پر قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ بکس پر لگی ہوئی چاروں سیلوں کے نمبر: _____

_____ / _____ / _____

ہاں	صرف ایک منتخب کردہ مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں	نہیں
	پولنگ ایجنٹ اپنی اتھارٹی لیٹرز/ کارڈز کے ساتھ موجود ہیں۔ (نیچے لکھیں) (نام زیادہ ہونے کی صورت میں اس صفحہ کی پشت پر لکھیں)	
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	دوسرے انتخابی مشاہدہ کار موجود ہیں۔ (نیچے لکھیں)	
	☆ دوسرے ملکی (پاکستانی) مشاہدہ کار موجود ہیں (اگر ہاں تو ادارہ کا نام لکھیں) _____	
	☆ بین الاقوامی (غیر ملکی) مشاہدہ کار ان نے دورہ کیا (اگر ہاں تو ادارہ کا نام لکھیں) _____	

ایک مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں ووٹنگ کا طریقہ کار

ہاں	عام طور پر ووٹروں کو ووٹ ڈالنے کی اجازت ہے اگر:-	نہیں
	☆ ووٹرز ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں اگر ان کے پاس قومی شناختی کارڈ یا کمپیوٹر ایزڈ شناختی کارڈ موجود ہے۔	
	☆ ووٹرز ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں اگر ان کے پاس کوئی دیگر شناختی دستاویز (پیدائش کا سرٹیفکیٹ، میٹرک کا سرٹیفکیٹ، نکاح نامہ وغیرہ موجود ہے)	
	☆ ووٹرز کسی شناخت کے بغیر ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں۔	
	کچھ ووٹرز بغیر ووٹ ڈالے چلے گئے کیونکہ:-	
	☆ ووٹرز پولنگ ایجنٹوں کے چیلنج کرنے کے باعث واپس گئے۔	
	☆ ووٹرز انتخابی عملہ کی جانب داری کے باعث واپس گئے۔	

ہاں	☆ ووٹرز پولنگ اسٹیشن پر قبضہ کے باعث واپس گئے۔	نہیں
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہروٹڑ کا نام اونچی آواز سے پکارتا کہ پولنگ ایجنٹ اور مشاہدہ کار سن سکیں۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہروٹڑ کا نام انتخابی فہرست میں تلاش کیا اور انتخابی فہرست میں اس کے نام پر پین سے لکیر لگا دی۔	
	چینج کئے گئے ووٹ (جب ایک پولنگ ایجنٹ کسی ووٹر پر اعتراض کرتا ہے) بیلٹ بکس سے علیحدہ رکھے گئے	
	ٹینڈر کئے گئے ووٹ (جب انتخابی فہرست میں ووٹر کے نام پر پہلے سے لکیر لگی ہوئی ہو) علیحدہ رکھے گئے۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہروٹڑ کے دائیں اگوٹھے کی پشت چیک کی۔ اور تب ہی ووٹ ڈالنے دیا جب ووٹر کے اگوٹھے کی پشت پر پہلے سے ان مٹ سیاہی نہ لگی تھی۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہروٹڑ کے دائیں اگوٹھے کی پشت پر ان مٹ سیاہی لگائی۔	
	اسسٹنٹ پریزائیڈنگ آفیسر نمبر 1 (APO-1) نے ہروٹڑ کے لئے قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیلٹ پیپر کی کاؤنٹر فائل کو پر کیا۔	
	APO-1 نے قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیلٹ پیپر کی کاؤنٹر فائل پر ہروٹڑ کا نشان اگھوٹھا لگوا دیا۔	
	APO-1 نے ہر کاؤنٹر فائل پر سامنے کی طرف اور بیلٹ پیپر کی پشت پر ایکشن کمیشن آف پاکستان کی مہر لگائی	
	APO-1 نے قومی اسمبلی کے ہر بیلٹ پیپر کی پشت پر سرکاری مہر کے اوپر اپنے دستخط کئے۔	
	APO-2 نے صوبائی اسمبلی کے لئے یہی طریقہ کار اختیار کیا۔	
	APO-2 نے مہر جس سے ووٹر بیلٹ پیپر پر نشان لگائے گا پر سیاہی لگائی اور ہروٹڑ کو ہدایات دیں کہ وہ مہر کو کیسے استعمال کرے گا۔	
	انتخابی عملہ نے قومی یا صوبائی اسمبلی کے کسی ایک امیدوار یا پارٹی کے نشان کی نشاندہی کرتے ہوئے ووٹر پر اثر انداز ہونے کی کوشش کی۔	
	بیلٹ پیپر پروٹری طرف سے انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹ یا کسی دیگر نے مہر لگائی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے _____	
	ووٹر بیلٹ پیپر پر مہر لگانے کیلئے ووٹنگ سکرین کے پیچھے گئے۔	
	لوگ (انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹ یا غیر متعلقہ لوگ) ووٹر کی مدد کرنے کیلئے ووٹنگ سکرین کے پیچھے گئے۔	
	APO-2 نے تسلی کی کہ ووٹر نے درست طور پر بیلٹ پیپر کو تہہ کیا ہے اور درست بیلٹ بکس میں ڈالا ہے۔	
	اگر کوئی بیلٹ پیپر ضائع ہوا (پھٹ گیا یا غلط نشان لگ گیا) تو انتخابی عملہ نے بیلٹ پیپر اور اس کی کاؤنٹر فائل پر ضائع شدہ دکھا۔ اور ووٹر کو نیا بیلٹ پیپر ملا۔	
	مردانہ پولنگ بوتھ پر ووٹنگ جب ختم ہوئی	
	ووٹنگ کے اختتام تک انتخابی عملہ کے تینوں ارکان پولنگ بوتھ میں موجود رہے۔	
	آخری ووٹر کے ووٹ ڈالنے کے بعد عملہ نے بیلٹ بکس میں ووٹ ڈالنے والی جگہ کے ڈھکن کو بند کر کے اس پر سرکاری سیل لگائی تاکہ بیلٹ بکس میں کوئی اضافی ووٹ نہ ڈالا جائے۔	
	عام سوالات..... دن کے آخر میں..... پولنگ اسٹیشن کے متعلق جوابات	
	عام طور پر پولنگ اسٹیشن کے باہر پولیس / سیکورٹی آفیسر صرف اور صرف امن عامہ برقرار رکھنے کیلئے موجود تھا۔	
	پولنگ اسٹیشن پر حفاظتی اقدامات برقرار رکھے گئے۔	
	پولنگ اسٹیشن میں مسلح افراد موجود تھے۔	
	انتخابی عملہ نے غیر جانبداری سے اپنے فرائض سرانجام دیے۔	
	انتخابی عملہ نے تمام ووٹروں کے ساتھ عزت کے ساتھ مساوی سلوک کیا۔	
	ووٹرز جنہیں اضافی معاونت درکار تھی (بوڑھے، معذور) نے مدد حاصل کی۔	
	☆ انہیں انتخابی عملہ سے مدد ملی۔	
	☆ انہیں خاندان کے افراد سے مدد ملی۔	
	☆ دوسرے غیر متعلقہ لوگ جو پولنگ بوتھ میں موجود تھے سے مدد ملی۔	

ہاں	نہیں
	ووٹروں کی بڑی تعداد انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹوں کی جانبداری یا پولنگ اسٹیشن پر قبضہ کی وجہ سے ووٹ ڈالنے سے محروم رہی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس کی وجہ سے؟
	صرف اجازت یافتہ افراد (انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹ، مشاہدہ کاران) کو پولنگ اسٹیشن میں رہنے کی اجازت تھی۔
	حکومتی اہل کاران (ناظم، DCO، DPO اور کولٹرز وغیرہ) نے پولنگ اسٹیشن کے اندر یا بہت نزدیک ووٹروں پر اثر انداز ہو سکی کوشش کی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے؟
	حکومتی اہل کاران (ناظم، DCO، DPO اور کولٹرز وغیرہ) نے اس پولنگ اسٹیشن پر انتخابی عملہ پر اثر انداز ہونے کی کوشش کی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے؟
	اس پولنگ اسٹیشن پر پولنگ کھانا نماز یا کسی اور وجہ سے بند ہوئی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس وجہ سے اور کتنی دیر تک؟
	پولنگ اسٹیشن پولنگ کے مقررہ وقت سے ایک گھنٹہ یا زیادہ دیر بعد بند ہوا۔ اگر ہاں تو کتنی دیر بعد؟

پورے پولنگ اسٹیشن میں تشدد/رکاوٹ

فائین کے انتخابی مشاہدہ کار کو تشدد کی صورت میں پولنگ اسٹیشن کو فوراً چھوڑ دینا چاہئے۔ کسی نزدیکی محفوظ جگہ پر جانے کی کوشش کریں اور تشدد ختم ہونے کے بعد یہ معلومات حاصل کرنے کی کوشش کریں۔

تشدد کس وقت شروع ہوا؟ _____ کتنے گھنٹے _____ منٹ: _____ جاری رہا۔

تشدد یا رکاوٹ کس نے پیدا کی؟

☆ پارٹی یا امیدوار کے حامیوں نے؟ (کون سی پارٹی یا امیدوار) _____

☆ ووٹر؟ (ہاں / نہیں): _____

☆ انتخابی عملہ؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

☆ قانون نافذ کرنے والے؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

کیا کسی نے مدد کرنے کی کوشش کی؟

☆ پارٹی یا امیدوار کے حامیوں نے؟ (کون سی پارٹی یا امیدوار) _____

☆ ووٹر؟ (ہاں / نہیں): _____

☆ انتخابی عملہ؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

☆ قانون نافذ کرنے والے؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے ووٹ کا حق استعمال نہ کر سکنے والے لوگوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے زخمی ہونے والوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے مرنے والوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

حالات کی تفصیل: _____

B. FAFEN Observation Form 2

آپ نے اس پولنگ بوتھ میں کتنی عورتوں کو ووٹ ڈالنے ہونے گنا

فائین کا مشاہدہ فارم نمبر 2

زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ

پولنگ سٹیشن کا کھولنا اور ووٹنگ کا عمل

ہدایات :- فارم کی ہر قطار میں جواب لکھیں۔ اور اس فارم کو ایکشن کے دن کے اختتام پر فائین کے دیگر فارموں کے ہمراہ اپنے حلقہ مشاہدہ کار (CC) کے حوالے کر دیں۔

ضلع: _____ NA حلقہ نمبر: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا نام: _____ فائین NGO کا نام: _____

پولنگ سٹیشن کا نام: _____ پولنگ سٹیشن کا نمبر _____

پولنگ بوتھ کی تعداد: _____ مردانہ: _____ زنانہ: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا متعلقہ اسٹیشن پر پہنچنے کا وقت: _____

ایک زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ

مشاہدہ کاری کے لئے صرف ایک زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ کا انتخاب کریں۔ بوتھ نمبر _____

وقت جب آپ کا زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ سرکاری طور پر کھلا: _____

پولنگ کے آغاز پر اس بوتھ میں قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ پیپرز کی کل تعداد: _____

وقت جب اس زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں آخری ووٹ ڈالا: _____

پولنگ کے اختتام پر اس بوتھ میں قومی اسمبلی کے ڈالے گئے سبز بیٹ پیپرز کی کل تعداد: _____

پولنگ کے آغاز پر قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ بکس پر لگائی گئی چاروں سیلوں کے نمبر: _____

پولنگ کے اختتام پر قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیٹ بکس پر لگئی ہوئی چاروں سیلوں کے نمبر: _____

وقت کھلا: وقت بند ہوا:

نہیں	پورے پولنگ سٹیشن کے لئے۔ دن کے آغاز پر	ہاں
	پولنگ کا عمل شروع ہونے سے پہلے ہر پولنگ بوتھ میں انتخابی عملہ کے درکار تینوں ارکان (APO-1، APO-2 اور پولنگ آفیسر موجود ہیں۔	
	اس زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں صرف خواتین کے ناموں پر مشتمل کپیوٹرائزڈ حتمی فہرست رائے دہندگان (FER) 2007 موجود ہے۔	
	اس زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں (FER) کے آخر میں صرف خواتین کے ناموں پر مشتمل 2002 کے انتخابی فہرستوں سے ضمنی فہرست رائے دہندگان لکھے ہیں۔	
	اس زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں دو شفاف بیٹ بکس موجود ہیں۔	
	ووٹنگ سکریٹیں ووٹ کی رازداری کو برقرار رکھنے کیلئے درست طور پر قائم کی گئی ہیں تاکہ کوئی بھی شخص ووٹوں کو اپنے بیٹ پیپر پر مہر لگانے نہ دیکھ سکے۔	
	پولنگ ایجنٹ اپنے اتھارٹی لیٹرز / کارڈز کے ساتھ موجود ہیں۔ (نیچے لکھیں) (نام زیادہ ہونے کی صورت اس صفحہ کی پشت پر لکھیں)	
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	آزاد (نام): _____	پارٹی: _____
	دوسرے انتخابی مشاہدہ کار موجود ہیں۔ (نیچے لکھیں)	
	☆ دوسرے ملکی (پاکستانی) مشاہدہ کار موجود ہیں (اگر ہاں تو ادارہ کا نام لکھیں)	
	☆ بین الاقوامی (غیر ملکی) مشاہدہ کاران نے دورہ کیا (اگر ہاں تو ادارہ کا نام لکھیں)	

ہاں	ووٹنگ کا طریقہ کار	نہیں
	عام طور پر ووٹروں کو ووٹ ڈالنے کی اجازت ہے اگر:-	
	☆ ووٹرز ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں اگر ان کے پاس قومی شناختی کارڈ یا کمپیوٹرائزڈ شناختی کارڈ موجود ہے۔	
	☆ ووٹرز ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں اگر ان کے پاس کوئی دیگر شناختی دستاویز (پیدائش کارڈ، سٹیمپ کیٹ، میٹرک کارڈ، سٹیمپ کیٹ، نکاح نامہ وغیرہ موجود ہے)	
	☆ ووٹرز کسی شناخت کے بغیر ووٹ ڈال سکتے ہیں۔	
	کچھ ووٹرز بغیر ووٹ ڈالنے چلے گئے کیونکہ:-	
	☆ ووٹرز پولنگ ایجنٹوں کے چیئنج کرنے کے باعث واپس گئے۔	
	☆ ووٹرز انتخابی عملہ کی جانب داری کے باعث واپس گئے۔	
	☆ ووٹرز انتخابی عملہ کی طرف سے شناخت ثابت کرنے کے لئے چہرہ دکھانے سے انکار کے باعث واپس گئے	
	☆ ووٹرز پولنگ سٹیشن پر قبضہ کے باعث واپس گئے۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہر ووٹر کا نام اونچی آواز سے پکارتا کہ پولنگ ایجنٹ اور مشاہدہ کارن سکیں۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہر ووٹر کا نام انتخابی فہرست میں تلاش کیا اور انتخابی فہرست میں اس کے نام پر پین سے لکیر لگا دی۔	
	چیئنج کئے گئے ووٹ (جب ایک پولنگ ایجنٹ کسی ووٹر پر اعتراض کرتا ہے) بیلٹ کس سے علیحدہ رکھے گئے	
	ٹیبلٹ رکھے گئے ووٹ (جب انتخابی فہرست میں ووٹر کے نام پر پہلے سے لکیر لگی ہوئی ہو) علیحدہ رکھے گئے۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہر ووٹر کے دائیں انگوٹھے کی پشت چیک کی۔ اور تب ہی ووٹ ڈالنے کا وجہ دہرے انگوٹھے کی پشت پر پہلے سے ان مٹ سیاہی نہ لگی تھی۔	
	پولنگ آفیسر نے ہر ووٹر کے دائیں انگوٹھے کی پشت پر ان مٹ سیاہی لگائی۔	
	اسسٹنٹ پریزیڈنگ آفیسر نمبر 1 (APO-1) نے ہر ووٹر کے لئے قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیلٹ پیپر کی کاؤنٹر فائل کو پری کیا۔	
	APO-1 نے قومی اسمبلی کے سبز بیلٹ پیپر کی کاؤنٹر فائل پر ہر ووٹر کا نشان اگوتھا لگوا یا۔	
	APO-1 نے ہر کاؤنٹر فائل پر سامنے کی طرف اور بیلٹ پیپر کی پشت پر ایکشن کمیشن آف پاکستان کی مہر لگائی	
	APO-1 نے قومی اسمبلی کے ہر بیلٹ پیپر کی پشت پر سرکاری مہر کے اوپر اپنے دستخط کئے۔	
	APO-2 نے صوبائی اسمبلی کے لئے یہی طریقہ کار اختیار کیا۔	
	APO-2 نے مہر جس سے ووٹرز بیلٹ پیپر پر نشان لگائے گا پر سیاہی لگائی اور ہر ووٹر کو ہدایات دیں کہ وہ مہر کو کیسے استعمال کرے گا۔	
	انتخابی عملہ نے قومی یا صوبائی اسمبلی کے کسی ایک امیدوار یا پارٹی کے نشان کی نشاندہی کرتے ہوئے ووٹر پر اثر انداز ہونے کی کوشش کی۔	
	بیلٹ پیپر پر ووٹر کی طرف سے انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹ یا کسی دیگر نے مہر لگائی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے؟۔۔	
	ووٹرز بیلٹ پیپر پر مہر لگانے کیلئے ووٹنگ سکرین کے پیچھے گئے۔	
	لوگ (انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹ یا غیر متعلقہ لوگ) ووٹر کی مدد کرنے کیلئے ووٹنگ سکرین کے پیچھے گئے۔	
	APO-2 نے تسلی کی کہ ووٹر نے درست طور پر بیلٹ پیپر کو تہہ کیا ہے اور درست بیلٹ کس میں ڈالا ہے۔	
	اگر کوئی بیلٹ پیپر ضائع ہوا (پھٹ گیا یا غلط نشان لگ گیا) تو انتخابی عملہ نے بیلٹ پیپر اور اس کی کاؤنٹر فائل پر ضائع شدہ لکھا۔ اور ووٹر کو نیا بیلٹ پیپر ملا۔	
	ایک زمانہ پولنگ بوتھ پر ووٹنگ جب ختم ہوئی	
	ووٹنگ کے اختتام تک انتخابی عملہ کے تینوں ارکان پولنگ بوتھ میں موجود رہے۔	
	آخری ووٹر کے ووٹ ڈالنے کے بعد عملہ نے بیلٹ کس میں ووٹ ڈالنے والی جگہ کے ڈھکن کو بند کر کے اس پر سرکاری سیل لگائی تاکہ بیلٹ کس میں کوئی اضافی ووٹ نہ ڈالا جائے۔	

عام سوالات..... دن کے آخر میں..... پولنگ اسٹیشن کے متعلق جوابات

ہاں	نہیں
	انتخابی عملہ نے غیر جانبداری سے اپنے فرائض سرانجام دیے۔
	انتخابی عملہ نے تمام ووٹروں کے ساتھ عزت کے ساتھ مساوی سلوک کیا۔
	ووٹر جنہیں اضافی معاونت درکار تھی (بوڑھے، معذور) نے مدد حاصل کی۔
	☆ انہیں انتخابی عملہ سے مدد ملی۔
	☆ انہیں خاندان کے افراد سے مدد ملی۔
	☆ انہوں نے پولنگ ایجنٹوں (پارٹی اور امیدوار کے حامیوں) سے مدد لی۔
	☆ دوسرے غیر متعلقہ لوگ جو پولنگ بوتھ میں موجود تھے سے مدد ملی۔
	ووٹروں کی بڑی تعداد انتخابی عملہ، پولنگ ایجنٹوں کی جانبداری یا پولنگ بوتھ پر قبضہ کی وجہ سے ووٹ ڈالنے سے محروم رہی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس کی وجہ سے؟
	اس زمانہ پولنگ بوتھ پر پولنگ کھانا، نماز یا کسی اور وجہ سے بند ہوئی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس وجہ سے اور کتنی دیر۔
	حکومتی اہل کاران (ناظم، DCO، DPO اور کنسلرز وغیرہ) نے اس پولنگ بوتھ کے اندر ووٹروں پر اثر انداز ہوئی کی کوشش کی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے۔
	حکومتی اہلکاران (ناظم، DCO، DPO اور کنسلرز وغیرہ) نے اس پولنگ بوتھ پر انتخابی عملہ پر اثر انداز ہونے کی کوشش کی۔ اگر ہاں تو کس نے۔

صرف زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ میں تشدد / رکاوٹ

ہاں	نہیں
	تشدد یا رکاوٹ خواتین کے پولنگ بوتھ کو بند کر کے خواتین کی دوئنگ روکنے کیلئے تھی یا خواتین کی پولنگ بوتھ تک رسائی روکنے کیلئے تھی۔
	پولنگ بوتھ کے اندر زنانہ انتخابی عملہ کو پکڑ لیا گیا تھا۔
	سیاسی پارٹیوں اور امیدواروں نے آپس میں تمام زنانہ پولنگ بوتھ بند کرنے کا معاہدہ کیا۔

نافین کے انتخابی مشاہدہ کار کو تشدد کی صورت میں پولنگ اسٹیشن کو فوراً چھوڑ دینا چاہئے۔ کسی نزدیکی محفوظ جگہ پر جانے کی کوشش کریں اور تشدد ختم ہونے کے بعد یہ معلومات حاصل کرنے کی کوشش کریں۔

تشدد کس وقت شروع ہوا؟
کتنے گھنٹے _____ منٹ: _____ جاری رہا۔

تشدد یا رکاوٹ کس نے پیدا کی؟

☆ پارٹی یا امیدوار کے حامیوں نے؟ (کون سی پارٹی یا امیدوار)

☆ ووٹر؟ (ہاں / نہیں): _____

☆ انتخابی عملہ؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

☆ قانون نافذ کرنے والے؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

کیا کسی نے مدد کرنے کی کوشش کی؟

☆ پارٹی یا امیدوار کے حامیوں نے؟ (کون سی پارٹی یا امیدوار)

☆ ووٹر؟ (ہاں / نہیں): _____

☆ انتخابی عملہ؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

☆ قانون نافذ کرنے والے؟ (کون سا اہلکار): _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے ووٹ کا حق استعمال نہ کر سکنے والے لوگوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے زخمی ہونے والوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

تشدد کی وجہ سے مرنے والوں کی اندازاً تعداد: _____

حالات کی تفصیل:

C. FAFEN Observation Form 3

FAFEN کا مشاہدہ فارم نمبر 3

پولنگ سٹیشن مشاہدہ کاری پولنگ بند ہونے اور گنتی کے عمل کے دوران

ہدایات: فارم کی ہر قطار میں جواب لکھیں۔ اپنی رائے آخر میں دی گئی لائینوں میں درج کریں۔ اور اس فارم کو الیکشن کے دن کے اختتام پر FAFEN کے دیگر فارموں کے ہمراہ اپنے حلقہ مشاہدہ کار (CC) کے حوالے کر دیں۔

ضلع: _____ حلقہ نمبر: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا نام: 1 _____ 2 _____

FAFEN میں جی او کا نام: _____ پولنگ سٹیشن کا نام: _____

پولنگ سٹیشن کا نمبر: _____ گنتی شروع ہونے کا وقت: _____

گرین بیلٹ پیپر برائے قومی اسمبلی کے ختم ہونے کا وقت: _____

مشاہدہ کار کا متعلقہ سٹیشن سے رواجی کا وقت: _____

پولنگ سٹیشن پر کل رجسٹرڈ ووٹوں کی تعداد: _____

پولنگ سٹیشن پر کل ڈالے گئے ووٹوں کی تعداد: _____

ہاں	پولنگ سٹیشن کا بند ہونا	نہیں
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے پولنگ بجے بند کر دی	
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے ان لوگوں کو ووٹ ڈالنے کی اجازت دی جو 5 بجے سے پولنگ سٹیشن کے اندر موجود تھے	
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے ان لوگوں کو بھی ووٹ ڈالنے کی اجازت دی جو 5 بجے کے بعد پولنگ سٹیشن میں آئے	
	گنتی کی تیاری	
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے گنتی کا عمل شروع ہونے سے پہلے تمام پولنگ بوتھ کے بیلٹ پیپر کی گنتی کر لی	
	پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے تمام ایجنٹوں، امیدواران اور ECP کی طرف سے جاری کردہ "پاس" رکھنے والے مشاہدہ کاران کو ووٹوں کی گنتی کا مشاہدہ کرنے کی اجازت دی۔	
	پولنگ سٹیشن میں گنتی کے دوران گنتی والے کمرے میں غیر متعلقہ افراد کو ٹھہرنے کی اجازت تھی	
	گنتی کا عمل شروع ہونے سے پہلے کمرے کے دروازے مکمل طور پر بند کر دئے گئے جب تک کہ گنتی مکمل نہیں ہوئی	
	FAFEN مشاہدہ کاران اور ایجنٹوں کو اس بات کی اجازت دی گئی کہ وہ قریب سے پورے عمل کا مشاہدہ کر سکیں تاکہ وہ ہر بیلٹ پیپر کو اچھی طرح دیکھ سکیں کہ اس پر نمبر لگی ہوئی ہے یا نہیں	
	صرف ECP کے عمل کو اجازت تھی کہ وہ بیلٹ پیپر کو چھو سکے	
	گنتی کے دوران تمام قومی اور صوبائی اسمبلی کے بیلٹ باکس کو آسانی اور اچھے طریقے سے دیکھا جاسکتا تھا	
	بیلٹ باکس سیل نمبر کا واضح طور پر اعلان کیا گیا تاکہ ان کو کھولنے کے وقت سیل نمبر سے موازنہ کیا جاسکے	

ہاں	نہیں
صرف قومی اسمبلی کے بیٹ باکس کی سیل کھولی گئی اور پولنگ ایجنٹوں اور مشاہدہ کاروں کی موجودگی میں بیٹ پیپر ز کو ایک جگہ پر جمع کیا گیا	
قومی اسمبلی کے تمام بیٹ پیپر ز کو ایک جگہ جمع کر کے گنتی مکمل کی گئی	
صوبائی اسمبلی کے سفید رنگ کے بیٹ پیپر ز جو غلطی سے قومی اسمبلی کے سبز رنگ والے بیٹ پیپر ز کے ساتھ مل گئے تھے، کو علیحدہ کر دیا گیا	
تمام قومی اسمبلی کے بیٹ پیپر ز کی دوبارہ گنتی کی گئی تاکہ کل تعداد کا پتہ چل جائے	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے تمام قومی اسمبلی کے بیٹ پیپر ز کو گنتی کے فارم پر درج کیا	

گنتی کا عمل

ہاں	نہیں
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے ہر ایک بیٹ پیپر کو ایک ایک کر کے دیکھا کہ وہ کارآمد ووٹ ہے	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے تمام بیٹ پیپر ز کو چیک کیا کہ ان پر سرکاری مہر اور متعلقہ آفیسر کے دستخط موجود ہیں اور ایسے تمام بیٹ پیپر ز کو مسترد کر دیا جن پر سرکاری مہر اور دستخط نہیں تھے۔	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے ایسے تمام بیٹ پیپر ز کو مسترد کر دیئے جن پر کسی بھی امیدوار کے نام پر مہر نہیں لگے تھے۔	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے "ECP ہینڈ بک پر پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر" صفحہ نمبر 70 کے تحت بیٹ پیپر ز کو مسترد کیے	
پولنگ ایجنٹ نے مطالبہ کیا کہ کچھ ووٹ صحیح ہیں ان کو منظور کیا جائے	
پولنگ ایجنٹ نے مطالبہ کیا کہ کچھ ووٹ مسترد ہیں اس لئے ان کو خارج کیا جائے۔	
مسترد شدہ ووٹ علیحدہ رکھے گئے۔	
پولنگ آفیسر نے قومی اسمبلی کے ایک ایک ووٹ کو گنتی کر کے الگ الگ ڈھیر کی صورت میں رکھا کہ کس امیدوار نے کتنے ووٹ حاصل کئے۔	
تمام امیدواروں کے ووٹوں کی دوبارہ گنتی کی گئی۔	
چیلنج شدہ بیٹ پیپر ز کی علیحدہ سے گنتی کی گئی۔	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے گنتی کے فارم نمبر 14 پر قومی اسمبلی کے تمام بیٹ پیپر ز کو زوری طور پر درج کر دیئے۔	
تمام گنتی شدہ بیٹ پیپر ز کو مناسب قومی اسمبلی کے لئے مخصوص لفافے میں رکھا گیا۔	
پریز اینڈنگ آفیسر نے بیٹ پیپر ز کے گنتی فارم کو قومی اسمبلی کی فائل میں لگایا۔	
تمام پولنگ ایجنٹوں اور امیدواروں نے گنتی کے فارم پر اپنے دستخط کر دیئے۔	
تمام پولنگ ایجنٹوں اور امیدواروں نے قومی اسمبلی کے بیٹ پیپر ز کو گنتی فارم پر دستخط کر دیئے۔	
قومی اسمبلی کی گنتی فارم کی اصل کا پی ریٹرننگ آفیسر کو ارسال کرنے والے سامان میں بھیج دی گئی	
گنتی فارم کی ایک ایک کاپی امیدوار اور پولنگ ایجنٹ کو ملی۔	
مشاہدہ کار کو بھی قومی اسمبلی کے گنتی فارم کی کاپی دی گئی	
پولنگ ایجنٹوں، امیدواروں اور مشاہدہ کاران کو اجازت دی گئی کہ وہ صوبائی اسمبلی کے ووٹوں کی گنتی شروع ہونے سے پہلے جاسکتے ہیں	
کیا جب تک صوبائی اسمبلی کی گنتی مکمل نہیں کی گئی آپکو زوری ہٹایا گیا۔	
جیسے ہی گنتی مکمل کی گئی قومی اسمبلی کے گنتی فارم کی ایک کاپی ریٹرننگ آفیسر کو بھیج دی گئی۔	
قومی اسمبلی کے گنتی فارم کی ایک کاپی پولنگ اسٹیشن کے باہر آویزاں کی گئی تاکہ ہر آدمی اس کو دیکھ سکے۔	

FAFEN مشاہدہ فارم نمبر 5 CC کا مشاہدہ برائے RO کو ووٹوں کو جمع اور اکٹھا کرنا

ہاں	
نہیں	ریٹرننگ آفیسر مشاہدہ کار کو نتائج کے شمار کو دیکھنے کی اجازت نہیں دیتا
	ریٹرننگ آفیسر نے تمام امیدواران کو نتائج کے شمارے کے لئے دن، وقت اور جگہ کے لئے تحریری نوٹس جاری کیا ہے
	ریٹرننگ آفیسر کسی بھی ظاہری وجہ کے بغیر نتائج کے شمار میں تاخیر کرتا ہے
	نتائج کے شمارے کا آغاز اس وقت ہوا جب کئی پولنگ سٹیشن سے نتائج پہنچ گئے
	ایک یا ایک سے زیادہ پولنگ سٹیشن کا نتیجہ بہت تاخیر سے پہنچا اگر ہاں تو تعداد لکھنے
	کچھ پریڈائیڈنگ آفیسر نتائج لا رہے ہیں
	ریٹرننگ آفیسر نے پولنگ سٹیشن سے نتائج وصول کرنے کا انتظام کر رکھا ہے۔
	پولیس پولنگ سٹیشن سے نتائج لا رہی ہے
	مد مقابل امیدوار نتائج کے شمار کی جگہ پر موجود نہیں ان امیدواران اور ان کی سیاسی جماعتوں کے نام لکھیں
	ریٹرننگ آفیسر ایک ایک کر کے ووٹوں کی تھیلیاں کھولتا ہے
	ریٹرننگ افسران بیلٹ پیپر کا معائنہ کرتا ہے جو کہ شمارے سے خارج کئے گئے ہیں
	اس کے بعد RO چیلنج شدہ بیلٹ پیپر کا معائنہ کرتا ہے
	RO امیدواران یا ان کے ایجنٹ کو خارج شدہ چیلنج شدہ بیلٹ پیپر دیکھنے کی اجازت دیتا ہے
	RO فیصلہ کرتا ہے کہ کچھ بیلٹ پیپر غلط خارج شدہ قرار دیا گیا ہے
	RO غلط طریقے سے خارج شدہ بیلٹ پیپر کو کسی بھی امیدوار کے حق میں درست قرار دیتا ہے
	جو پوسٹل بیلٹ پیپر ز مقررہ تاریخ کے بعد موصول ہوئے ہیں انہیں خارج کیا گیا۔
	کچھ بیلٹس کو تکنیکی وجوہات کی بناء پر خارج کیا گیا
	امیدواران، ایجنٹ نے شمار کنندہ پوسٹل بیلٹ پر اعتراض کیا
	امیدواران/ایجنٹ نے شمار کنندہ پوسٹل بیلٹ پر اعتراض کیا
	پوسٹل بیلٹس کے موازنہ سے الیکشن کے حتمی نتیجے پر اثر پڑا
	امیدواران/ایجنٹس نے نتائج کے شمار پر اطمینان کا اظہار کیا
	امیدوار/ایجنٹس نے دوبارہ شمار کی درخواست دی اگر ہاں تو وجہ بیان کریں
	RO نے دوبارہ شمار پر رضامندی کا اظہار کیا
	RO نے دوبارہ شمار کی اجازت دی اگر ہاں تو وجہ بیان کریں
	RO نے ECP کا فارم نمبر 17 پر کیا: شمار کا نتیجہ
	RO نے فارم نمبر 17 کی نقل امیدوار / ایجنٹ کو فراہم کی

وٹوں کی گنتی کا نتیجہ

صحیح ڈالے گئے وٹوں کی تعداد	امیدوار کا نام	امیدوار کی سیاسی جماعت	نمبر شمار
			1
			2
			3
			4
			5
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About FAFEN

FAFEN is a nationwide coalition of 30 Pakistani civil society organizations, working together to promote electoral and democratic accountability in the country. Formed in 2006 in preparation for national elections held in February 2008, FAFEN:

- observed the public display of Pakistan's draft electoral roll and conducted the country's first statistically-valid voters list audit in 2007;
- fielded long-term observers nationwide and published 19 pre-election reports;
- deployed more than 18,000 observers nationwide on Election Day; and
- conducted Pakistan's first Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) for more than 250 separate constituencies.

All of FAFEN's election observation materials, methodology, statements, and reports are available at www.fafen.org. FAFEN member organizations have registered as a collective Trust under Pakistani law and are continuing to implement robust programs in between elections related to monitoring parliamentary affairs, connecting constituents to their elected representatives, promoting active citizenship through ongoing civic education, and advocating for electoral and democratic reforms.