

Pakistan General Elections 2008

# Election Observation Summary & Recommendations for Electoral Reforms

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**Submitted to the Electoral Reforms Committee**

June 21, 2008



**Free & Fair Election Network**

**Title:** Pakistan General Election 2008: Election Observation Summary and Recommendations for Electoral Reforms

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# Introduction

## Background

Unprecedented data collected on Election Day by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) demonstrates that critical reforms in electoral administration and procedures are needed, which the Parliament and the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) have a timely opportunity to enact now for the future benefit the Pakistani electorate, candidates, and political parties.

FAFEN is the first domestic election observation effort in Pakistan to use a long-term, nationwide, systematic, statistically-driven methodology, following international standards and best practices. A coalition of forty leading Pakistani civil society organizations, FAFEN was established in 2006 to observe the election process, educate voters and advocate for electoral and democratic reform.

## Long-Term Observation

Beginning in October 2007, five months prior to the Pakistan 2008 National and Provincial Assembly Elections, FAFEN trained Observer District Coordinators (ODCs) in all districts of Pakistan and three FATA agencies (Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai). These ODCs reported weekly to the FAFEN Secretariat using a standard checklist, focused on these following themes: election administration, the role of local government officials in the election process, political parties and candidates, and Election intimidation and violence.

Starting in November 2007, additional Constituency Coordinators (CCs) were trained and deployed in each of 264 National Assembly constituencies (out of a total of 272). FAFEN did not observe the election process in eight FATA constituencies. ODCs and CCs continued to report weekly to the FAFEN Secretariat, using a standardized methodology, until Election Day.

The FAFEN Secretariat analyzed the first-hand observation reports from ODCs and CCs and published 19 "FAFEN Election Updates" based on these reports. These Updates were posted at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org) and sent electronically to national and international stakeholders, including print and electronic media, political parties, the Election Commission of Pakistan, national and international observer groups, donors and academics.

## **Election Day Observation**

On Election Day, February 18, 2008, FAFEN conducted the world's largest Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) along with a robust, nationwide election observation methodology, following international principles and best practices.

Almost 16,000 FAFEN Polling Station Observers (PSOs) witnessed and recorded the counting of ballots in a statistically-valid sample of 7,778 randomly-selected polling stations in 260 National Assembly constituencies. An additional 3,000 Mobile Observers (MOs) helped transport the "Statement of the Count" and PSO checklists from polling stations to CCs. Each CC compiled the polling station data on standardized forms and faxed these PVT election results to the FAFEN Secretariat in Islamabad.

The purpose of a PVT is to compare the observed vote count in a sample of polling stations with the compiled election result for that constituency in order to provide evidence that confirms or disputes the official election result. A PVT does not take account of other aspects of the election process, such as pre-poll violations of the Code of Conduct. However, FAFEN has combined its PVT data with evidence provided by polling station observers of problems they witnessed first-hand on Election Day, such as party agents or polling officials stamping ballots. These observations often substantiate the anomalies that FAFEN has found in the quantitative PVT election results data.

This combination of quantitative PVT data and qualitative Election Day observations has enabled FAFEN to produce three unique "Election Result Analysis" reports between March 9 and May 7, 2008. These reports are compiled in this publication, along with samples of FAFEN's PVT data and graphs for several constituencies. All of the reports and graphs are posted at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org).

FAFEN Election Result Analysis-I provides a detailed description of FAFEN's PVT methodology and the challenges FAFEN faced, and includes data for 33 constituencies. FAFEN Election Result Analysis-II presents data for 174 constituencies along with detailed recommendations for electoral reform. FAFEN Election Result Analysis - III compiles data and observations from the 20 National Assembly constituencies in Karachi and offers additional recommendations.

## **Observation Summary Findings**

### **Pre-Election Findings**

FAFEN's pre-election key findings can be grouped into four categories, as follows:

#### **1. Election Administration**

Copies of the Final Electoral Rolls (FER) and polling station lists ("polling schemes") were not consistently distributed to district and constituency election officials and were not made available to election stakeholders until very late in the election calendar.

Many AECs, DROs, and ROs repeatedly received unclear instructions from the national ECP. They also received training from the ECP very late in the election process. Some of these officials were unwilling to meet with or respond to election observers and other stakeholders. Many DROs, in particular, were not aware of or were resistant to their election-related responsibilities, such as accrediting election observers.

ECP officials at the district and constituency levels were not consistently aware of election complaint procedures or mechanisms for tracking and enforcement of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates or election spending limits for candidates. These officials often took no action to enforce the Code of Conduct.

Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs), District Returning Officers (DROs), and ROs were transferred and replaced after the announcement of the election schedule in a number of constituencies.

## **2. Role of Local Governments**

Despite the provisions of the Local Government Ordinance 2000 as well as the spirit of the ECP Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates for General Elections 2008 (Article 1(17)) and Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act 1976), Nazims at all three tiers supported candidates or parties in many constituencies in advance of the elections.

Nazims and other district and local government officials supported parties and candidates by urging voters to vote for them, attending their rallies, and allowing use of official resources such as use of official cars and premises. FAFEN observers reported that political party candidates mobilized support through Union Nazims in more than 30% of the constituencies where candidate strategies were observed, except for PML-Q candidates, who did so in 72% of constituencies where their candidates were observed.

## **3. Political Parties and Candidates**

Despite the ban on announcing new development schemes after the announcement of the election schedule, in more than 50% of constituencies, candidates were committing to undertake specific projects if they won the seat, and local government officials were speeding the completion of development projects or initiating new projects. Some political parties and independent candidates were inducing voters through payments or promises of payments or other reward.

Other violations of the Code of Conduct included advertising on public and private buildings, intimidating local printing presses, using abusive language against rivals, inciting sectarian (or cultural/regional) sentiments, destruction of property, discouraging women from voting, and violating size limits for billboards and other signs and materials.

All major political parties' candidates were found to be mobilizing voters through the influence of biradari leaders or through appeals to biradari affiliations in more than 68% of the constituencies where campaign strategies were observed. Some parties were mobilizing voters through appeals to ethnic affiliations or religious themes and affiliations.

The political parties that boycotted the polls were actively campaigning for the boycott and some were intimidating voters into boycotting. The boycotting parties also interfered with voter education programs.

## **4. Intimidation and Violence**

Candidates were observed in many constituencies intimidating voters – primarily voters who are dependent for their livelihoods on landowners, employers, or others – in order to gain support.

Police were observed harassing candidates and/or workers of certain political parties by threatening to register cases against them. Police also asked supporters and candidates of certain political parties to stop campaigning. District police often refused to authorize rallies and public meetings of candidates of some parties on one pretext or another.

Police in many constituencies acted in favor of candidates affiliated to the former ruling party by providing protocol and extra-ordinary security to candidates and by attending rallies or putting up campaign materials of some candidates.

During the first ten days of February, FAFEN's media monitoring project noted 46 separate incidents involving either violence or accusations about violence and fraud. The most deadly incidents reported in the media from February 1-10 occurred in Punjab, where 32 people were killed in election-related violence, followed by NWFP with 25 deaths.

## **Election Day Findings**

FAFEN's Election Day key findings can be grouped into four categories, as follows:

### **1. Difference in Election Results -- PVT Estimate vs. ECP Result**

In 146 out of 174 National Assembly constituencies, the PVT estimate and ECP result are statistically equivalent. In 24 constituencies there is a statistically significant difference in the PVT estimate and ECP result for the margin of victory of the winner or for the runner-up, but with the same winning candidate. In four (4) constituencies there is both a statistically significant difference between the PVT estimate and the ECP result and a difference in the outcome (i.e., a different winning candidate). The statistical differences in these constituencies do not indicate with certainty that a different candidate won the election. However, the differences are significant enough to be outside the PVT's margin of error.

This summary does not include Karachi constituencies, where polling station problems were so significant that FAFEN is unable to confirm the election results in any constituency. However, FAFEN PVT data in Karachi suggest that there is a statistically significant difference in the outcome in at least one constituency (and possibly two) and a statistically significant difference in the margin of victory in four constituencies.

### **2. Close Contests with Significant Problems at Polling Stations**

In at least 60 constituencies out of 194 (31%), FAFEN's election observation qualitative information and PVT data indicate that the contest was close and that polling station problems were widespread and/or serious enough that they could have had an effect on the outcome of the election.

An additional 69 constituencies (36% of 194) did not have close election outcomes, but reported major polling-station level problems. These problems included polling officials, polling agents, or others stamping ballot papers; voters being openly pressured inside polling stations to choose a particular party or candidate; polling stations 'captured' by armed men, polling agents, or others; physical violence against voters, polling officials, polling agents, or election observers; showing and use of firearms inside polling stations; and closure of women's polling booths. In total, significant problems in polling stations were documented in 129 out of 194 constituencies (66% or two-thirds).

### 3. Voter Turnout Greater than 100%

In 49 of 194 constituencies (25%), one or more polling stations in the sample had voter turnout rates equal to or exceeding 100% of the number of registered voters published by the ECP the week preceding the election. In other words, more ballots were counted in the ballot boxes in these polling stations than the number of voters registered to vote in the stations.

### 4. Low Voter Turnout in Female Polling Stations

The voter turnout in all sampled female polling stations was below average compared to the voter turnout for both male and combined polling stations sampled in the constituencies. Excluding all polling stations where turnout was 100% or more, the average national turnout was 49.8% in male polling stations, 50.3% in combined polling stations, and 39.7% in female polling stations. Turnout in women's stations was even lower in FATA (12.4%) and NWFP (23.3%).

## **FAFEN Recommendations for Electoral Reforms**

FAFEN's recommendations for electoral reform are based on statistically-valid data gathered by observers nationwide from May 2007 to February 2008. These recommendations are documented in three FAFEN Election Results Analysis reports, three FAFEN preliminary statements immediately on and following Election Day, 19 FAFEN Election Updates and a dozen other pre-election publications. All FAFEN documents can be found at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org).

### **The Government and/or Parliament should:**

1. Establish a Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms to consolidate, clarify, and improve upon the Election Laws, to ensure the independent functioning of the Election Commission of Pakistan, and to eliminate local government interference in elections. Conduct public hearings to allow for consultation with stakeholders. Ensure that election-related laws and Codes of Conduct include enforcement mechanisms.
2. In keeping with Pakistan Constitution Articles 220 and 221, relieve members of the judiciary (appointed as District Returning Officers, DROs and ROs) from all election-related duties, including finalization of polling station lists, confirmation of election officials, and accreditation of election observers. Instead, the law should require that the ECP take direct responsibility for the timely and full implementation of all of these functions, with the judicial branch serving only as an appeals tribunal for complaints and petitions.
3. Establish a mandatory procedure for publishing the election result from each polling station recorded on ECP Form XVI (Consolidation Statement of the Results of the Count Furnished by the Presiding Officers) before the gazetting of official results.
4. Ban announcement of results for constituencies with more than 100% voter turnout in any polling station (votes polled exceeds registered voters) or where women are prevented from voting in any polling station. Either the vote counts from those polling stations should be excluded from the compilation of the official result or re-polling should take place in those stations.

5. Reform the election law so that all polling stations should be combined (male and female) stations, rather than all-female or all male polling stations, as women tend to turn out in greater numbers at combine polling stations as compared to all-female polling stations.
6. Implement its promise to provide CNICs to all citizens free of cost through NADRA mobile units and offices.
7. Amend the law to ban candidates from running for office in more than one constituency.
8. Take stringent measures to ensure election-related security, including training of police in election duties, to enable all political parties and candidates to conduct campaign activities equitably and to increase voter confidence.
9. Enforce a ban on openly partisan activities of government officials at all levels, mass transfers of personnel, and initiation of new development schemes after the announcement of the election calendar.

#### **The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) should:**

10. Use the 2007 Final Electoral Roll, excluding the 2002 supplemental voters list, to continue registering additional voters through systematic house-to-house enumeration, in collaboration with mobile NADRA units providing all eligible citizens with computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs).
11. Reform the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates in full consultation with all relevant stakeholders, adding clear enforcement mechanisms. The Code should ban the common, inappropriate use of state resources of all kinds in advance of elections. Ensure the tracking and enforcement of violations of the Code as well as election spending limits by contesting candidates.
12. Host regular, collective meetings with political parties and candidates to address concerns both before and after the elections.
13. Beginning with the announcement of the election calendar, ECP should instruct all PECs and AECs to host weekly meetings of local election stakeholders to discuss problems and provide basic information about the status of electoral preparations.
14. Host regular briefings for the media and the public beginning before the announcement of the election calendar and continuing through the full election process.
15. Provide parties and candidates copies of the Final Electoral Roll (FER) and polling station lists much earlier in the election process, free of charge.
16. Finalize the list of Presiding Officers well in advance of the election date and distribute these lists to local stakeholders free of charge or make them available on the ECP website in a timely manner.
17. Establish a training unit for election personnel at the national ECP and arrange for timely, comprehensive training in advance of each election.

18. Issue uniform, clear instructions and guidance to DROs, ROs, AECs, and other relevant election officials at all levels regarding their election-related responsibilities.
19. The electoral reform law should include provisions to deter last-minute substitutions of untrained Presiding Officers from being appointed, such as stipulating that no Presiding Officer will be paid for election-day duties unless he or she has undergone the entire training program provided by the ECP.
20. Ensure that election officials, political parties, candidates, and the general public in local areas have clear information about submitting election-related complaints and how these complaints are being handled. The ECP should ensure all complaints are handled internally by the ECP in a timely manner, according to due process of law, in open proceedings. ECP should make information about the full resolution of each complaint transparently available as a matter of public record.
21. Develop and make public clear procedures for the accreditation of neutral election observers well in advance of the election date and preferably during the pre-election period. Respond to written communications and telephone calls from election observation groups and other stakeholders and establish a public relations office at the national ECP for this purpose.
22. In consultation with election stakeholders, plan well in advance for security, communication, contingencies, and emergencies, especially in locations with a history of electoral violence or current political unrest.
23. Take extra steps to ensure that female polling booths remain open and safe during the full period on Election Day.
24. Provide instructions and training to police around the country regarding their roles and responsibilities during the election campaign period as well as during Election Day to ensure both security and a level playing field for all independent and political party candidates.

### **Political Parties and Candidates should:**

25. Take all possible measures to ensure that candidates do not violate the letter or spirit of the Election Law and Code of Conduct, including with regard to intimidation of potential voters, destruction of opposing candidates' campaign materials, and illegal involvement of local government officials in campaigning.
26. Candidates should make public declarations that they will follow the law and Code, including campaign spending limits.
27. Campaign based on issues of concern to their constituents, rather than appeals to personality or clan, religion, or ethnic affiliations.
28. Provide concrete evidence to the ECP of any violations of the law or Code to enable the ECP to enforce these provisions. Hold the Commission accountable for the equitable enforcement of the same.
29. Provide meaningful training to party and candidate polling agents in advance of the election date.

30. Democratize their ranks to ensure vertical mobility of political workers and to reduce monopolies on political power of few families and individuals.

### **Citizens and Media should:**

31. Citizens -- including especially women and youth -- should participate in the electoral process as voter education "social mobilizers," party and candidate polling agents, neutral election observers, and voters.
32. Media should provide well-informed, non-partisan reporting during campaigning and elections in order to provide valuable information about issues of concern to the electorate.
33. Media should avoid promoting ethnic or other divisive politics during elections.

### **Special Note**

#### **Law and Codes Should Be Enforced on Election Day**

In particular, FAFEN emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the Election Laws and Codes of Conduct are enforced on Election Day in polling stations, where FAFEN data clearly demonstrates that there are significant electoral irregularities in all parts of the country.

The following measures would help ensure that the Laws and Codes are enforced on Election Day in polling stations:

- Codification of enforcement mechanisms with penalties for election crimes and violations of the ECP Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates.
- Trained and neutral polling station security personnel who are empowered to enforce the law and the Code, such as preventing anyone from trying to influence voters within 400 meters of polling stations.
- Well-trained and empowered polling station officials with safety protections to prevent polling agents from exceeding their mandate inside polling booths and to stop anyone from going behind secrecy screens with voters or otherwise interfering with or influencing voters.
- Specific provision for election observers in electoral law and regulations, with a realistic procedure and timetable for their accreditation and penalties for anyone who interferes with the performance of their duties on Election Day.
- ECP regular consultations with political parties as well as information sessions for polling agents about the Law, Code of Conduct, and election procedures to supplement the parties' own training of their Election Day personnel.



## FAFEN Election Updates

**Based on Pre-Election Observation Reports  
from 264 Constituency Coordinators Nationwide**

*November 2007 – February 2008*

The following table summarizes the FAFEN Election Updates distributed through FAFEN's listserve and posted on FAFEN's website between November 2007 and February 2008.

Theme Color Code
Election Administration Issues
Role of Government Officials
Political Parties and Candidates
Security and Violence

Number	Title	Themes	Date
Election Update 1	Election Administration Issues	Willingness of election officials to meet with FAFEN observers; impartiality of election officials; and availability of the voters list in the districts	Nov. 30, 2007
Election Update 2	Election Administration Issues	Logistics and security plans; election complaints; campaign expense tracking systems; training of election officials; and accreditation of election observers	Dec. 3, 2007
Election Update 3	Role of Government Officials	Partisan local and district government officials; illegal postings and transfers; illegal promises of new development schemes; and partisan caretaker ministers	Dec. 6, 2007
Election Update 4	Socio-Economic Background of Candidates	Landlords and businessmen as candidates; changing loyalties of candidates; experience of candidates; and the process of selecting candidates	Dec. 7, 2007
Election Update 5	Election Administration Issues	Finalization of polling station lists; follow-up on issues in Updates 1 and 2	Dec. 8, 2007
Election Update 6	Police and Intelligence Agencies	Police harassment or support of candidates; inequitable security for candidates; interference by intelligence agencies; voter intimidation; destruction of election materials	Dec. 11, 2007
Election Update 7	Police and Intelligence Agencies	Follow-up on all issues covered in Update 6	Dec. 19, 2007

<b>Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Themes</b>	<b>Date</b>
Election Update 8	Political Parties/ Candidates: Election Campaign Strategies and Activities	Involvement of Local Government representatives; intimidation; voter inducements; campaign strategies such as mobilizing voters through appeals to biradari, ethnic, and religious affiliations, and other voter outreach methods	Jan. 26, 2008
Election Update 9	Intimidation and Harassment by Police and Intelligence Agencies	Follow-up on all issues covered in Update 6	Jan. 29, 2008
Election Update 10	Violations of Election Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates	Announcement of development schemes; advertising on private and public buildings; intimidating local printing presses; using abusive language about rivals; inciting sectarian sentiments; colluding to bar women from voting; destruction of property; displaying arms; campaign materials in excess of size restrictions	Feb. 1, 2008
Election Update 11	Role of Local and District Government Officials	Follow-up on all issues covered in Update 3	Feb. 5, 2008
Election Update 12	Security and Elections in NWFP and FATA	Voters' safety fears; campaigning despite security concerns; boycotts; intimidation of media and civil society	Feb. 9, 2008
Election Update 13	Partisan Police	Follow-up on issues covered in Update 6, with district-by-district details	Feb. 9, 2008
Election Update 14	Security Concerns Among Voters and Candidates	Level of satisfaction with official security plans; extra security measures by candidates; participation in rallies; anticipated violence on election day; plans for election day security	Feb. 12, 2008
Election Update 15	Election Boycott Campaign	Activities of political parties boycotting the February 18 elections, including voter intimidation and disrupting voter education events	Feb. 21, 2008

Number	Title	Themes	Date
Election Update 16	Role of Local and District Government Officials	Follow-up on all issues covered in Update 3	Feb. 16, 2008
Election Update 17	FAFEN Introduces Election-Violence Monitoring	Summary of data from media reports on election-related violent incidents February 1-10, 2008	Feb. 16, 2008
Election Update 18	Election Administration: Key Issues	Methodology, sources of requests, and reasons for declaring “sensitive” polling stations; transfers and postings, whether postal ballots are being recorded	Feb. 17, 2008
Election Update 19	Notes for Observers and Media on Election Day	What to look for re polling station lists, voters’ lists (voters finding their polling stations, police checking party “chits,” polling officials checking ID); local government officials and others at polling stations; disruptions at women’s polling stations and booths; ballot counting, results compilation, and resolution of election petitions	Feb. 17, 2008



# FAFEN Election Result Analysis – I

Islamabad, March 8, 2008

As part of the world's largest Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), almost 16,000 Polling Station Observers (PSOs) from the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) witnessed and recorded the actual vote count in a statistically-valid sample of 7,778 randomly-selected polling stations during the 2008 Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Elections. A PVT compares the observed vote count in a sample of polling stations with the compiled election result for that constituency in order to provide evidence that confirms or disputes the official election result.<sup>1</sup>

FAFEN's sample represents an average of 12% of polling stations in each constituency and throughout the country. Twenty years of global experience with PVTs demonstrates that this sample size is statistically sufficient to draw conclusions about a constituency on the basis of the sample. In addition to the vote count data for each polling station, the FAFEN observers also collected detailed information about the conduct of elections from the opening of the polls through the counting of ballots.

As FAFEN continues to compile and analyze its PVT data, it is now able to release results and analysis for more than 1,000 polling stations in 33 of the 256 National Assembly constituencies in which FAFEN was able to observe elections (out of a total of 272 in the country).<sup>2</sup>

For 29 of the 33 constituencies for which FAFEN data is being made available today, the PVT vote percentages for each candidate are statistically equivalent to the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP's) unofficial results. However, in one constituency the PVT result and ECP result differ as to the winner, and in three other constituencies the PVT and ECP results differ as to the margin of victory.

<sup>1</sup>A PVT does not take account of or provide evidence about other aspects of the election process, such as pre-poll violations of the Code of Conduct or Election Day ballot box stuffing.

<sup>2</sup>District Returning Officers (DROs) in many districts around the country declined to provide FAFEN observers with their federally-authorized accreditation cards to observe the voting and counting in the polling stations. With last-minute intervention from national and provincial ECP authorities, FAFEN was able to accredit 18,829 observers out of 20,000 who had been recruited and trained. Nevertheless, at least 103 out of 256 constituency Returning Officers (40%) declined to allow FAFEN observers to witness the election result consolidation process on election night, as ECP regulations require.

The PVT data also reveal anomalies at the polling-station level in 16 out of 33 constituencies (48%). These anomalies include voter turnout in excess of 100% in one or more polling stations, rejected ballots in constituencies for which the ECP has reported none, and above-average numbers of votes going to one candidate in a few polling stations. FAFEN's polling station observers have provided brief descriptions of problems that they witnessed first-hand, such as polling station officials stamping ballots, which substantiate the anomalies that FAFEN analysts have found in the quantitative PVT election results data.

While these patterns do not constitute proof of electoral manipulation, they indicate the possibility localized electoral irregularities, "captured" polling stations, and/or "bloc-voting." All of these polling-station issues are contrary to the ideal of free and fair elections with secret voting by individual voters.

**FAFEN's PVT findings demonstrate the importance of the ECP releasing polling station-wise results in order for candidates and other stakeholders to be able to scrutinize the integrity of the election process and results. The ECP has polling station level results available in a new electronic database, and this information should be made public.**

This report provides a description of PVT methodology generally and specific details about FAFEN's PVT. It also includes a summary of the key findings from FAFEN's PVT analysis to date. These key findings are based on analysis of a set of tables that present all of the PVT data for 33 National Assembly constituencies, along with information about polling stations based on direct observation by FAFEN monitors. The constituency tables and analysis are available at [http://www.fafen.org/view\\_data.php?php=pvt\\_results.php](http://www.fafen.org/view_data.php?php=pvt_results.php).

## **Summary of Key Findings**

### **Lower Turnout of Women Voters at Separate Female Polling Stations**

- Voter turnout data suggest that Combination Polling Stations (with both Female Polling Booths and Male Polling Booths) are more likely to promote participation of women in elections rather than separate Female Polling Stations. Of the 140 Female Polling Stations in the FAFEN PVT sample in 33 constituencies, average turnout was about 37% (excluding those constituencies with at least one polling station reporting more than 100% turnout), compared to about 50% voter turnout in the 287 Male Polling Stations and 51% voter turnout in the 586 Combination Polling Stations.

### **PVT Confirms ECP Announced Election Result (29 constituencies)**

- For the 33 constituencies for which data is available, the ECP unofficial result for 29 constituencies is within the PVT estimate's margin of error and therefore suggests no evidence of fraud in the consolidation of polling station results at the constituency level. However, despite the PVT's verification of the final election result, data from FAFEN election observers shows polling-station level problems with voting and counting that cannot be detected by the PVT.
- The constituencies for which the ECP result is within the PVT's margin of error are NA-19, NA-26, NA-28, NA-35, NA-48, NA-49, NA-53, NA-61, NA-74, NA-81, NA-94, NA-95, NA-98, NA-105, NA-109, NA-116, NA-121, NA-130, NA-138, NA-152, NA-157, NA-165, NA-202, NA-203, NA-213, NA-221, NA-227, NA-233, and NA-237.

## Difference in PVT vs. ECP Election Results or Margin of Victory (4 constituencies)

- In one constituency, NA-32 (Chitral), the ECP has awarded the seat to the PML-Q candidate, while the PVT result suggests that Independent candidate Sardar Muhammad Khan was the winner. FAFEN's sample of 18 polling stations in NA-32 is smaller than average due to security concerns and inclement weather. Nevertheless, the PVT's relatively small margin of error for the PVT's winning candidate (+/- 6.48%) indicates that there may be a discrepancy between the polling station vote counts and the compiled election result. This potential problem could be resolved easily if ECP data for each polling station were available to the candidates and the public.
- In three other constituencies (NA-195, NA-229, NA-232), the PVT confirms the ECP announced result as to the winner, but the ECP and PVT results differ significantly with regard to the margin of victory.

## Significant Problems in Polling Stations<sup>3</sup> (11 constituencies)

- In two constituencies (NA-203 and NA-229) FAFEN observers documented serious problems in multiple polling stations. In NA-203, observers in nine of 26 (35%) sampled polling stations reported significant problems, including the presence of District Nazims and Union Councilors in polling stations, "captured" polling booths, and violence. Similar problems were reported in NA-229.
- Polling station observers in seven other constituencies (NA-48, NA-74, NA-94, NA-98, NA-105, NA-130 and NA-157) documented additional specific problems, such as polling officials stamping ballot papers and/or voter intimidation. These observed problems substantiate quantitative anomalies with regard to voter turnout and vote counts in those constituencies.
- Problems were reported by observers in one or more sampled polling stations from two other constituencies (NA-19 and NA-28) from which the quantitative election results data reveal no major anomalies.

## Improbable Voter Turnout (5 constituencies)

- In five constituencies (NA-26, NA-109, NA-165, NA-213, and NA-221), voter turnout in at least one polling station was greater than 100% of the ECP's number of registered voters or much larger than average voter turnout. One Female Polling Station in NA-221 reported more than double the average female turnout, with 100% of votes going to one party.

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<sup>3</sup>Because of the statistical random sampling methodology of the PVT, problems witnessed in one or more polling stations in a constituency are likely to have happened in the same percentage of polling stations throughout the constituency. For example, if five out of 25 sampled polling stations (20%) were closed on election day in a constituency with a total of 250 polling stations, it would be appropriate to estimate that 50 polling stations (20% of the total) were closed on election day.

## **PVT Methodology**

PVT methodology was developed over twenty years ago and has been applied in many countries around the world by international and domestic election monitoring organizations as a proven analytical method for verifying the accuracy of government vote counts. The PVT is based on direct observation of vote counting in a scientifically-verifiable, robust sample of the polling stations in each constituency.

Although the PVT cannot measure other election-related problems like vote buying, voter intimidation, ballot box stuffing, or the use of ghost polling stations, PVTs are designed to identify potential inaccuracies in the official count by comparing it with actual observed and verified vote counts at sampled polling stations. The PVT can help detect centralized changes in vote counts if the percentage vote in official count differs in a statistically significant way from the percentages calculated from the PVT sample. In cases in which election commissions release polling-station level election results, PVT counts for sampled polling stations and ECP polling station data can be compared directly.

## **The FAFEN PVT Sample**

FAFEN observed the 2008 Pakistan General Elections in a total of 258 National Assembly constituencies and conducted a PVT in 256 constituencies. Three constituencies in Balochistan were omitted at the last minute due to accreditation problems; in two constituencies the election has been delayed because of the death of a candidate; and a PVT was not conducted in 11 other constituencies because of security concerns (including eight in FATA, two in Swat NWFP, and one in Balochistan).

Experience with past PVTs has shown that drawing a sample of 25-30 polling stations provides sufficient data, within a relatively small margin of sampling error, to assess the reasonableness of official election results. Adding additional polling stations to the sample, even when the number of total polling stations is large, does not improve the margins of sampling error dramatically.

The reason for this statistical principle is that a PVT works with “cluster samples” – each polling station “cluster” averages 1,000 registered voters, and 25 polling stations in a constituency produces a sample of 25,000 voters (25 polling stations x 1,000 voters each) which is much more than statistically sufficient to permit comparisons with official results. The national sample totaled 7,778 polling stations, representing almost eight million registered voters.

Because the list of polling stations for 2008 was not released by the ECP until two weeks before the election, FAFEN had to devise a more complex strategy for selecting a representative sample of the more than 64,000 polling stations nationwide. To select the unprecedented large number of polling stations needed to conduct the PVT, FAFEN used the most recent national census (1998, Population Census Organization) to draw a Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sample of census locations based on population density, a reasonable geographic analog for the concentration of polling station locations. Based on 1998 statistics, FAFEN estimated that there would be a minimum of about 237,000 people per constituency and designed a sample to identify about 30 polling stations, representing 10-12% of the population, within each constituency.

FAFEN Constituency Coordinators identified the polling station(s) contained in each of

the sampled circles or wards selected from the census-based sampling frame. They then recruited and trained two observers (one man and one women, wherever possible) from each area where a sampled polling station was located. Coordinators also made communication and transportation arrangements weeks or months in advance to stay in touch with PSOs during Election Day and to ensure that as many polling station results as possible could be collected immediately after the vote counting process.

## Challenges in PVT Implementation

The tasks of recruiting and training more than 18,000 election observers and executing a rapid and accurate data collection system from such a large nationally distributed sample was daunting. Despite the problems encountered, FAFEN received data from nearly 3,000 polling stations on election night — greater than any single national PVT conducted elsewhere in the world, where PVTs have been used to assess primarily national-level races rather than 256 separate elections. In fact, FAFEN's PVT undertaking in Pakistan is equivalent to the work of conducting a PVT in 256 countries with national races.

FAFEN's 16,000 Polling Station Observers (PSOs) observed the vote count at their assigned polling stations and recorded and obtained a copy of each "Statement of the Count." Almost 3,000 additional Mobile Observers (MOs) helped collect and deliver these polling station results to FAFEN Constituency Coordinators, who compiled them onto special forms and faxed them throughout election night and the following day to FAFEN's headquarters in Islamabad. As data reached the FAFEN Secretariat and Data Center, two shifts of 20 Data Center Operators entered the vote counts into a national database using a verified double-data entry system.

For any given constituency, the data must be near-perfect, which necessitates collecting a very high percentage of the sample and checking the numbers sent on election night against the long forms filled out by the PSOs at each polling station. In addition to collecting the quantitative count data, PSOs collected detailed data and qualitative narratives about problems at the sampled polling stations, the numbers of male and female voters, and adherence to procedures by polling station officials. Four color-coded forms for each polling station containing these detailed reports arrived by courier in the first few days following the election and continue to be compiled to supplement the quantitative vote count and turnout data.

Communications and transportation obstacles prevented many of the polling station counts from reaching the Islamabad Data Center in as timely a manner as was planned. Data collection was further complicated by unannounced changes in the number of polling stations and their locations. Last minute changes of candidates from independent to party status required database programming changes. Failures of some fax transmissions and intermittent trunk (landline) telephone line blockages added time to the data collection process.

In addition, unusually high turnout and almost 100% of votes going to one candidate in some polling stations mean that there is dramatic deviation in many sampled polling stations from the average turnout and/or vote percentage for the constituency as a whole, patterns that may reflect highly-localized bloc-voting or, perhaps, "captured" polling stations. Such patterns can compromise the statistical power of the PVT sample, but are nevertheless important evidence of voting patterns that deviate from "normal" election results. Such cases have required conversations with the PSOs who completed the original tallies. Such due diligence data checking for almost 8,000 polling stations demands many hours

by a data cleaning team. For these reasons, the only responsible decision was to delay reporting rather than risk a hasty release resulting in possible errors.

## **Ongoing PVT Analysis**

As part of its year-long election monitoring initiative, FAFEN continues to analyze vote count data from the most ambitious PVT yet attempted in the twenty-year global history of sample-based vote count verifications. FAFEN conducted Pakistan's first and the world's most complex and largest PVT to date in order to provide verification of the candidate results and turnout percentages for the individual National Assembly contests as released by Returning Officers and the ECP.

FAFEN members anticipated how difficult this task would be from the outset but concluded that the modest impact of previous domestic monitoring efforts in Pakistan warranted this extraordinary effort. Assertions by parties and domestic monitors claiming that elections are rigged have lacked quantitative proof. The PVT, with its methodological rigor and deployment of large numbers of monitors, is known to be among the most effective methods both for deterring counting fraud and for detecting whether official vote counts reflect the voters' choice at the ballot box during the post-election period.

Although FAFEN cannot claim definitively that deployment of polling station observers, in addition to mobile observers, and implementation of the PVT in nearly all of the National Assembly constituencies was a reason the rumored mass rigging seems not to have materialized, some have suggested that FAFEN's widespread election observation played just such a role.

The results of the 2008 National Assembly election were largely accepted by all parties soon after the polls closed, but FAFEN can use the PVT data to detect issues and irregularities that have implication on the constituency results in order to put forward empirically sound recommendations for electoral reforms. PVT data analysis continues and should it identify discrepancies, the data can be used to assess the veracity of the official results. Should the sample results indicate a possible discrepancy between the PVT and ECP counts, it is particularly important that FAFEN be absolutely certain of the accuracy of its data and the broader picture provided by the qualitative information that it has collected.

This report contains information for 33 constituencies for which all data have been cross-checked and verified and illustrates the ways in which the rich results of the FAFEN election observation effort can inform understanding of the election process beyond simple generalizations about its quality based on aggregate results at the national level and anecdotal evidence from some constituencies. FAFEN will continue to analyze PVT data as it is verified and make reports available as appropriate.



# FAFEN Election Result Analysis - II

Islamabad, April, 9, 2008

Unprecedented polling station data collected on Election Day by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) demonstrates that critical reforms in electoral administration and procedures are needed, which Parliament has a timely opportunity to enact now for the future benefit the Pakistani electorate, candidates, and political parties.

FAFEN's data shows that while the results of its Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) and the election commission result are equivalent for most of the 174 constituencies included in this report, polling-station level irregularities were common to all independent and party candidates alike. FAFEN's findings demonstrate the need for key changes in electoral procedures and administration to ensure transparency and confidence in elections in Pakistan.

The 2008 election results have been accepted by almost all parties and candidates. FAFEN's PVT data is not intended to challenge those results. FAFEN does not recommend any revision of the 2008 electoral results unless a formal election petition has been filed and is successful. However, FAFEN recommends that the Election Commission of Pakistan should ensure immediate, centralized publication of election results for every polling station, rather than only the consolidated totals for each constituency, as well as a policy for mandatory collection and publication of polling station results immediately after every election, before the confirmation of the unofficial results by the central election commission on its website or by gazette.

Systematic release of polling station results will address problems that characterize elections in Pakistan, where misconduct occurs at the local level. This would [a] deter electoral irregularities at the polling station level, [b] help determine whether polling station problems in a constituency warrant any immediate legal or administrative action, and [c] enable candidates and other election stakeholders to identify problematic polling stations during one election and make necessary arrangements to mitigate the problems for future elections. In addition, systems must be put in place to ensure that major anomalies in the polling station results (such as turnout figures in excess of 100% or a margin of victory small enough to have been determined by the vote count in one polling station) trigger automatic scrutiny

and investigation before release of the unofficial result. The election commission should not certify any constituency result in which voter turnout in any single polling station exceeds 100 percent.

These changes in election procedure require action by Parliament, which is now united in a commitment to national reconciliation and democratic development. Comprehensive electoral administration law reform should be among Parliament's first priorities.

FAFEN's Parallel Vote Tabulation has produced the world's largest ever scientific sample of polling-station level results. FAFEN's website ([www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org)) provides detailed information about the methodology--used for over twenty years in elections around the world -- as well as instructions for how to understand the statistical results for each constituency.

Almost 16,000 FAFEN Polling Station Observers (PSOs) attempted to witness voting and ballot counting in a statistically-valid sample of 7,778 polling stations, or 12% of all polling stations, in 256 constituencies. Data for 174 of these constituencies, including the 33 constituencies released in FAFEN's Election Result Analysis - I, are now available (118 constituencies in Punjab, 23 in NWFP, 29 in Sindh, and two each in FATA and Islamabad). Analysis and data from additional constituencies will be made available as it is checked and verified against forms submitted by FAFEN's PSOs. Data from some constituencies in which FAFEN planned to observe are not sufficiently robust for statistical analysis due to obstacles that FAFEN observers faced in the field. These obstacles included denial of access to polling stations despite having appropriate accreditation, logistical and security problems, direct threats of violence and denial of accreditations by District Returning Officers (DROs).

The findings from FAFEN's statistical analysis of the PVT data are summarized below. FAFEN is still analyzing data from PSO reports regarding the polling day environment, but has expedited qualitative analysis for 111 of the 174 constituencies for which data is being released today. Such analysis was done under these circumstances: if the PVT and ECP results differed; if either the ECP and/or PVT results indicated that the contest was close; if turnout in at least one polling station was equal to or greater than 100%; or where FAFEN received reports of violence or other problems on election day. In 109 of the 111 constituencies for which FAFEN was able to compare qualitative information with the PVT statistical data, PSOs observed ballot stamping, booth capture, violence, closure of women's polling booths, and other problems.

Of the 70 constituencies for which qualitative information is available in Punjab, PSOs reported problems in 68 (97%) of them. In NWFP, PSOs reported major problems in thirteen of fourteen constituencies (93%). For 27 of 29 Sindh constituencies (93%) covered in this report, FAFEN PSOs reported major problems. One constituency in FATA and one in Islamabad had problems (50% each).

Summaries of PSO observations in these constituencies are included with the PVT data available at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org). In light of these findings, FAFEN recommends enforcement of basic requirements for free elections enshrined in Pakistan's electoral law, such as ballot secrecy and freedom from intimidation and other forms of undue influence. Changing the law to require mandatory release of polling station results would deter such polling-station level election misconduct in the future.

## **Summary Findings**

### **1. Difference in Election Results -- PVT Estimate vs. Election Commission Unofficial Result**

Out of 174 constituencies for which data is being released, in 141 constituencies, the PVT estimate and ECP result are statistically equivalent. In four constituencies, there is both a statistically significant difference between the PVT estimate and the ECP result and a difference in the outcome (i.e., a different winning candidate). These constituencies are NA-32 (Chitral), NA-64 (Sargodha-I), NA-142 (Kasur-V), and NA-163 (Sahiwal-IV). These statistical differences do not indicate with certainty that a different candidate won the election. However, the differences are significant enough to be outside the PVT's margin of error.

In an additional 24 constituencies, there is a statistically significant difference in the PVT estimate and ECP result for the margin of victory of the winner or for the runner-up, but with the same winning candidate. Constituencies for which these differences are statistically significant are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Province	Number of Constituencies		Constituencies for which Differences in PVT Estimate and ECP Result are Statistically Significant
	PVT Different Winner	PVT Different with Same Winner	
Punjab	4	12	(Different Outcome) NA-64, NA-142, NA-163 (Same Outcome) NA-62, NA-86, NA-96, NA-103, NA-106, NA-113, NA-114, NA-115, NA-157, NA-159, NA-192, NA-195
NWFP/FATA	1	3	(Different Outcome) NA-32 (Same Outcome) NA-3, NA-4, NA-21
Sindh	0	8	(Same Outcome) NA-200, NA-206, NA-214,
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>24</b>	

### **2. Close Contests with Significant Problems at Polling Stations**

Out of 111 constituencies for which data is being released and for which PSO reports were scrutinized by FAFEN analysts, in 55 constituencies (48.7%), FAFEN's election observation qualitative information and PVT data indicate that the contest was close and that polling station problems were widespread and/or serious enough that they could have had an effect on the outcome of the election. An additional 54 constituencies did not have close election outcomes, but reported major polling-station level problems. In Sindh, major problems occurred in 25 constituencies in which one candidate won an overwhelming victory. However, the qualitative evidence suggests that such huge margins of victory may be attributable in part to the kinds of election irregularities that FAFEN PSOs have documented.

Table 2 lists the constituencies for which PSOs reported major problems. Summaries of the specific problems they observed by polling station are provided in the accompanying constituency-wise report.

Table 2

Province	Total Problem Constituencies	Constituencies Clear Victories	Total	Close Constituencies	Problems in Close Elections
Punjab	68	NA-55, NA-67, NA-77, NA-96, NA-97, NA-98, NA-101, NA-102, NA-106, NA-113, NA-115, NA-118, NA-120, NA-132, NA-134, NA-175, NA-179, NA-182, NA-183, NA-193, NA-194, NA-195, NA-197	23	NA-57, NA-58, NA-61, NA-64, NA-66, NA-69, NA-70, NA-71, NA-72, NA-76, NA-83, NA-86, NA-87, NA-90, NA-94, NA-99, NA-100, NA-105, NA-108, NA-114, NA-130, NA-131, NA-135, NA-137, NA-142, NA-152, NA-153, NA-154, NA-156, NA-157, NA-158, NA-159, NA-161, NA-162, NA-163, NA-164, NA-168, NA-169, NA-172, NA-173, NA-181, NA-188, NA-190, NA-191, NA-192	45
NWFP	13	NA-1, NA-4, NA-6, NA-11, NA-13	6	NA-3, NA-5, NA-8, NA-12, NA-15, NA-23, NA-28	7
FATA	1			NA-46	1
Sindh	27	NA-198, NA-200, NA-201, NA-203, NA-206, NA-213, NA-214, NA-216, NA-217, NA-218, NA-219, NA-220, NA-221, NA-223, NA-226, NA-227, NA-228, NA-229, NA-230, NA-232, NA-233, NA-234, NA-236, NA-237, NA-238	25	NA-202, NA-210	2
FCT					0
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>		<b>54</b>		<b>55</b>

### 3. More than 100% Voter Turnout at Polling Stations

Out of 174 constituencies for which data is being released, in 39 constituencies (22.5%) at least one sampled polling station observed by FAFEN reported 100% voter turnout or greater - in other words, more ballots were cast in the polling station than the number of voters

registered to vote in the station. The average turnout was 122% in these polling stations, but was as high as 229% in one female polling station.

At least one polling station in the sample had 100% or more voter turnout in 29 out of 117 constituencies in Punjab, four out of 23 constituencies in NWFP, four out of 29 constituencies in Sindh, and two out of two constituencies in Islamabad. In many cases, polling station observers witnessed behavior, such as ballot stamping, in polling stations with abnormal turnout rates.

The constituencies in which at least one polling station had 100% or greater voter turnout are listed in Table 3.

Table 3

Province	Number of Constituencies	Constituency Numbers
Punjab	29	NA-58, NA-60, NA-68, NA-70, NA-76, NA-77, NA-84, NA-86, NA-92, NA-93, NA-94, NA-97, NA-98, NA-103, NA-118, NA-120, NA-128, NA-131, NA-132, NA-136, NA-147, NA-153, NA-161, NA-162, NA-163, NA-172, NA-175, NA-188, NA-195
NWFP/FATA	4	NA-6, NA-12, NA-17, NA-23
Sindh	4	NA-203, NA-216, NA-219, NA-236
Federal Capital	2	NA-48, NA-49
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	

#### 4. Low Turnout in All-Female Polling Stations


Out of 174 constituencies for which data is being released and in which FAFEN observers were assigned by random selection to monitor Female Polling Stations, 155 (89%) had one or more all-female polling stations, with a total of 902 all-female polling stations. The voter turnout in all sampled female polling stations was below average compared to the voter turnout for both all-male and mixed polling stations sampled in the constituencies. Excluding all polling stations where turnout was 100% or more, the average national turnout was 49.8% in male polling stations, 50.3% in combined polling stations, and 39.7% in all-female polling stations. Turnout in women's stations was even lower in FATA (12.4%) and NWFP (23.3%) (See Table 4 and Figure 1).

These finding suggest that women may be more likely to vote in combined polling stations, rather than all-female stations, counter to common assumptions. The higher rates of voter turnout in combined stations cannot be explained only by turnout of male voters, since the turnout rate for male voters would have to be abnormally high in every case to balance out the lower female voting.

Table 4

Province	Male	Female	Combined	Total
<b>Punjab</b>	50.9	39.7	53.7	50.5
<b>NWFP</b>	45.9	23.3	38.7	38.9
<b>Sindh</b>	50.6	43.4	47.2	47.3
<b>FATA</b>	37.1	12.4	42.0	34.7
<b>Islamabad</b>	53.2	39.3	51.4	49.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>48.2</b>

Figure 1



In some polling stations, turnout in all-female stations exceeded 100%, but in some polling stations PSOs documented cases in which all of the party representatives and polling station officials agreed to close the women's polling station and to split the ballots between candidates. This phenomenon was not documented throughout any single constituency, as has happened in previous elections in Pakistan, which may be a positive development. In addition, PSOs in several polling stations witnessed that very few women showed up to vote, but that nevertheless the ballot boxes for those women's polling booths were full. Such cases were reported from all provinces. This anecdotal evidence suggests the possibility that turnout figures for women may in fact be somewhat inflated.

## **Recommendations**

1. Release the election result from each polling station recorded on ECP Form XVI [Consolidation Statement of the Results of the Count Furnished by the Presiding Officers] immediately and establish a mandatory procedure for doing so immediately following all future elections so that candidates and other stakeholders can compare the total of all polling station result counts with the unofficial ECP result compiled in each constituency.
2. Parliament should introduce new electoral administration laws that require the ECP to withhold announcement of results for constituencies in which there are polling stations where the number of votes polled exceed the official number of registered voters for that polling station. Either the vote counts from those polling stations should be excluded from the compilation of the official result or re-polling should take place in those stations.

3. All polling stations should be combined stations, which would enable women to travel with and wait in line with other family members, reducing their vulnerability to intimidation by party agents, police, and other local influentials. With the low turnout in female polling stations and evidence suggesting that misconduct may be easier in female polling stations, combined stations will better promote women's political participation. Female polling stations can be setup only where they are absolutely necessary.
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# FAFEN Election Result Analysis - III

Islamabad, May 7, 2008

Polling station data from 20 constituencies in Karachi gathered by Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) observers on Election Day reveal significant problems in the electoral process in all these constituencies. Problems ranged from intimidation of election observers and voters to widespread ballot stamping by polling staff and other forms of electoral fraud.

Although FAFEN documented the most severe problems in Karachi, its observers reported similar electoral irregularities on a lesser scale in almost all of the constituencies it observed around the country. Data for 20 Karachi constituencies and analysis for 175 other constituencies are available at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org).

FAFEN's analysis is based on data gathered from approximately 16,000 stationary Polling Station Observers (PSOs) as part of the largest election observation effort undertaken in Pakistan, including a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), in 256 National Assembly constituencies. FAFEN's methodology focused on gathering statistical evidence and narrative reports on all aspects of the election-day process, following international best practices and principles. Explanations of FAFEN's PVT methodology and how to understand its constituency-wise data are also available on its website.

FAFEN met with all political parties in four provincial capitals and Islamabad in order to brief them of its plans to observe and establish its neutral, nonpartisan credentials. During the first week of February, FAFEN also held meetings in Karachi with representatives of PPP, ANP, and MQM, all of whom welcomed and promised full cooperation with FAFEN's observation work.

As stated in its first two Election Results Analysis reports, FAFEN faced direct obstacles to observing the elections, such as denial of accreditation by District Returning Officers (DROs), in several parts of the country. However, only in Karachi did FAFEN face a city-wide effort to prevent it from carrying out its ECP-accredited role through threats of and, in some instances, infliction of physical harm to, both supervisory staff and observers.

Nevertheless, many courageous FAFEN observers recorded detailed information, enabling FAFEN to consolidate data into this summary report, which demonstrates how consistent

patterns of electoral irregularities undermined the freedom, fairness, and safety of elections throughout Pakistan's largest city.

Anecdotal reports from Karachi in previous elections, including FAFEN's observation report on the 2007 NA-250 by-election, can now be confirmed with concrete, statistical evidence. More generally, FAFEN's experience proves that nationwide, stationary election observation by trained local election monitors collecting standardized information can reveal the most important kinds of electoral irregularities, which happen at the polling station level.

Observations about the election-day process, in combination with the polling station vote totals collected through FAFEN's PVT, make information available to the public for the first time showing how irregularities can distort vote counts and influence the final outcome of an election.

Findings based on FAFEN observer reports from Karachi are described below, followed by specific recommendations.

## **Summary of Findings**

### **1. Threats to and Interference with Election Observers**

Approximately 1,300 Polling Station Observers (PSOs) from the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) attempted to observe polling and vote-counting in a statistically-valid random sample of 650 polling stations in Karachi as part of its unprecedented national election observation and Parallel Vote Tabulation effort.

FAFEN was able to observe some or all of the electoral process in 525 polling stations in 19 of 20 constituencies in Karachi. No observers were able to send reports from NA-255 and only very limited observation was possible in NA-243 and NA-256. According to a Polling Station Observer in NA-243, only 13 teams of PSOs were able to observe in the constituency after they were informed that a FAFEN representative received direct threats on the eve of the election. They were told that those who attempted to observe in certain areas of the constituency would be harmed. In NA-256, many PSOs were beaten up and their forms taken and torn up, leaving data for only seven polling stations out of 37 in the original random sample of assigned stations.

Out of 650 polling stations in FAFEN's planned sample in Karachi, FAFEN PSOs were physically prevented, threatened, or otherwise barred from observing in 122 polling stations (18.8%) in 16 constituencies (80%). In many cases, fear of physical harm left PSOs no choice but to relocate to safer areas, abandon their posts before the count on election day, halt observation altogether, or censor their reporting.<sup>1</sup> In at least 11 of Karachi's 20 constituencies, FAFEN supervisors also received telephone or in-person threats of violence to themselves or observers, either prior to or during the election.

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<sup>1</sup>One PSO said that he was told to "go home" by a member of "the tanzeem", who said that "fair elections have never occurred in Pakistan." Another pair of PSOs were "pinched" by a "Chief tanzeem coordinator" and told not to "poke their noses in business that doesn't concern them" before being expelled from the station and having their forms confiscated. The PSOs had to beg to keep their mobile phones. Several PSOs in one constituency had their IDs confiscated and were told, "You are not going to observe this election," and other PSOs in another constituency told their supervisor they "ran for their lives". Others were told, "You are not a candidate, you're not government. You're an NGO and you have no right to be here."

When contacted for clarification and elaboration of information contained in their constituency reports and observation forms, both supervisory staff and PSOs were in most cases unwilling to discuss details of their experiences over the phone. Those who shared information first wanted reassurance that their identities would be protected.

In order to ensure the safety of those involved with the election observation effort, FAFEN has replaced the ECP polling station numbers with a FAFEN numbering system in all FAFEN documentation. Furthermore, a few specific incidents of threats or use of violence are not included in the constituency-wise narratives because describing them in any detail could endanger the victims, their families, or associates.

## 2. Difference in Election Results - PVT Estimate vs. ECP Result

In 11 of Karachi's 20 constituencies, the PVT estimate and ECP result are statistically equivalent, while no data are available for one constituency (NA-255). In an additional six constituencies (NA-239, NA-242, NA-251, NA-252, NA-253, and NA-257), there is a statistically significant difference in the PVT estimate and ECP result for the margin of victory of the winner or for the runner-up, but with the same winning candidate.

In two constituencies (NA-241 and NA-243), there is both a statistically significant difference between the PVT estimate and the ECP result and a difference in the outcome (i.e. a different winning candidate). In the PVT sample for NA-241, the ANP received more votes (47.48%) than did MQM (38.81%), while the ECP result has the MQM candidate as the winner. However, in NA-243, the number of polling stations where FAFEN PSOs were able to observe the ballot counting is too small for reliable statistical inference. The statistical differences in these two constituencies do not indicate with certainty that a different candidate won the election. However, the differences are significant enough to be outside the PVT's margin of error.

## 3. Voter Turnout Equal to or Greater than 100%

In 10 of the 20 constituencies in Karachi (50%), one or more polling stations in the sample had voter turnout rates equal to or exceeding 100% of the number of registered voters published by the ECP the week preceding the election. While other parts of the country also had unrealistic turnout figures in some polling stations, turnout in some polling stations in Karachi reached as high as 735%, 631%, and 471% in NA-242.<sup>2</sup>

Overall Turnout Rates Including or Excluding Polling Stations with 100% or More Voter Turnout		
	Including	Excluding
Male	64.1	44.4
Female	56.4	43.6
Combined	51.5	47.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>46.5</b>

In these polling stations with high turnout rates, PSOs were told that they could not observe the ballot counting and instead had to give their forms to MQM representatives and retrieve

<sup>2</sup>These polling stations had 6,324, 4,385, and 6,877 ballots cast, respectively. The average number of registered voters in each polling station in the constituency is 1,506. In NA-245, where 6,527 ballots were counted in a polling station with 1,648 registered voters (390% turnout), voters would have had to cast ballots every 5.2 seconds.

the forms later in the evening. The party polling agents who completed the forms recorded more than 8,000 registered voters in those polling stations. As a result of these anomalies, FAFEN analysts used the ECP number of registered voters for its entire country-wide analysis to ensure accurate estimation of turnout.

FAFEN received documentation of 15 polling stations in which PSOs were barred from observing the ballot count, but throughout the city, FAFEN supervisors reported that many more PSOs were not permitted to observe the count and were asked to leave their count forms at the polling stations to be collected later. It is unknown how many polling station ballot count forms received by the FAFEN Secretariat were recorded by party polling agents rather than FAFEN observers.

In 24 polling stations in five Karachi constituencies (or 4.6% of all 525 observed polling stations), observers reported that they saw fewer voters casting ballots than the number of votes counted at the end of the day. In nine polling stations in four constituencies, PSOs reported that the ballot boxes in women's booths were full of ballots, although they saw few women turning out to vote.

These inflated turnout figures have a significant effect on the rate of overall turnout in Karachi. When the polling stations with greater than 100% turnout are included in the average turnout for Karachi, overall voter turnout for the city is 53.9%. When these exceptional stations are omitted from the analysis, voter turnout is reduced to 46.5%. With regard to all-male polling stations, omitting those stations with excessive turnout reduces average voter turnout by almost 20 percentage points.

#### **4. Stamping Ballots, “Captured” Stations, and Undue Influence**

In 110 (21%) of 525 polling stations, FAFEN observers witnessed unauthorized persons stamping ballot papers. Ballots were illegally stamped in 48 of these 110 instances (43.6%) by polling staff, in 19 cases (17.3%) by party polling agents, and in 43 cases (39%) by family members of candidates, voters, or unidentified persons. Sixteen constituencies reported such incidents.

In 60 polling stations (11.4%) of 525 observed polling stations, PSOs reported that one or more polling stations were ‘captured’ by armed men, party polling agents or party workers, or others. Nine of these polling stations were taken over completely, while one or more booths were taken over in the other 51 polling stations. Eight constituencies reported such incidents.

Voters were openly pressured inside the polling station to choose a particular political party or candidate symbol on the ballot in 70 out of 525 polling stations (13.3%). In 46 of these 70 polling stations (65.7%) it was polling station staff who sought to influence voters, while in 19 stations (27%), party polling agents were pressuring voters. Candidates themselves exerted influence in 2 polling stations. Twelve constituencies reported such incidents.

#### **5. Violence at Polling Stations**

FAFEN PSOs reported actual physical violence against voters, polling staff, party polling agents, or election observers, including showing and use of firearms, in 44 (8.4%) of the 525 polling stations observed by FAFEN. More than half of these 44 incidents (25, or 57%) were initiated by what PSOs described either as “the party”, “the tanzeem”, or, more explicitly, “MQM agents”.

PPP and MMA supporters were involved in a fight in one polling station, and PPP was involved in two other incidents involving violence. An independent candidate was involved in one violent incident, and police were implicated in violence unrelated to their security duties in three incidents.<sup>3</sup> Unknown individuals or armed men were involved in seven other incidents. Thirteen constituencies reported incidents of violence.

## **Recommendations**

1. FAFEN urges the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) new Electoral Reforms Committee to hold public hearings and consultations with political parties, civil society, and other stakeholders to ensure the reform process is transparent and that all information and recommendations are taken into account.
2. Parliament should establish its own committee on electoral reform to convene independent consultations with stakeholders about the role of the ECP and the final recommendations from the ECP's Electoral Reform Committee. The ultimate goal of both reform efforts should be the transparent and participatory development and enactment of legislation that consolidates and improves upon the current complex and dispersed election law framework.
3. FAFEN reiterates that the law should require that in constituencies with one or more polling stations with certain kinds of electoral irregularities -- such as turnout in excess of the number of registered voters -- the ECP result should not be released until problems are investigated and re-polling held where necessary.

### **4. FAFEN's Karachi findings also demonstrate the importance of guaranteeing free electoral competition in every corner of the country, including ensuring that:**

- All parties and candidates have an equal opportunity to compete freely in all areas of all constituencies;
- Eligible voters have the right to join any party, show support for any party or candidate, and cast ballots for their candidates of choice in the polling booth;
- Election observers and media are able to access and report freely about all aspects of the electoral process without fear of physical harm or economic loss.

### **5. For the conduct of free and fair elections in the future, ECP should ensure:**

- [a] Codification and equitable enforcement of penalties for election crimes and violations of the ECP Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates.
- [b] Trained and neutral polling station security personnel who are empowered to enforce the law and the Code, such as preventing anyone from trying to influence voters within 400 meters of polling stations.

<sup>3</sup> The FAFEN Secretariat was among a large list of recipients in a series of mass email messages from MQM's Communication and Media Management Wing on Election Day reporting violent incidents against MQM in almost 90 polling stations in eight Karachi constituencies, allegedly perpetrated by PPP supporters in 44 polling stations and ANP supporters in 18 polling stations.

- [c] Empowered polling station personnel with guarantees of their safety to prevent polling agents from exceeding their mandate inside polling booths and to stop anyone from going behind secrecy screens with voters or otherwise interfering with or influencing voters.
- [d] Specific provision for election observers in electoral law and regulations, with a realistic procedure and timetable for their accreditation and penalties for anyone who interferes with the performance of their duties on Election Day.

**6. FAFEN reiterates that the ECP should make polling station results publicly available before consolidated constituency results are gazetted in order to deter and detect polling station irregularities and fraud.**

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# FAFEN Election Result Analysis - IV

Islamabad, August 8, 2008

A final set of data from 48 National Assembly constituencies gathered by the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) observers during the February 18, 2008, General Elections confirms previous findings of consistent problems at the polling station level that compromise the freedom and fairness of Pakistani elections. FAFEN reiterates that the single most important reform the Election Commission's Electoral Reforms Committee could make to end election rigging is to release the election results from each polling station immediately after the elections.

Similar problems at the polling-station level have been documented by FAFEN observers in almost every constituency around the country. Most of these problems would be deterred if the Electoral Reforms Committee, which is currently considering significant changes to the Election Law, would require that each polling station result is published promptly after the elections. This change would enable the Election Commission, candidates, and observers to detect polling station abnormalities and eliminate those polling stations from the combined results total for the constituency.

Many of the polling station problems documented by FAFEN observers take place in closely contested constituencies, where polling station irregularities could have made a difference in the outcome of the election for that seat.

FAFEN has posted its election observation data, including polling station results, from a random selection of polling stations in a total of 243 constituencies in all provinces. All data is presented in unique, easy-to-read graphs on the FAFEN website at [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org). This data was gathered by more than 18,000 FAFEN election observers during the February 18, 2008, General Election.

## 1. More than 100% Voter Turnout and “Captured” Polling Stations

FAFEN's analysis shows that in more than one-fourth of all constituencies (55 out of 243, or 23%), one or more polling stations reported that number of ballots cast exceeded the number of registered voters (>100% turnout). Moreover, in about one-third of all constituencies around the country there are polling stations with abnormally high voter turnout compared to the rest of the constituency.

The table below shows the number of constituencies in each province where one or more polling stations reported 100% or greater turnout. Many more constituencies had one or more polling stations with reported voter turnout well above average for that constituency.

Province	Number of Constituencies with one or more Polling Stations having turnout greater than 100%	Constituency Numbers
NWFP/FATA	7	NA-24, NA-25
Federal Capital	2	NA-48, NA-49
Punjab	36	NA-58, NA-60, NA-68, NA-70, NA-76, NA-77, NA-80, NA-84, NA-86, NA-92, NA-93, NA-94, NA-97, NA-98, NA-103, NA-107, NA-118, NA-120, NA-126, NA-128, NA-131, NA-132, NA-136, NA-147, NA-153, NA-161, NA-162, NA-163, NA-170, NA-171, NA-172, NA-175, NA-177, NA-188, NA-195, NA-196
Sindh	6	NA-203, NA-212, NA-216, NA-219, NA-224, NA-236
Balochistan	4	NA-262, NA-263, NA-269, NA-270
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	

In about half of these cases, most or all of the ballots cast in these polling stations are for a single candidate. This phenomenon may indicate that ballot boxes were “stuffed” with ballots for one candidate. Indeed, FAFEN election observers from virtually every constituency across the country witnessed polling station officials or other unauthorized people stamping extra ballots in one or more polling stations.

Polling stations with greater than 100% voter turnout could be described as “captured.” Polling officials at these stations could be under the influence of a candidate, political party, or other influential forces. Voters in these polling stations could be under economic duress or other illegal intimidation to vote for a single candidate. Such patterns in voting are contrary to the principles of a “free” election.

Notably, many polling stations with abnormally high voter turnout in NWFP and Baluchistan are all-Female Polling Stations. All-Female Stations may be particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud, especially in areas of the country with traditionally low female voter turnout, since very few voters or others would be present in the stations to witness the fraud.

In four constituencies of NWFP the polling places with abnormally high turnout were women's polling stations (NA-2, NA-16, NA-20, and NA-30), the same holds true for five Balochistan constituencies (NA-259, NA-260, NA-261, NA-262, and NA-270). In NA-262, four all-Female Polling Stations reported more than 160% of registered voters cast ballots, including one station with an astronomical 746% voter turnout. NA-260 is another interesting example, with five all-Female Polling Stations reporting voter turnout (79-47%) well above the highest turnout rate for any all-Male Polling Station (38%).

## **2. Women Barred From Voting**

In at least five constituencies, women were reportedly barred from voting in some polling stations. These include four constituencies in NWFP/FATA (NA-16, NA-22, NA-29, and NA-33) as well as one constituency in Sindh (NA-209).

In previous elections in Pakistan, women have reportedly been barred from voting in one or more entire constituencies, especially in NWFP. FAFEN observers did not report that women were barred from voting in every polling place from any of the 258 (out of 272) observed constituencies. Nevertheless, not even one women's polling place should be closed to voters. It is the responsibility of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to ensure that all Election Laws are enforced, including women's equal right to vote, regardless of local cultural or other factors.

FAFEN and its member organizations raised this concern about women's voting repeatedly to the ECP prior to the 2008 General Elections. The ECP Secretary gave assurances that he would issue written instructions to Assistant Election Commissioners (AECs) to take all measures necessary to ensure that women's polling stations and booths remained open and that women were allowed to vote. It is not clear whether the Secretary issued those instructions or took any other action on this issue.

## **3. Close Contests and Possible Differences in Election Results (PVT vs. Election Commission Results)**

In most of the 48 constituencies for which data is being released with this report, FAFEN observers were not permitted or not able to observe the elections in the random sample of polling stations to which they were assigned. Therefore, it is not appropriate to draw definitive statistical conclusions from the data for these constituencies. However, FAFEN's Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) of the election results in almost all of these constituencies shows the same election result as the ECP official result. This corroboration indicates the strength of the PVT methodology, despite the difficulty in accessing some of the randomly selected polling stations.

FAFEN's PVT data indicate that there are seven constituencies in this group of 48 for which the PVT result differs from the ECP result. Again, these data are not conclusive. The seven constituencies showing a difference between the PVT and ECP results are NA-20, NA-25, and NA-29 in NWFP, NA-171 and NA-180 in Punjab, and NA-262 and NA-263 in Balochistan.

All seven of these elections were relatively close races. The difference in vote count between the winning candidate and the runner-up also was relatively close in an additional seven National Assembly constituency elections. These constituencies are NA-36 in NWFP; NA-73, NA-107, NA-176, and NA-196 in Punjab; and NA-270 and NA-271 in Balochistan.

In all of these 14 closely-contested constituencies, polling-station level electoral irregularities could have had an effect on the outcome of the election. Irregularities include greater than 100% voter turnout (or clearly greater than average turnout for the constituency) and prevent-

ing women from voting. FAFEN observers reported two other kinds of irregularities from virtually every constituency in one or more polling stations, namely ballot stamping (or ballot box stuffing) and illegal influence or intimidation of voters in polling stations. All of these issues could have made a difference in any close electoral race.

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# PVT

## Parallel Vote Tabulation Results

The following pages give a sample election result analysis for one constituency as well as notes on how to read this data. For result analysis of 240 constituencies, visit [www.fafen.org](http://www.fafen.org)



## Abbreviations & Definitions

- **PSO:** FAFEN Polling Station Observer
- **ECP:** Election Commission of Pakistan
- **ME:** Margin of Sampling Error
- **SE:** Standard Error
- **PVT:** Parallel Vote Tabulation
- **PVT Estimate:** Calculation of ratio of votes for Party A out of total valid votes polled for a constituency (based on sample size and variance across polling stations)
- “**Sample: X of Y Polling Stations**”: The PVT process selected a sample of X polling stations out of a total of Y polling stations in the entire constituency
- **Rejected Ballot:** Term used by ECP to denote spoiled ballots - those marked twice, left blank, or otherwise making determination of voters’ vote choice impossible. High numbers can sometimes indicate fraud.
- **Polling Station Number:** This number is generally the official ECP polling station number. However, in some cases the polling station numbers were different on the day of the election than they were when the PSO initially found the polling station. It is possible that in some cases, the ECP number and FAFEN PSO numbers do not match.

## Interpretation of the PVT Results

- The cover page for each constituency indicates whether the PVT *estimate FOR EACH PARTY*, based on a *representative sample* of all polling stations, is statistically equivalent to the **UNOFFICIAL ECP result FOR THAT PARTY** (still available online on the ECP website as of March 2, 2008).
- The second bullet point on the cover page gives the size of the final number of polling stations observed in the constituency. This number may be somewhat smaller than the planned sample size due to problems with accreditation, security, and/or inclement weather. Loss of one to two polling stations from the original random sample in each constituency is not noted unless (a) loss of sample points reduced the sample below 25 polling stations, and/or (b) loss of sample points was non-random (e.g., occurred in a particular region/area).
- The third bullet point indicates whether there are anomalies in the polling-station level data for the constituency, whether or not the PVT and ECP results are equivalent.
- Additional points include information on qualitative findings from PSOs, which are discussed in fuller detail.

## Understanding the Constituency PVT Results (Sample NA)

- 26 polling stations in sample out of a total of 175 polling stations
- PVT Estimate and PVT Result **statistically equivalent**
- FAFEN PSOs observed that one or more booths were captured in polling stations 67, 94 and 157, the FAFEN PSOs noted that the number of votes counted far exceeded the number of voters. This indicates that the PVT margin of error is less than 150.
- One person was killed and five injured in polling station 67 when booths were captured for 1 hour and 15 minutes. The FAFEN PSO had to take refuge inside of the office of the FAFEN's mobile observers. Nazims and Union Councilors were present. PML-Q workers threw the polling station officials and party agents out of the polling station. Although the FAFEN PSOs were unable to witness the counting, **one wrote that "the result is obvious: the PML-Q got all the votes."**
- In polling station 94, **FAFEN PSOs witnessed** polling station officials stamping the ballots themselves. **Concillors were influencing the voters in both male and female polling booths.**
- In polling station 15, which had no police or other security presence, "local influentials" were voters, and PML-Q members physically detained the PPP party polling agents. The polling station closed at a total of four hours as a result of violence and did not reopen again after 2:00 p.m. During the counting process, **more votes** were counted than had been cast during the day.
- FAFEN PSOs were not permitted to fully witness the vote count process in polling station 128, but observed that the wide ballot papers used for Provincial Assembly were found in the National Assembly **ballot boxes and counted as National Assembly candidate votes**. No one in the polling station challenged this violation of ECP procedures. None of the party polling agents or election monitors were allowed to see the ballots clearly during the count.
- Turnout in excess of 100% in several polling stations.

PVT Sample Size


Indicates whether PVT and ECP estimates are the same or whether ECP estimate for one or more candidates lies OUTSIDE PVT margin of error, which means the results differ in a statistically significant way (illustrated in Figure 1).

Details that FAFEN Polling Station Observers (PSOs) or Constituency Coordinators observed about specific polling stations or constituency as a whole.

Observations about patterns in the polling-station level data presented in Figures 2 and 3.

Election observer forms compiled in custom database created by FAFEN in MySQL and PHP. All data analysis and graphics conducted using Stata 10/SE. All PVT percentages and margins of sampling error calculated using estimate of proportion for clustered samples of unequal size (see William G. Cochran. *Sampling Techniques*. Third Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977: 64-68).

## How to Read Figure I




### • What is statistical equivalence?

→ PVT vote percentages are estimates from a *sample*. All samples from a population are subject to sampling error/sampling bias, which diminishes the larger the sample size, and the lower the variance in the number being calculated (in this case, the number of votes for each party). If there are high numbers of votes for Party A and low votes for Party B in one polling station, but high votes for B and low for A in another polling station, the variance will be very high. Every statistic (e.g., the average, mean, a ratio of votes for a party out of total votes cast) calculated from a *sample* has sampling error associated with the sample size and variance in sampled locations.

→ This error, often called the **margin of sampling error**, is a way to assess the degree of UNCERTAINTY about the precision of the estimate. This is generally calculated at what is called a 95% level of confidence, which means that 95% of random samples drawn from a population of election results with the same vote percentage for that party would fall between the upper and lower number.

## How to Read PVT Data

### How to Read Figure I, continued



→ EVEN IF THE PVT and the ECP results are different, they are *statistically equivalent* if the ECP result falls within the PVT estimate's Margin of Sampling Error (represented by the lower bound and upper numbers above and below each PVT estimate presented).


Each PVT estimate (vote ratio for a party), then, should be viewed as being an average that could be anywhere between the lower number and the upper number and **still come from the same set of election results as that presented by the ECP**.

→ If the ECP estimate is OUTSIDE of the PVT margins of error (the 95% confidence interval), the greater the difference, the more *unlikely it is that the ECP and PVT percentages come from the same set of election results - that is, it is statistically improbable that the ECP could have calculated its result from the population from which the PVT sample was drawn - it would either have had to change the result or a few polling stations not sampled would have had to have results highly anomalous from the rest of the constituency.*

### PVT Estimate and Election Commission Result, NA-203

Pakistan National Assembly Election 2008

**NOTE: Margins of Sampling Error are DIFFERENT for each candidate in each constituency and must not be compared between candidates. ME depends not only on sample size but also vote variation for that particular candidate!**



NA-203 PVT Sample: 26 of 175 Polling Stations  
PVT estimate represented by dashed column with upper and lower margin of sampling error (95% confidence interval).



# NA-249

## NA-249 Karachi-XI

To ensure observers' safety, FAFEN has replaced ECP polling station numbers with its own numbering system.

- PVT Estimate and ECP Result statistically equivalent, but PVT outcome would be different, with PPP winning by a close margin.
- There was one polling station (PS-5410) with 157% turnout and 4,420 votes cast for PPP.
- 36 polling stations in final valid PVT sample out of a total of 147 total polling stations in constituency.
- One or more booths were 'captured' in eight polling stations (5410, 5417, 5420, 5424, 5425, 5427, 5431, and 5442).
- Final vote counts exceeded the actual number of voters who were seen casting ballots at five polling stations (5410, 5420, 5424, 5427, 5431).
- In PS-5410, PS-5419, PS-5424 and PS-5431, female voters' ballot boxes were full despite little or no presence of female voters at the station.

( CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE )

Election Observer forms compiled in custom database created by FAFEN in MySQL and PHP. All data analysis and graphics conducted using Stata 10/SE. All PVT percentages and margins of sampling error calculated using estimate of proportion for clustered samples of unequal size (see William G. Cochran. *Sampling Techniques*. Third Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977: 64-68).


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## NA-249 Karachi-XI

To ensure observers' safety, FAFEN has replaced ECP polling station numbers with its own numbering system.

- Unauthorized persons were stamping ballot papers in nine polling stations: 5410, 5419, 5424, 5425, 5427 and 5431 (polling staff); 5420, 5428, and 5436 (unidentified persons).
- Voters were pressured in favor of a particular candidate or party symbol in nine polling stations: 5420, 5427, 5437 and 5439 (polling staff); 5410, 5424, 5425, 5427, and 5431 (unidentified persons).
- Armed individuals were present inside PS-5420, PS-5424, and PS-5427.
- In PS-5436, MQM and PPP workers disagreed over voters' freedom to choose freely to vote for their favored party. The conflict escalated to a physical fight between the two groups.
- FAFEN PSOs witnessed MQM casting fake votes after they 'captured' polling station 5430. A substantial number of voters were also unable to cast ballots.
- FAFEN PSOs reported that PPP workers "tried to stir up trouble" in PS-5417 after 5:00 PM. The situation was soon brought under control by police.

## PVT Estimate and Election Commission Result, NA-249 Pakistan National Assembly Election 2008




FAFEN observed 36 out of 147 total polling stations

Estimate for candidates winning 3% or more (of 5 total candidates) in dashed column framed by +/- margin of error (95% confidence)

## Turnout and Rejected Ballots in PVT Sample by Polling Station, NA-249

Percent Turnout (Votes Polled as % of Registered)




## Gender Mix and FAFEN Dummy Polling Station Number

Note: Dashed line represents AVERAGE PVT Turnout. Dummy Polling Station Numbers used for observers' safety.

To ensure observers' safety, FAFEN has replaced  
ECP polling station numbers with its own numbering system.

## Sample Constituency Result Analysis



## Glossary of FAFEN observed Constituencies

Number	Name	Number	Name	Number	Name
NA-1	Peshawar-I	NA-54	Rawalpindi-V	NA-100	Gujranwala-VI
NA-2	Peshawar-II	NA-55	Rawalpindi-VI	NA-101	Gujranwala-VII
NA-3	Peshawar-III	NA-56	Rawalpindi-VII	NA-102	Hafizabad-I
NA-4	Peshawar-IV	NA-57	Attock-I	NA-103	Hafizabad-II
NA-5	Nowshera-I	NA-58	Attock-II	NA-104	Gujrat-I
NA-6	Nowshera-II	NA-59	Attock-III	NA-105	Gujrat-II
NA-7	Charsadda-I	NA-60	Chakwal-I	NA-106	Gujrat-III
NA-8	Charsadda-II	NA-61	Chakwal-II	NA-107	Gujrat-IV
NA-9	Mardan-I	NA-62	Jhelum-I	NA-108	Mandi Bahu Din-I
NA-10	Mardan-II	NA-63	Jhelum-II	NA-109	Mandi Bahu Din-II
NA-11	Mardan-III	NA-64	Sargodha-I	NA-110	Sialkot-I
NA-12	Swabi-I	NA-65	Sargodha-II	NA-111	Sialkot-II
NA-13	Swabi-II	NA-66	Sargodha-III	NA-112	Sialkot-III
NA-14	Kohat	NA-67	Sargodha-IV	NA-113	Sialkot-IV
NA-15	Karak	NA-68	Sargodha-V	NA-114	Sialkot-V
NA-16	Hangu	NA-69	Khushab-I	NA-115	Narowal-I
NA-17	Abbottabad-I	NA-70	Khushab-II	NA-116	Narowal-II
NA-18	Abbottabad-II	NA-71	Mianwali-I	NA-117	Narowal-III
NA-19	Haripur	NA-72	Mianwali-II	NA-118	Lahore-I
NA-20	Mansehra-I	NA-73	Bhakkar-I	NA-120	Lahore-III
NA-21	Mansehra-II	NA-74	Bhakkar-II	NA-121	Lahore-IV
NA-22	Battagram	NA-75	Faisalabad-I	NA-122	Lahore-V
NA-23	Kohistan	NA-76	Faisalabad-II	NA-123	Lahore-VI
NA-24	Dera Ismail Khan	NA-77	Faisalabad-III	NA-124	Lahore-VII
NA-25	Dera Ismail Khan/Tank	NA-78	Faisalabad-IV	NA-125	Lahore-VIII
NA-26	Bannu	NA-79	Faisalabad-V	NA-126	Lahore-IX
NA-27	Lakki Marwat	NA-80	Faisalabad-VI	NA-127	Lahore-X
NA-28	Buner	NA-81	Faisalabad-VII	NA-128	Lahore-XI
NA-29	Swat-I	NA-82	Faisalabad-VIII	NA-129	Lahore-XII
NA-30	Swat-II	NA-83	Faisalabad-IX	NA-130	Lahore-XIII
NA-31	Shangla	NA-84	Faisalabad-X	NA-131	Sheikhupura-I
NA-32	Chitral	NA-85	Faisalabad-XI	NA-132	Sheikhupura/Nankana Sahib-I
NA-33	Upper Dir/Lower Dir	NA-86	Jhang-I	NA-133	Sheikhupura-II
NA-34	Lower Dir	NA-87	Jhang-II	NA-134	Sheikhupura/Nankana Sahib-II
NA-35	Malakand Protected Area	NA-88	Jhang-III	NA-135	Nankana-Sahib-I
NA-36	Tribal Area-I	NA-89	Jhang-IV	NA-136	Nankana Sahib/Sheikhupura
NA-39	Tribal Area-IV	NA-90	Jhang-V	NA-137	Nankana Sahib-II
NA-45	Tribal Area-X	NA-91	Jhang-VI	NA-138	Kasur-I
NA-46	Tribal Area-XI	NA-92	Toba Tek Singh-I	NA-139	Kasur-II
NA-48	Islamabad-I	NA-93	Toba Tek Singh-II	NA-140	Kasur-III
NA-49	Islamabad-II	NA-94	Toba Tek Singh-III	NA-141	Kasur-IV
NA-50	Rawalpindi-I	NA-95	Gujranwala-I	NA-142	Kasur-V
NA-50	Rawalpindi-I	NA-96	Gujranwala-II	NA-143	Okara-I
NA-51	Rawalpindi-II	NA-97	Gujranwala-III	NA-144	Okara-II
NA-52	Rawalpindi-III	NA-98	Gujranwala-IV	NA-145	Okara-III
NA-53	Rawalpindi-IV	NA-99	Gujranwala-V	NA-146	Okara-IV

Number	Name	Number	Name	Number	Name
NA-147	Okara-V	NA-189	Bahawalnagar-II	NA-232	Dadu-I
NA-148	Multan-I	NA-190	Bahawalnagar-III	NA-233	Dadu-II
NA-149	Multan-II	NA-191	Bahawalnagar-IV	NA-234	Sanghar-I
NA-150	Multan-III	NA-192	Rahimyar Khan-I	NA-235	Sanghar/Mirpurkhas/Umerkot
NA-151	Multan-IV	NA-193	Rahimyar Khan-II	NA-236	Sanghar-II
NA-152	Multan-V	NA-194	Rahimyar Khan-III	NA-237	Thatta-I
NA-153	Multan-VI	NA-195	Rahimyar Khan-IV	NA-238	Thatta-II
NA-154	Lodhran-I	NA-196	Rahimyar Khan-V	NA-239	Karachi-I
NA-155	Lodhran-II	NA-197	Rahimyar Khan-VI	NA-240	Karachi-II
NA-156	Khanewal-I	NA-198	Sukkur/Shikarpur-I	NA-241	Karachi-III
NA-157	Khanewal-II	NA-199	Sukkur/Shikarpur-II	NA-242	Karachi-IV
NA-158	Khanewal-III	NA-200	Ghotki-I	NA-243	Karachi-V
NA-159	Khanewal-IV	NA-201	Ghotki-II	NA-244	Karachi-VI
NA-160	Sahiwal-I	NA-202	Shikarpur	NA-245	Karachi-VII
NA-161	Sahiwal-II	NA-203	Shikarpur/Sukkur/Larkana	NA-246	Karachi-VIII
NA-162	Sahiwal-III	NA-204	Larkana	NA-247	Karachi-IX
NA-163	Sahiwal-IV	NA-205	Larkana/Kamber Shahdadkot	NA-248	Karachi-X
NA-164	Pakpattan-I	NA-206	Kamber Shahdadkot	NA-249	Karachi-XI
NA-165	Pakpattan-II	NA-208	Jacobabad	NA-250	Karachi-XII
NA-166	Pakpattan-III	NA-209	Jacobabad/Kashmore	NA-251	Karachi-XIII
NA-167	Vehari-I	NA-210	Kashmore	NA-252	Karachi-XIV
NA-168	Vehari-II	NA-211	Naushero Feroze-I	NA-253	Karachi-XV
NA-169	Vehari-III	NA-212	Naushero Feroze-II	NA-254	Karachi-XVI
NA-170	Vehari-IV	NA-213	Nawabshah-I	NA-255	Karachi-XVII
NA-171	Dera Ghazi Khan-I	NA-214	Nawabshah-II	NA-256	Karachi-XVIII
NA-172	Dera Ghazi Khan-II	NA-215	Khairpur-I	NA-257	Karachi-XIX
NA-173	Dera Ghazi Khan-III	NA-216	Khairpur-II	NA-258	Karachi-XX
NA-174	Rajanpur-I	NA-217	Khairpur-III	NA-259	Quetta
NA-175	Rajanpur-II	NA-218	Matiari/Hyderabad	NA-260	Quetta/Chagai/Nushki
NA-176	Muzaffargarh-I	NA-219	Hyderabad-I	NA-261	Pishin/Ziarat
NA-177	Muzaffargarh-II	NA-220	Hyderabad-II	NA-262	Killa Abdullah
NA-178	Muzaffargarh-III	NA-221	Hyderabad/Matiari	NA-263	Loralai/Musakhel/Barkhan
NA-179	Muzaffargarh-IV	NA-222	Tando Muhammad Khan/Hyderabad/Badin	NA-264	Zhob/Sherani-/Killa Saifullah
NA-180	Muzaffargarh-V	NA-223	Tando Allahyar/Matiari	NA-265	Sibi/Kohlu/Dera Bugti/Hernai
NA-181	Layyah-I	NA-224	Badin/Tando Muhammad Khan-I	NA-266	Nasirabad/Jaffarabad
NA-182	Layyah-II	NA-225	Badin/Tando Muhammad Khan-II	NA-267	Bolan/Jhal Magsi
NA-183	Bahawalpur-I	NA-226	Mirpurkhas/Umerkot-I	NA-268	Kalat/Mastung
NA-184	Bahawalpur-II	NA-227	Mirpurkhas/Umerkot-II	NA-269	Khuzdar
NA-185	Bahawalpur-III	NA-228	Umerkot	NA-270	Awaran/Lasbelia
NA-186	Bahawalpur-IV	NA-229	Tharparkar-I	NA-271	Kharan/Washuk/Panjgur
NA-187	Bahawalpur-V	NA-230	Tharparkar-II	NA-272	Kech/Gwadar
NA-188	Bahawalnagar-I	NA-231	Jamshoro		

## **About FAFEN**

Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) is a network of 30 civil society organizations working in various fields throughout Pakistan. FAFEN believes in democratic and just society that guarantees rights, respect and dignity to all individuals. It also believes that elections are necessary, though not sufficient, for democracy and is committed to supporting election monitoring and voter education in Pakistan that contribute to long-term civic engagement and democratic accountabilities.

FAFEN is run by a democratically elected seven-member Executive Council and is headed by its Secretary General. The main objectives of the network include:

- To observe national, provincial, and local elections nationwide during the pre-polling, polling, and post-polling periods and to report on electoral fraud, violence, and any other problems that disenfranchise voters and compromise the quality of elections
- To monitor and report on violations of the law and electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Contesting Candidates
- To promote participation of marginalized people, including women and first-time voters in democratic processes
- To reduce electoral violence by documenting incidents, raising awareness, and involving relevant stakeholders
- To monitor the post-election performance of elected representatives and institutions
- To campaign for electoral and political reforms in support of democratic governance
- To build the capacity of civil society organizations to promote democratic values