Pakistan ratified the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2010, making these the first national elections to be held under the legal obligations of the treaty. Pakistan’s legislative framework largely provides for ICCPR election-related rights. However some aspects of the current legislation, such as the subjective candidacy requirements, are not consistent with the ICCPR. Furthermore there are some omissions, specifically in regards to access to administrative remedy in case of dispute, and a lack of provisions for transparency.

The legal framework has been improved through various amendments to the Constitution. These established a parliamentary process for the appointment of the Caretaker Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and the ECP leadership, as well as collective decision-making by the ECP Members and Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). These improved mechanisms contributed to enhanced confidence in the institutions and reduced allegations of bias compared to 2008. However further legislative reform for elections was not significantly achieved.

The ECP has undertaken some consultation with political parties and civil society, which has contributed to increased confidence in and performance by the institution. However the ECP has not used its broad powers to establish a complete regulatory framework, leaving critical aspects of the election open to discretion. The ECP has also not taken full responsibility for all aspects of the election administration, instead deferring some key matters to temporarily appointed Returning Officers (ROs) without sufficient regulation or central oversight.

Requirements for transparency were not met. For example the legislation does not provide for observer access and for results information to be made publicly accessible. Furthermore the ECP did not always make information of public interest easily available and in a timely manner. For example notifications of ECP decisions, data on changes to the polling station scheme, and results records.

The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) has been instrumental in the formation of a markedly improved Electoral Roll (ER), which provided a strong safeguard in the electoral process. However the universality of the franchise continues to be undermined by the under-registration of women compared to men. In addition equality of the vote is compromised by the large variation in constituency sizes.

The elections were undertaken in a difficult security environment that affected voters, political parties, candidates, the election administration, observers and the media. Despite militant threats, a high number of citizens contested, with a total of 16,692 candidacies accepted, of which 5,000 were for the 342 National Assembly (NA) seats (272 general seats, 60 reserved for women and 10 for non-Muslims), and 11,692 for the 728 Provincial Assembly (PA) seats. There was an average of 17.2 candidates per NA constituency, a doubling from 8.3 in 2008. All those parties that boycotted the 2008 elections chose to participate in 2013, and only one party declared a boycott before election day.

The right to stand as a candidate was not evenly provided for. The process of candidate registration was made problematic and unnecessarily burdensome by the vague and moral candidacy requirements that were unevenly applied, hence there were cases of the same candidate being accepted in one constituency and rejected in another. In some cases there was an assumption of guilt and consequent rejection of candidacy for people who had been charged but not tried.

During the last four weeks of the campaign, there were a reported 130 security incidents resulting in more than 150 people killed. Most of the attacks were directed against candidates and supporters of parties identified as secular, in particular the Awami National Party (ANP) in Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) and the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in Sindh, two of the three political parties the Tehreek-e Taleban Pakistan (TTP) had threatened, the third being the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). However, the last two weeks of the campaign saw an increasing number of attacks against other parties and independent candidates in all four provinces and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The federal and provincial caretaker Governments took, in varying degrees, security measures and made protection arrangements for candidates.

The high number of attacks affected campaigning and unbalanced the playing field, in particular in KPK, Balochistan and Karachi. In contrast, in vast parts of the country the pre-electoral environment was generally vibrant with a lively campaign period, notably in all Punjab and central and interior Sindh. While some parties were able to undertake large-scale campaign events, overall the campaign was largely characterized by small-to-medium sized rallies, corner meetings and door-to-door activities. EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) Long-Term Observers (LTOs) reported isolated cases of violent clashes between party supporters.

No grave violations of the ECP’s Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates were directly observed by EU EOM LTOs. Further analysis is hampered by the lack of a systematic mechanism for addressing violations, and a lack of information from the ECP on breaches and responses to breaches of the Code of Conduct.

The media provided a range of viewpoints, as well as scrutiny of the election process. Although the media generally enjoys freedom of speech, journalists and editors were targeted by militant or other groups in Karachi, some other parts of Sindh, Balochistan and FATA, and the state authorities took insufficient measures to protect.

In the absence of a transparent and efficient enforcement mechanism for the otherwise sound Code of Conduct for the Media, state and privately owned broadcasters did not provide the main contestants with equitable coverage. For example the six TV channels monitored by the EU EOM broadcasted numerous Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) publicity events granting the party a total of nearly 16 hours of live coverage, while MQM, Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI) and PPP had a total of 9, 5 and 4 hours respectively.

Election day proceeded more smoothly than anticipated with a large-scale security effort in place, although still there were reportedly 62 violent incidents resulting in at least 64 election-related deaths and 225 people injured. Over 140 EU EOM observers scrutinized polling, counting and the compilation of results in 140 constituencies in 3 provinces. Security conditions precluded EU EOM observation in Balochistan and FATA. Most of the polling booths observed were rated as satisfactory or good. However 9% were rated as poor or inadequate. In some cases serious problems were seen, including in Karachi, where overall polling stations were more negatively rated.

Counting was more problematic, with 9 out of 64 stations rated as poor or inadequate. In 17 cases results forms were not correctly filled in, and in half of the observations the results forms were not displayed. Similar transparency problems were also found in consolidation at the constituency level, when only in 14 cases, out of 39 observed, did EU EOM observers see full results displayed with a polling station breakdown that allows for checking the veracity of the announced totals.

Post election day there were a number of allegations of “rigging”, and thus the electoral process was challenged, although the federal and provincial outcomes were clearly accepted, with strong margins of victory contributing to the recognition of overall mandates. The lack of availability of crucial data from the ECP on polling stations, numbers of registered voters, and individual polling station results, reduced confidence in the process and opportunity for complaints to be lodged and addressed in a speedy manner. Furthermore it prevents full analysis of results and rigging allegations, thereby precluding full identification of issues arising. EU EOM observers noted shortcomings in the completion of results forms and some polling stations with questionably high levels of invalid ballots.

It appears that ROs made some last minute changes to the polling station scheme and polling staff, and that the ECP has no central record of the changes or final lists of actual stations and staff used on election day. This is problematic in regards to ballot accountability, implementation of procedures as untrained staff were used, and the organisation of voters, agents and observers. Such unaccounted for changes can result in suspicions about possible motivations.

The ECP didn’t regulate for the resolution of complaints, and instead its various offices and ROs used ad hoc procedures, resulting in some re-polling and recounting being undertaken in a number of stations and constituencies. The lack of a central record-keeping system and routine publication of decisions, makes it difficult to assess the extent to which there was consistent opportunity for effective remedy.

The number of women elected to NA general seats dropped to only 6 (2%), although with the reserved seats there are a total of 66 (19.3%) women in the assembly. Despite a two-fold increase in the number of female candidates, the majority of parties awarded tickets to three or fewer women. In the media, women candidates were hardly visible. Despite a significant increase in the number of registered women, there were some 11 million fewer registered female than male voters. Women-only polling stations were more negatively assessed by EU EOM observers.

The Ahmadi community continues to be discriminated against as, unlike other minority groups, they are registered on a separate ER. Even though the Code of Conduct for the Media tasks broadcasters to air programmes targeting “groups traditionally excluded from the political process”, voter education spots promoting non-Muslim participation in the elections were not aired on state-owned broadcasters.

At the time of finalisation of this report, 19 June 2013, the election process remains incomplete. Some constituencies are still to hold polling, and some cases are outstanding at Election Tribunals and Superior Courts. Improvements to the overall election process could still be made through the publication of the polling station scheme used on election day and results data, as well as by consistent and efficient handling of petitions and investigation of alleged election offences.

This report was produced by the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) and presents the EU EOM’s findings on the
General Elections May 11 2013 in Pakistan. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the European
Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the Commission. The European Commission does not
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made thereof.

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Electioneering in Prohibited Areas

Prohibited by the ECP, the political parties and candidates were found in violation of the restrictions imposed on electioneering in and around the polling stations. Of the 38,274 polling stations observed, 11,093 had political parties/candidates in violation of the reserved space. Of these, 4,506 (12% of the observed 38,274) polling stations were reported to have political parties’/candidates’ camps within the restricted space of 400- yards around the polling stations, 5,345 (14%) had parties’/candidates’ campaign material within the restricted 100 -yards, while 1, 242 (3%) polling stations had campaign material inside the stations’ premises.

Irregularities in Pre-Voting Preparation and Processes

FAFEN observers reported 5,142 instances of shortcomings and irregularities in implementation of the prevoting preparations and processes. At 795 (2% of the 38,274) polling stations, polling official did not check the observers’ ECP accreditation while of the 18,130 polling stations whose opening was observed, polling officials at 532 (3%) polling stations did not collect the authority letters from all the polling agents. With regards to the preparation for voting, 1,253 (3% of the 38,274) polling stations did not have the polling station sign prominently displayed, while 282 (1% of the 31,337) polling booths were observed where the required three polling officials were not present. The polling materials were similarly observed missing or not meeting the required standards in a number of polling booths. For instance, the voters list was unavailable in 163 (1%) polling booths while 90 did not have the National Assembly ballots present prior to the start of polling. Furthermore, 183 (1%) polling booths did not have the required two ballot boxes while ballot boxes in 155 polling booths were not properly sealed and 94 polling booths had ballot boxes that did not have a visible ECP monogram on their respective seals. From the perspective of other pre-voting transparency measures, the polling officials in 716 (2%) of the observed polling booths did not show or read out the seal numbers to the polling agents and at 715 (2%) polling booths, the polling officials were observed to not have obtained the signatures on Ballot Attestation Form XI-A from all polling agents present in the polling booth.

Irregularities in Voter Identification Procedures

Voter identification is a critical part of a transparent voting exercise. Given its importance, the voter identification process has evolved into a systematic sub-set of processes. FAFEN’S observation of 31,337 polling booths recorded a total of 2,567 irregularities. Of these, 657 (2%) polling booths had instances of voters being allowed to vote with identification forms other than the CNIC. At 191 (1%) polling booths, the observers recorded cases of some voters with no official identification form being allowed to vote. The established procedure of calling out each prospective voter was not followed in 1,327 (4%) polling booths, while at 116 polling booths the polling officials were observed not crossing each identified and processed voter from the voter’s list. As a set and established procedure of applying indelible ink to check multiple voting by a voter, the observers reported 118 polling booths where the polling officers were not applying the ink on each voter’s thumb and another 158 where each voter’s thumb was not being checked for the indelible ink mark. It is pertinent to note that in 2,168 (7% of the observed 31,337) polling booths, the observers recorded instances of the polling agents of the parties challenging voters’ identity.

Irregularities in Ballot and Counterfoil Processing

Following the identification of voters, the next key set of procedures deals with the issuance and recording of the ballots. The observers recorded 3,054 instances where the procedures were not followed. At 126 polling booths, the polling officials failed to secure each voter’s thumb print on the National Assembly ballot counterfoil. In 78 polling booths, the polling officials were observed to be not recording each voter’s CNIC details on the ballot counterfoil and in 125 polling booths, the officials were observed to have failed to put the official stamp and signature on the National Assembly ballot counterfoil. In addition, the concerned Assistant Presiding Officer in 58 polling booths were not putting the official stamp and signature on the back of each NA Ballot issued to the voters while in 2,667 polling booths, the polling officials were not putting the wrongly marked or torn NA ballot in the special envelops as per the requirements and procedures.

Irregularities in Voter Facilitation and Secrecy

The polling officials are tasked with facilitating voters in following the voting process and helping ensure the voters’ right to privacy. Of the 31,337 polling booths observed, polling officials did not instruct voters at 968 (3%) polling booths on how to mark the ballot correctly while in 312 (1%) polling booths, the officials did not ask the voters to go behind the secrecy screens. Maintaining the voter’s right to secrecy is a critical feature of the voting system. However, of the 31,337 polling booth observed on election-day, 355 were reported to have instances of polling officials accompanying voters not requiring assistance. In 383 polling booths, the polling agents were seen accompanying the voters behind the secrecy screen. In 101 polling booths, instances of security officials accompanying voters behind secrecy screen was recorded while in 371 polling booths, unidentified personnel were seen visiting the privacy area with the voters. Furthermore, in 1,306 (4%) polling booths, the polling officials allowed people other than the designated assistant to escort the voters with special needs behind the secrecy screens.

Ballot Stuffing and Polling Station Capture

Of the 31,337 polling booths and 38,274 polling stations observed, 1,303 had instances of ballot stuffing or polling station capture by a particular party/candidate. Aggregated for polling stations, the number of polling stations captured reached a significant 458 (almost 1%) of the total polling stations observed. The incidents of ballot stuffing—recorded at the polling booth level—highlighted various forms of ballot stuffing in 845 (3%) polling booths. Of those, polling officials were observed marking NA ballots on behalf of voters in 122 polling booths. Polling agents and other unidentified persons were observed marking ballots on behalf of voters in 327 and 324 polling booths respectively. Furthermore, security officials were observed to have indulged in false voting in 72 polling booths.

Influencing Voters and Polling Officials

Of the 31,337 polling booths, the incidents of undue influence on voters and polling officials were recorded in 2,435 (8%). Of those, 273 polling booths reportedly had incidents of people pressurizing the polling officials to favor a certain candidate/party. In addition, there were 141 polling booths where the polling officials were observed asking voters to vote for a certain candidate/party and 42 polling booths where government officials were seen influencing voters to favor a particular party/candidate. Furthermore, the security officials were seen involved in the polling process, without the concerned presiding officer’s request, in 1,979 polling booths in contravention of their assigned roles to maintain law and order outside the booth.

Irregularities in Closing of Polling

The closing of the poll and preparation for the vote count was observed for 16,933 polling stations and 31,337 polling booths. A total of 12,789 anomalies were observed in the process. Of the 16,933 polling stations, 453 (3%) were closed before 5pm while in 3,927 (13%) of the 31,337 booths, voters already in the queue were not allowed to vote. In 7,338 (23%) other polling booths, not only voters in queue were allowed to vote but new voters were allowed to join the queue after 5pm. Prior to the counting process, polling official at 583 (2%) polling booths did not close and seal the ballot boxes after the last voter had cast his/her vote. Similarly, in 488 (3%) of the 16,933 polling stations observed, the premises was not closed before the start of the vote counting.

Irregularities in Vote Counting Processes

As one of the most critical aspects of the electoral process, the vote counting procedures were documented in extensive detail. The relevant processes were observed in 16,933 polling stations yielding 17,358 irregularities and violations. In 1,387 (8%) polling stations, the polling officials did not call out and show the ballot box seal numbers to the polling agents. In 611 (4%) polling stations, the polling officials did not collect all the National Assembly ballots in one central location. In 957 (6%) polling stations, the polling officers did not check the stamp and signature on the back of each National Assembly ballot. In the process of counting of the candidates votes, polling officials in 670 (4%) polling stations did not separate the votes for each individual candidate while in 1,092 (6%) polling stations, the votes for each candidate were not counted twice as per the requirement of the procedure. Furthermore, in 877 (5%) polling stations, the polling officials did not re-count all the National Assembly ballots for the second time as per the procedure. The treatment of ‘invalid’ votes is a key element in the vote counting process. The observers reported 2,012 (12%) polling stations where the polling officials did not put the ballots without a clear mark in the invalid pile. In addition, observers from 2,558 (15%) polling stations reported that the polling officials were counting National Assembly ballots that did not have a clear mark. Furthermore, in 1,560 (9%) polling stations, the polling officials did not discard votes without signature and sign of the Assistant Presiding Officer in the invalid pile. The number of polling stations where the polling agents or the candidates argued for declaring certain National Assembly ballots as invalid was recorded at 2,334 (14%). Conversely, polling officials at 3,606 (21%) polling stations declared some votes as invalid that did have clear stamp/mark. In addition, polling agents in 2,461 (15%) polling stations argued for declaring some invalid votes as valid and counted in favor of their candidates. Furthermore, the polling officials did not separate the invalid ballots into a pile in 668 (4%) of the polling stations and in 1,360 (8%) of the polling stations, polling officials did not count the challenged ballots for each candidate.

Irregularities in Result Documentation and Dissemination

A total of 7,331 irregularities were observed in the documentation and dissemination of the results at the polling station level in the observed 16,933 polling stations. In 262 (2%) of the polling stations, the polling officials did not fill the National Assembly ballots account form while in 824 (5%) polling stations, all the polling agents did not sign the National Assembly ballot account form. Similarly, polling officials in 152 (1%) polling stations did not fill the National Assembly statement of the Count form carefully and completely while in 898 (5%) polling stations, all the polling agents did not sign the National Assembly Statement of the Count. The packing of National Assembly election material in prescribed envelope prior to its transfer to the Returning Officer office witnessed several shortcomings and irregularities. Of the observed 16,933 polling stations, polling officials in 89 did not carefully pack the National Assembly material carefully into their separate envelopes and in 148 polling stations failed to put all the material into the special National Assembly tamper evident bag. Furthermore, not all polling agents in 909 (5% polling stations) and the presiding officers in 182 (1%) of the polling stations sign the National Assembly tamper evident bag. With regards to the dissemination of the polling station’s result, copy of the prescribed Form XIV was not provided to all the polling agents in 1,274 (8%) polling stations while in 2,593 (15%) polling stations, the result was not posted outside the polling station.

Incidents of Violence and Intimidation

Incidents of intimidation and violence were recorded in detail as a critical part of the election-day observation. A total of 4,241 instances of violence and intimidation were reported from across the country. Of the 31,337 polling booths observed, 1,321 (4%) reported the unauthorized presence of armed people inside the polling booth. Furthermore, there were 2,920 incidents of violence reported from 2,196 (6% of the observed 38,274) polling stations. Of these incidents, 109 were armed clashes between political parties, 531 were major quarrels and 2,280 were minor quarrels. The list of casualties reported includes 19 deaths and 628 injuries.

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This report was published by Election Commission of Pakistan and made available for General Public .

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The ten themes in this report include voter turnout, barriers to women’s voting, irregularities in polling stations during voting and counting procedures, and weak election results management. The report also includes sections on last-minute changes in polling schemes; pre-election violence, government interference and Code of Conduct violations; and constituency delimitations.

The following analysis is still preliminary and does not represent FAFEN’s final analysis, which will be based on aggregation of comprehensive checklists filled by hand on Election Day in a statisticallyvalid random sample of 9,160 polling stations by more than 25,000 static observers and about 15,000 additional mobile observers each visiting 2-4 polling stations.

FAFEN’s final analysis will also depend on the extent to which the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) transparently releases official forms from all 69,801 polling stations and all 272 National Assembly (NA) constituencies around the country, as urged by both FAFEN and the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) in public statements. Following are the key findings;

a) Voter Turnout

General Election 2013 witnessed voter turnout that was considerably higher than elections held previously in the country since 1985. Analysis of unofficial results of 263 out of 272 NA constituencies suggests that 53.4% of registered voters nationally turned out to vote for candidates contesting NA seats. However, accurate voter turnout can only be analyzed when ECP releases Form XIV (Statement of the Count), Form XV (Ballot Paper Account), Form VI (Consolidation Statement of the Results of the Count) and Form XVII (Result of the Count) for full public scrutiny.

For the first time in Pakistan, ECP introduced specific amendments to the Statement of the Count to measure the sex-disaggregated voter turnout for General Election 2013. However, according to FAFEN assessment of 264 Statements of the Count from 26 constituencies, the Presiding Officers at as many as two-thirds of polling stations did not fill out the specific sections of the form correctly, raising concern that ECP may not be able to provide accurate sex-disaggregated turnout.

b) Barriers to Women’s Voting

FAFEN observers reported a total of 15 incidents in which women were barred from voting by under implicit understanding among candidates and community leaders. Most of these cases were reported in Punjab, where 10 incidents of expressed intention of men to bar women from voting were recorded in Khanewal (4), Faisalabad (3), Sahiwal (2), and Kasur (1). In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, barring women from voting was observed in four districts, namely Peshawar, Buner, Kohat and Lower Dir. In
FATA, one such case was reported from North Waziristan Agency. No cases of women being barred from voting were reported from Balochistan or Sindh.

c) Weak Polling Station Management

Based on FAFEN’s data analysis so far, no significant improvement was witnessed in polling station management comparing General Elections in 2008 and 2013. Predictable irregularities continued,including interference in voting by polling officials and unauthorized people in polling booths and stations.

FAFEN has analyzed summary data sent on May 11 and 12, 2013, by observers deployed at 6,314 polling stations. A total of 1,492 irregularities were reported from 1,181 of the reporting polling stations. Some of these irregularities are relatively minor, but some have the potential of creating conducive environment for Election Day fraud.

These irregularities were reported from all provinces. At least 291 of these irregularities, most of which were recorded in Punjab, were related to changes in polling schemes. A high number of violent incidents (288) were also reported from across the country; however, most of these were also seen in Punjab.

FAFEN observers were restricted from carrying out their duties in 226 polling stations, while at least 106 incidences of interference by security/other officials and 123 incidents of illegal or fraudulent voting were observed.

Most importantly, the procedures for counting ballots and votes in polling stations remain chaotic and non-transparent. In particular, FAFEN is beginning to scrutinize polling station Statements of the Count (Form XIV) gathered by observers, which have errors and irregularities. These irregularities could be indications or electoral fraud, and could help identify specific recommendations for reforms in electoral procedure and training for polling officials to improve future bi-elections and general
elections.

The Statements of the Count filled by many Presiding Officers were misleading and reflective of the lack of basic training on how to complete this crucial document. In a review of the 264 Statements of the Count shared with FAFEN observers by presiding officers for 26 NA constituencies, on 86 Statements, the presiding officer did not fill properly the number of registered voters assigned to that polling station. As many as 41 Statements of the Count have an incorrect total of valid votes for each candidate with minor differences. In 114 Statements of the Count the percentage of invalid ballots was more than 3%. In 12 cases, the invalid ballots amounted to more than 10% of polled votes. In one case, invalid ballots amounted to one fourth of the total polled votes.

d) Weak Management of Election Results

All forms from all polling stations in the constituency must be carefully reviewed and, if necessary, investigated by Returning Officers openly in the presence of candidates (or their representatives) and accredited observers on election night. Data from each polling station should be added on a flipchart or board within view of these stakeholders. Both polling station forms and consolidation of election result forms must be transmitted promptly to ECP. None of these steps are currently followed
consistently or well, according to FAFEN observations.

According to FAFEN Parallel Vote Tabulations (PVTs), which are now complete in 92 (out of 272) constituencies, 89 reconcile with ECP results with the same winner and same runner up. However, the PVT results do not reconcile with the winner on three constituencies. Very narrow margins of victory in these three constituencies (NA-28, NA-171 and NA-208) make it very difficult to verify the ECP results.

The most important single step that ECP can make to ensure transparency and legitimacy of the elections is that before certifying any election results, ECP must post official documents from all polling stations and all constituencies on its website, including Form XIV (Statement of the Count), Form XV (Ballot Paper Account), Form VI (Consolidation Statement of the Results of the Count) and Form XVII (Result of the Count). These forms are the most important evidence of the quality of election administration and the validity of results in each constituency.

e) Changes in Polling Schemes

The polling schemes in three provinces – Punjab, Sindh and KP – were finalized and posted on the ECP website during the week immediately preceding elections. The scheme for Balochistan has not been posted to date. The late finalization and failure to notify the voting public and election stakeholders in Balochistan are counter to Representation of the Peoples Act (ROPA) Article 8(2).

In addition, ECP officials and/or constituency ROs apparently changed the numbers, locations and configuration of polling stations after public notification of the final polling schemes. FAFEN observers reported changes in the addresses or numbers of 255 polling stations across Pakistan, with 127 reports coming from Punjab followed by 105 from Sindh, 17 from KP and three each from FATA and KP. These last-minute changes raise doubts about the motives and accountability of these officials.

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